Arrangement of Business
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)
My Lords, if there is a Division in the Chamber while we are sitting, this Committee will adjourn as soon as the Division Bells are rung and resume after 10 minutes.
Sentencing Guidelines (Pre-sentence Reports) Bill
(1 day, 5 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)
My Lords, I inform the Committee that, if Amendment 1 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 4 because of pre-emption.
Amendment 1
Baroness Chakrabarti
“(4A) But sentencing guidelines may not require or prohibit the provision of a pre-sentence report by reference to an offender’s protected characteristics alone.”Member’s explanatory statement
This and other amendments in the name of Baroness Chakrabarti replace the reference in clause 1 to “different personal characteristics of an offender” with the tighter definition of “protected characteristics” in the Equality Act. It further restores some discretion to the Sentencing Council as long as guidelines do not require or prohibit pre-sentence reports on the basis of such characteristics alone.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I apologise to the Committee that I was not able to speak at Second Reading because I was unable to stay for the whole debate, but I attended a significant portion of it and I have read Hansard for the rest. I apologise as well that, subject to how long we are engaged in this Committee, I shall have to shuttle between the Moses Room and the Chamber for Committee on the Employment Rights Bill, where I also have amendments—no discourtesy is intended. Who knows, the Chair might give us a nod with her advice as to how business is going in the Chamber. We may have Divisions on the earlier business in the Chamber.
I take this opportunity to welcome my noble friend the Minister to his first Committee stage of a Bill. I am sad that this is the first Bill that he has had to grapple with. I should have liked a more auspicious Bill for him to begin with—but who knows? With the Gauke review to come, I still have high hopes for cross-party or non-party sensible approaches to sentencing, of a kind that I think we heard a little flavour of perhaps at Questions just now.
I have made no secret of the fact that I am not a fan of this Bill, either of the politics or the constitutionality of it, and I also have practical concerns about it. It is a real shame that this Bill came out of a soundbite war, essentially, about two-tier justice, and so on, which was really an extension of the appalling sights that we witnessed last summer. It is a shame that the Government felt it necessary to respond to less than thoughtful voices on all that, and it is a shame that they were unable to reach a sensible diplomatic resolution with the Sentencing Council.
Also, as a proud member of the governing party, I believe in a certain amount of affirmative action. Again, in this regard, I pay tribute to my noble friend the Minister. One reason why he is such an asset to the Government is that the Timpson brand, not just on the high street but in terms of penal reform, is such a well-respected brand, partly for its extraordinarily progressive experiment in a version of affirmative action, offering employment to people who otherwise would not get a look-in, for whom employment makes all the difference—that is, people who have been in custody. I pay all tribute to my noble friend and to his family.
The Labour Party has been a pioneer in affirmative action, with all-women shortlists and the idea that sometimes, to deal with entrenched discrimination and injustice, one has to tilt the dial and try to take some affirmative measures. In a nutshell, that is the spirit of the Lammy report. That is where I am coming from, without making the Second Reading speech that I did not make.
We are where we are, as many noble Lords said at Second Reading. So, in the spirit of good faith and attempting to improve the Bill, I have in my name Amendments 1, 5, 11 and 13 in this group, and I support all the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, and his colleagues, which I think are in the same spirit, attempting to minimise in particular any constitutional damage. Let us not throw the baby out with the bath water if we are concerned about perceptions of so-called two-tier justice; let us just get this right and make sure, of course, that people are being treated as individuals and not as ciphers for any particular group, but that their circumstances are also appropriately taken into account, which really is the whole point of a pre-sentence report in the first place.
First, in my Amendment 1, I take issue with the broad and quite vague concept of “personal characteristics” offered in the Bill and suggest that, if the Government are so concerned about this sloganistic perception of two-tiered justice, they should probably go to the tighter definitions in the Equality Act of protected characteristics on the one hand, but also not really clip the wings of the Sentencing Council too much: make sure the Sentencing Council does not clip the wings of individual sentencers on the one hand, and let individual sentencers make decisions about when they should and should not require a pre-sentence report. But this concept of personal characteristics is very vague.
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for his letter of last week, but I think that relying on Strasbourg case law about Article 14 is really not the best approach in the context of domestic law. Not that I am not a great champion of the convention, you understand; there are criteria that are useful at that kind of international law level. But at the domestic level, we should be a bit more granular and precise. In the context of looking at convicted people as individual human beings and at sentencing as an exercise in looking at those individual human beings and at what will help with rehabilitation and preventing reoffending, this very broad, vague concept that is been adopted in the Bill is a mistake and is in grave danger of shutting out the sorts of considerations that actually would be very useful when deciding in the context of rationing.
It is a shame we have to ration pre-sentence reports. Let us be clear—let me put myself on the record. I would like to have a pre-sentence report, ideally, whenever someone is going to be sentenced to a community penalty or to custody, and especially for the first time. If I am going to be told that that is totally unrealistic, so be it, but I certainly do not want their individual circumstances to be shut out of that assessment, and the Bill as currently drafted risks that. That was put incredibly well by a number of noble Lords at Second Reading and I refer colleagues to Hansard on that.
So that is why I suggest in my amendment to Clause 1 that it is one thing to say that a protected characteristic under the Equality Act should never be the reason why you definitely get a PSR or you do not get one, because we are concerned about two-tier justice and all of that—so you should not just get one because you are a woman or because you are black. But if that is part of the matrix of your general experience, knowing what we know about oversentencing and disproportionate outcomes, on the one hand, we need the tighter definition that comes with the Equality Act rather than in the case law from Article 14, and on the other hand, we should not clip the wings of the Sentencing Council too tightly.
Why should we not do that? From a constitutional point of view, the Sentencing Council plays a very important role in bridging the constitutional gap between the Executive and the legislature on the one hand, and sentences and judges on the other hand. What do I mean by that? If Parliament, with or without the initiation of the Government—it usually is on the initiation of the Government, let us be clear—wants to tell judges what to do, Parliament has vehicles for so doing. The primary vehicle is primary legislation and there is also secondary legislation. But the point of sentencing guidelines is not to do that.
The point of the guidelines is so that judges passing sentences of any level rightly and necessarily have discretion, which they must exercise in the interests of individual justice. Sentencing guidelines are about helping them structure that discretion so that we do not have a total postcode lottery and, in a sense, so that brother and sister sentencers can share their thinking about the sorts of factors they might like to have in mind before they sentence or, in this case, before they commission a pre-sentence report. That is what my first amendment is about: do not clip the wings of the Sentencing Council too tightly. Do not use vague terms that come from the jurisprudence of Article 14 rather than the tighter definitions in our established domestic legislation.
Moving on to other amendments in my name in this group, I draw the Committee’s attention to Amendment 5. This flips the dial and looks positively at the sorts of factors we would perhaps want. We have talked about what we do not want the Sentencing Council to be invoking in its guidelines because we are afraid of any suggestion that people are getting special treatment. But what about the sorts of things that ought to encourage the use of pre-sentence reports? I repeat that I would like everyone to get one but, if they have to be rationed, what sorts of factors would we actively want a judge to take into account and therefore the Sentencing Council to take into account and suggest to judges?
These factors are found in my Amendment 5, which includes
“where the sentencer believes that their own life experience is particularly far removed from that of the offender”.
We do not like to talk about this, but that was partly what the Lammy review was about. This is not an affront to people of a particular type; it is just saying that it is very hard. It is one thing to sit in judgment when you are trying to come up with positive, creative community and/or custodial sentences that are going to make things better and not worse. Maybe you should try to understand an offender that you do not understand—so, where the sentencer believes that their own life experience is particularly far removed from that of the offender.
The amendment also includes
“where the sentencer believes that an offender is a member of social group that appears to be over-represented in the prison population”.
I refer once more to the excellent Lammy report, which is how we got here in the first place. I am embarrassed, but also proud, to say that it was commissioned by a Conservative Prime Minister and written by the now Labour Foreign Secretary. It seems to be possible to have a different kind of conversation about sentencing and the criminal justice system, which I hope will continue later this week with the advent of the Gauke review.
The third area for consideration proposed by Amendment 5 is
“where the sentencer believes that an offender or their dependants may be particularly badly”
affected
“by the imposition of a community or custodial sentence”.
A famous Strasbourg judgment, Thlimmenos v Greece, makes a point about equal treatment; it is a very important Strasbourg decision. Non-discrimination is not just about treating people in the same way; it is about understanding the different needs and experiences of different people. If I require everyone coming to my restaurant or hotel to go up a steep staircase, I am shutting out anyone in a wheelchair. Thlimmenos v Greece is the landmark Strasbourg decision that said we also need to think about treating people with different experiences and needs differently in order to enforce the very important human rights principle of equal treatment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I tabled the next amendment in this group, Amendment 3, but, having had a conversation with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, I hope that we might hear from him, as I think he would be very helpful to the Committee at this point. I say that in case anyone looks at me and wonders why I am not speaking at this point.
Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for that suggestion. I hope not to detain the Committee for long. I declare some interests at the outset. When I was Lord Chief Justice, I was president of the Sentencing Council and thus responsible for appointing all its judicial members, with the concurrence of the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor appointed all the lay members with my concurrence. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, I was present at the Second Reading debate but did not speak. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, spoke, and we considered that, for the sake of all those there, one former Lord Chief Justice was probably enough.
In one way or another, all the amendments in this group seek to confine or define what is meant by the term “personal characteristics” in the Bill. As all noble Lords will have noted, the term is not defined in the Bill and, in accord with various noble Lords who have tabled amendments, my strong view is that it needs a definition. Although there is no definition in the Bill, the Explanatory Notes try to provide some further explanation. They use the term “demographic cohort” as a synonym for personal characteristics, and they contrast “personal characteristics” with “personal circumstances”, but neither of those terms is in the Bill or defined.
In the Second Reading debate, the Minister said:
“The Bill states that personal characteristics include race, religion or belief, and cultural background, but these are examples and not a comprehensive list. ‘Personal characteristics’ is intended to include a wide range of characteristics, such as sex, gender identity, physical disabilities and pregnancy status”.—[Official Report, 7/5/25; col. 1625.]
The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, explores what might be meant by “cultural background”, which is, of course, a term that came from the Sentencing Council’s draft guideline. Like others, I find it an extremely elastic and elusive concept. However, the inclusion of pregnancy status as a personal characteristic illustrates the problem caused by the lack of a statutory definition.
A few minutes later, in the same debate, the Minister said:
“A particular concern was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about how the Bill may impact on women—in particular, pregnant women … To be clear, nothing in the Bill prevents judges requesting pre-sentence reports for pregnant women, nor will it affect Court of Appeal case law, which states that a pre-sentence report is desirable in the case of pregnant or postnatal women”.—[Official Report, 7/5/25; cols. 1626-27.]
With the greatest of respect to the Government, this exposes a degree of incoherence. The Government’s view is that pregnancy is a personal characteristic. It follows that, if this Bill passes in its current form, it would be unlawful for the Sentencing Council to include it in a guideline on pre-sentence reports; and that it would thus be unlawful for the Sentencing Council to give guidance that reflects judgments of the Court of Appeal. Is that really what the Government are trying to achieve? The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, who sits directly opposite me, has an amendment to deal with that extraordinary outcome.
Although the Government have shied away from defining “personal characteristic” in the Bill, they have not had such inhibition in correspondence both to the Constitution Committee, on which I serve, and to all Peers. In a letter to all Peers, in a long section headed “Definition of ‘personal circumstances’”, the Minister explains that the European Court of Human Rights uses the term when considering, for the purposes of Article 14 discrimination, whether a person enjoys another status; the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has already referred in passing to some of the jurisprudence on that matter. However, if I may say so—in complete agreement with the Government—that term in the Strasbourg case law has no crisp definition, and it does not do so for very good reasons.
The Minister refers in his letter to jurisprudence in the House of Lords, where, in the context of Article 14, my noble and learned friend Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury—I am glad to see that he is in his place—and my noble and learned friend Lady Hale provided assistance with the meaning of “personal characteristics”. In his letter, the Minister approbates the interpretation of my noble friend Lord Neuberger, who said that
“the concept of ‘personal characteristic’ … generally requires one to concentrate on what somebody is, rather than what he is doing or what is being done to him”.
If it is the Government’s view that those wise words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger, provide the kernel of a definition for the term, “personal characteristics”, why on earth is it not in the Bill? It matters because the correspondence goes on to suggest that the observations of both the noble Lord, Lord Neuberger, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, and also, historically, Lord Steyn, would be a legitimate aid to construction to assist the Sentencing Council. I emphasise that it would not be a legitimate aid to construction should the matter ever find its way to a court—that is to say, the noble Lord’s letter, rather than the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Neuberger.
That comment, if I may respectfully say so, perhaps illustrates a faint misunderstanding in the Government. It is not only the Sentencing Council that needs to understand with clarity what the term “personal circumstances” means. All those who respond to consultation put out by the Sentencing Council must also be able to understand what it means. In these fevered times, it is not impossible that there might be a challenge to what the Sentencing Council has put in a draft guideline, and which might emerge in a final guideline. So, a court will have to—at least perhaps—interpret this phrase.
It is with that in mind that I support all or any amendments that seek to bring some clarity to what “personal circumstances” means in this context. Without a definition, I fear that the Government are storing up trouble for the future.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I have Amendments 3 and 12 in this group. Like other noble Lords, I am sure, I have found myself very torn. I basically oppose the Bill, but we are having to deal with it today at the level of detail.
I am sorry not to be able to go absolutely all the way with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, but I am worried about the term “protected characteristics”. Perhaps this is taking too short-term a view, being too aware of the baggage that the term carries at the moment, but I have a nervous reaction against using a term which is in particular legislation for a particular purpose.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, mentioned the report of the Constitution Committee, of which I am also a member, which recommended that
“the Bill should be amended to ensure appropriate legislative certainty and clarity”,
going on to say there should be
“a full definition of the ‘personal characteristics’ on the face of the Bill or … an alternative term which is clearly legally defined”,
and also commented on retrospectivity. If the Bill is intended to apply to guidelines which are already operational, this should be explicit in the Bill.
Over the weekend, I thought about another approach to this. It was too late to table it as an amendment, but as we will come back to this clause—essentially, the whole of the Bill—on Report, I thought I would float it now. I found myself increasingly intrigued by the phrase
“framed by reference to different personal characteristics”.
Does that mean that the guidelines can include some characteristics if they are not the frame for them? Does it mean framed alone or only by reference to personal characteristics? I want to get rid of the Bill entirely, as I have said, but anything that will ameliorate the effects is worth looking at.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Amendment 14 in this group, like all the others, seeks to probe and challenge the uncertainty surrounding the definition on which the whole Bill depends. I welcome the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, in that respect. I am particularly attracted by Amendment 5, which goes to the fundamentals of the problem. I hope that will get discussed in the course of our proceedings.
I am a member of the Constitution Committee, like several noble Lords present today, and I share the committee’s concerns about the legislative uncertainty and unhelpful precedent set by the inclusion and non-definition of personal characteristics. The committee said that this clause was insufficiently clear and introduced legislative uncertainty. The list of personal characteristics is, as the Government indicate in their Explanatory Note, non-exhaustive, which leaves a legislative hole. The Sentencing Council is placed under a prohibition: it must not frame guidelines by reference to different personal characteristics. But because the list is non-exhaustive, the council has no way of knowing what other personal characteristics fall within the prohibition.
It is a pretty basic principle of the rule of law that, in order that people should obey the law, they should be able to find out what the law is—but there is no way to find out what are acceptable other personal characteristics, and correspondence with Select Committees is in no way definitive in that respect. You create a body, in the form of the Sentencing Council, that is placed under a prohibition and cannot know the full extent of that prohibition. It is pretty weird—and, I think, very bad—legislative practice.
In his letter to the committee, the Minister indicates a number of things that, in his view, are not personal characteristics, including being a sole or primary carer or a victim of domestic violence. Where is the authority in the Bill to exclude those characteristics but not others, such as autism, neurodiversity or having a background of being brought up in local authority care? There is a whole number of things that might be considered personal characteristics or might not. What is the council intended to do about that?
My Amendment 14 addresses an even more confusing aspect of the personal characteristics problem. Several cases taken to appeal have set out where circumstances or characteristics should have been taken into account in deciding whether to seek a pre-sentence report: pregnancy in Thompson, 2024; modern slavery in Kurmekaj, 2024; and young offenders in Meanley, 2022—I think. A sentencing judge is expected to take account of those cases when deciding whether to seek a pre-sentence report. Of course, as the Minister will point out, the Bill does not directly impact on the court, or on the judge who is passing sentence. In any formal sense it does not change the criteria that the judge will consider while sentencing. But that is a very formal view of that matter—it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this discussion and the passing of this legislation might not have some influence on how judges view their freedom to seek pre-sentencing reports.
What can the Sentencing Council do about this? It appears to me that the effect of the Bill is that the Sentencing Council would be in trouble if it drew attention to the cases to which I have referred and sought to make judges aware that they are relevant to those particular circumstances—autism, a background of local authority care, and all sorts of other circumstances, such as being brought up on a particularly rough estate where there is known to be gangland activity and much likelihood of falling under the influence of violence if they had not carried out the offence. There are all sorts of circumstances like that which might be treated as personal characteristics, but to refer to existing cases that define circumstances in which pre-sentence reports should be used appears to be something that the Sentencing Council is precluded from doing. That does not make any sense to me at all, which is why I have drafted the amendment in that form.
I believe that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said, damage has been done to the authority of the Sentencing Council, particularly if we do not amend the Bill to make it legally coherent. The Sentencing Council sought to address a recognised and widely admitted problem about the disproportionate levels of custody sentences imposed on some sections of the community from particular backgrounds. In doing so, it unintentionally created what turned out to be a political problem, and the consequence of that is a disproportionate response from the Government and legislation, which, frankly, does not make sense and will result in legal confusion.
We ought to remember that the sentencing legislation already in existence, the Sentencing Act 2020, makes pre-sentence reports something courts should seek unless they deem it unnecessary to do so. Here we are, creating an aura of doubt around what judges should do when those very circumstances arise, which may be contributing to the disproportionate presence in our jails of people from certain backgrounds. That is careless and shows a lack of awareness of the unintended effects legislation can have. Therefore, we should amend the Bill, make it clearer and try to avoid some of those consequences.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, before I come to the substance of the debate, may I make one more plea to the Government? I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and others in their trenchant criticisms of the Bill. I conclude—and I invite the Government now, even at this late stage, to conclude—that the Bill ought not to proceed before the publication of David Gauke’s Independent Sentencing Review, expected as early as this week. It could and should be withdrawn, or at least paused, to await that report and to allow time for reflection, both on the report and on the Bill in the light of it.
The Government’s own website, in describing the terms of reference for the Gauke review, says:
“The review will provide long term solutions for our justice system by”,
and then the sixth bullet point says,
“considering whether the sentencing framework should be amended to take into account the specific needs or vulnerabilities of specific cohorts, such as young adult offenders, older offenders, and women”,
which is precisely what the in-position guideline, approved by the Sentencing Council and now largely to be prohibited by the Bill, concluded should happen.
The Bill contains a number of difficulties which are addressed in a number of the amendments proposed by noble Lords from around the Committee, all of which are well within the terms of reference of the Gauke review. The first is highlighted by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and is presented by the shortage of resources, about which we all know, which has resulted in a failure to meet the clear and uncontroversial need for judges to have the benefit of full and well-prepared pre-sentence reports for all defendants—certainly for all defendants at risk of custodial sentences. Then there is the central difficulty of the Bill’s ruling out prioritising pre-sentence reports for particular cohorts, such as black defendants, in the face of very strong evidence—cited by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti—such as that produced by the Lammy review, that black defendants are more likely to be sent to prison than their white counterparts, and more likely to be sentenced to longer terms.
The Lord Bishop of Gloucester
My Lords, I will not repeat the arguments I made at Second Reading. However, as other noble Lords have said, I still do not believe that we need this Bill—and even less so, as the noble Lord, Lord Marks, said, given that the independent sentencing review will be published imminently. That should be the means for us to deal with the underlying principles raised today, and I do not know why this is not being paused and put on hold. I am also deeply concerned that the Bill may pass in a matter of days, while we go on waiting for decisive action flowing from the Lammy report, which stands at eight years and counting.
On the specific amendment in my name, Amendment 16, I will endeavour not to repeat all the important points that other noble Lords have made. I am simply seeking to minimise the harm to the unborn child and the wider family, and I hope that the sentencing review will give the opportunity to look at all this afresh.
I am grateful to organisations that have been advocating for PSRs for pregnant women, including Level Up and Birth Companions, and academics including Dr Shona Minson. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and others, for supporting my amendment.
The Bill provides that sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports may not include provision framed by reference to an offender’s personal characteristics. It therefore removes any direction in any Sentencing Council guidelines for sentencers to obtain a PSR before sentencing a pregnant woman or a mother of a child. This means that an existing protection included in the current mitigating factor for pregnancy and the post-natal period, published in April last year, which directs sentencers to obtain a PSR before sentencing—and indeed adjourns sentencing until one is available—will now become unlawful.
In the absence of clear directions for courts to obtain a PSR for pregnant women and mothers who face a potential prison term, and whose children will be impacted by their incarceration, there is no guarantee that magistrates and judges will order PSRs for these women. The Government have put in jeopardy the now widely acknowledged need to urgently reconsider the incarceration of pregnant women and those who are primary carers of young children.
I do not want to rehearse the many reasons why incarcerating pregnant women and primary carers is dangerous, but I will give just a few key facts, which we have heard many times before. Pregnant women in prison are seven times more likely to suffer a stillbirth, twice as likely to give birth prematurely, twice as likely to give birth to a baby that needs specialist neonatal care and five times more likely to miss vital midwifery appointments due to staffing issues. Then, there are all those children deeply affected by the incarceration of their mothers and the removal of their right to family life when their mother is taken from them. Some 19 out of 20 children are forced to leave their homes when a mother goes to prison.
In 2019, the Joint Committee on Human Rights inquiry, The Right to Family Life: Children Whose Mothers Are in Prison, recommended that judges must not sentence mothers or primary carers without a pre-sentence report. It is critical that courts are directed to obtain a PSR before sentencing a pregnant woman or the mother of a dependent child.
Of all female defendants prosecuted at court, 14% were prosecuted for indictable offences. That means that the vast majority of women in court who are accused of low-level non-violent crimes are sentenced by magistrates: hard-working volunteers who nevertheless undergo less than four days of training. Women in these courts are often represented by underpaid, overworked criminal defence practitioners. Without formal guidance on PSRs, the fate of pregnant women and mothers is in the hands of people who are very dedicated but may sentence them to prison without recognising the damage this causes.
I began by saying that I did not wish to repeat arguments made at Second Reading. I must say, however, that in tabling this amendment, I hope it to be, essentially, a stop-gap measure on a misguided Bill which should not have been brought in the first place and leaves me deeply perturbed.
Baroness Bakewell of Hardington Mandeville (LD)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a member of the APPG for Gypsies, Travellers and Roma, and I apologise for not being present at Second Reading. I did, however, watch this at home on the Parliament channel.
I will speak to Amendment 11 but support the whole of this group of amendments. I am, however, in two minds about the Bill. When I listened to the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, during his opening address at Second Reading, I felt that he was right. Everyone should be treated equally; there should be no preferential treatment for some. However, I know from my past experience that equality of treatment does not come automatically to everyone. Sadly, the evidence supports this.
I state at the outset that I have no legal experience. I am not a lawyer or an expert on technical legalistic language, and I am somewhat overwhelmed by the experience around me, but I will swallow hard and continue. We have heard some pertinent contributions this afternoon about whether the words “personal characteristics” should replace “protected characteristics”, as defined in the Equality Act 2010. I hope to make the case for “protected” over “personal”.
Lord Dholakia (LD)
My Lords, I first offer my apologies for missing the Second Reading of the Bill. I was chairing another meeting at the time and was therefore absent.
I have been involved in race-relations issues since the early 1960s, which, if I may say so, was well before the Lammy review on sentencing. The Lammy review highlights the stark ethnic disparity in all stages of the criminal justice system, and ably describes what happens. It explains that, from the point of arrest, through to prosecution, custodial remand, sentencing and imprisonment, ethnic-minority groups are disproportionately represented and experience disproportionately worse outcomes. The review specifically highlights the importance of pre-sentence reports in tackling such anomalies. It sheds light on individuals from backgrounds unfamiliar to the judges in this country.
My interest in the criminal justice system started in the early 1960s, when I was appointed a member of the board of visitors of HMP Lewes, a predominantly white town in Sussex. The problem was that coachloads of young black people on remand were brought from Brixton to Lewes prison, and the perception of white prison officers was that they were all criminals. It took me quite an effort to convince staff that bringing black people such as doctors, dentists, teachers and technologists into prisons as visitors would demonstrate that they provided a valuable service to the community. I was not surprised by the limited knowledge about different communities within our country and the complete lack of understanding about them. I was well aware that the race relations adviser in the Home Office at the time was stopped and searched at least 35 times when he was driving his car to work or other engagements. That was the situation in those days.
Years later, a parole system review was set up by Douglas Hurd, the Home Secretary, under Lord Carlisle of Bucklow, and I was appointed a member. In the course of our visits to the United States, I was astonished to see the number of black faces in prison. One of the members of the review team was Roger Hood, director of criminological research at Oxford University, and we both came to a conclusion about the need for systematic research so that we did not end up with predominantly black prisons in the United Kingdom. On our return, we approached the Commission for Racial Equality for funding, and it was granted.
We had serious problems with ethnic statistics, which were not kept, except by police forces. We looked at nearly 4,000 cases that had gone through the West Midlands courts, so there was no instance of influencing an ongoing process. In addition, the research looked at 1,000 predominantly white cases as its controlled element. Never before was such a vast research project undertaken. With ethnic data available from police files, and using over 80 sentencing variables, later reduced to about 20, the results were startling. The study revealed a complex pattern of racial disparities influencing variations in the use of custody, sentence length and alternative punishments. It challenged the need to eliminate racial bias from sentencing practices. This was the first major study to examine whether race is a factor in influencing the crown courts in England.
One thing I failed to report was that, when we looked at the statistics of the 4,000 cases before us, we not only identified the discrepancies in the sentencing process itself but were able to identify the judges predominantly involved in this exercise. All these factors appeared well before the Sentencing Council was established in 2010. Despite this, there are still a large number of black faces in our prisons compared with their representation in our community. The same applies to women in prison.
The Government have been wrong in the past and will be so in future. The number of ethnic minority faces will rise in our prisons. A good PSR will allow a judge and probation officer to do sentence planning, with a higher number of community sentences rather than custodial sentences. We need to understand that good sentence planning allows us proper rehabilitation and resettlement instead of planning for gloom and doom. We need a system that is effective and less costly in future.
I am also delighted to support the amendment from the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester.
I have racked my brain to find any logic as to why the Bill is necessary. It is a fact that the public and political world is conditioned by gut feeling rather than by examining the outcomes of social research. We are often reliant on prisons as a means of dealing with offenders instead of assisting reforms. There is a crying need to give priority to crime prevention and diverting offenders from the criminal justice system.
I often ask myself: are women’s prisons necessary? I look to our judiciary to ensure that courts should send to prison only those whose offending makes any other course of action unacceptable but, more importantly, to ensure that those sent to prison should not stay there for any longer than is absolutely necessary.
The pattern of crime changes from place to place and from generation to generation. There is ample research into the causes of crime and a good deal of information about how society could respond. I am grateful to one of my colleagues, Bela Mongia, a human rights lawyer, and Janey Starling, who has been supporting Level Up’s No Births Behind Bars campaign for a while now.
Unless we take measures of this kind now, it will be very difficult for overstretched prisons to provide regimes which vulnerable inmates need. We still continue with short sentences which serve little purpose. They are too short for sustained rehabilitation programmes but long enough for people to lose jobs and accommodation and to weaken their family ties. Most of these offenders would be better dealt with by community orders which can provide a longer period of supervision to address their offending behaviour—a point well made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks.
I have repeatedly urged Governments to legislate to make sentencing guidelines take account of the capacity of the prison system. At a time when all other parts of the system have to work within the reality of limited resources, there is no reason why sentences should be exempt from this provision.
The campaign has achieved extensive media coverage and continues to work towards an end to the imprisonment of pregnant women and mothers. It has the support of the Royal College of Midwives, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, and the Association of Child Psychotherapists.
The Sentencing Council has credited this organisation in its decision to introduce two key guidelines: a new mitigation factor for pregnancy guideline, and a new imposition of community and custodial sentences guideline. These avoid custodial sentences for pregnant women and new mothers on account of the risks.
I do not believe there are important sources within the Home Office or Justice Department who possess the expertise required in such matters. I believe the Minister is misguided in reaching a decision on these matters. It is not right to have any birth certificate which identifies a place of birth as “HM Prison”. Public opinion polling shows that the majority of people want to see pregnant women and mothers given community sentences.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
My Lords, I will speak briefly about definition, and in particular the lack of definition of “personal characteristics”. There is a possibility that the Bill could have unintended consequences for two groups that I have a particular interest in: first, people with learning disabilities and autistic people, and, secondly, mothers and their children.
On the first point, offending behaviour by people with learning disabilities and autistic people is often a consequence of environmental failures, and custodial sentences do not reduce offending for these groups. PSRs are essential because they may not be easily recognisable without a pre-sentencing report. It is quite worrying, especially at a time when it seems as if new mental health legislation may not adequately develop the community resources that are needed to keep them safe. That is one issue.
I specifically want to speak about Amendment 16, introduced by the right reverend Prelate, and agree with the points she made. I am a retired psychiatrist with a specialism in child psychiatry and psychotherapy, as well as learning disability and autism. I am concerned about the impact this may have on maternal and children’s well-being, in both the short and the long term. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, commented about innocent children, but it is much worse than that. We know unequivocally that perinatal and postnatal periods are critical to the lifelong health and well-being of the child. When mothers are sent to prison, 19 in 20 children are forced to leave their homes at that time. This is not okay.
We have plenty of evidence from developmental psychology, psychiatry and neuroscience that shows that maternal stress and separation during the perinatal period can alter a child’s developmental trajectory. The effects ripple across the child’s whole lifespan, impacting their ability to form secure relationships, regulate emotions, perform in school and thrive in adulthood. That kind of developmental trauma significantly increases a child’s own long-term risk of mental illness, future offending and substance misuse.
Baroness Hollins (CB)
I was talking about unintended consequences and the risks of a lack of clarity. I was going to end simply by urging the Minister to reflect deeply on the evidence. We just cannot afford to legislate in ways that risk compounding harm and perpetuating disadvantage.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)
My Lords, I realise that it is now 50 years since I was appointed as an assistant recorder; I was involved in sentencing for a very long time until I finally gave up. I later became a recorder, then a deputy High Court judge, and I dealt with many cases. The principle you have to apply, I think, is that the more you know, the better the sentence. For that reason, I fully support everything that has already been said by my noble friends, in particular that this Bill is completely misconceived.
In sitting here, I was trying to think of an illustration. It comes from a case that I did many years ago in the Midlands. It involved a family from south Asia. The wife of the son of the family was in an arranged marriage. She had come over from India or Pakistan—I cannot remember which—and married the son, who was a taxi driver. She could not speak a word of English. She had come over on a tourist visa, I think; in any case, there was something wrong with the visa. She became extremely fat because she ate with the family, then ate again with her husband when he had finished with his taxi business at night. So she stopped eating, and she slowly dwindled away until she was in a desperate condition. However, she was unwilling to go to the doctor. So the son took her to the doctor, but he went in himself and described her symptoms as if he was suffering from them. He got a prescription for the symptoms by pretending that he was the person who was suffering. The poor girl eventually could not walk, was incontinent and so on. She died. The son and both his parents were then charged with manslaughter. The trial took place, with the three of them charged with manslaughter, and they were all convicted. They then came up before the judge for sentencing.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I did not speak at Second Reading and for that I apologise. On this side of the Committee, we support the direction of travel of this Bill. We agree and endorse the principle that all those before the criminal courts should be treated equally and without special treatment. We have heard, however, compelling arguments from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, and other speakers about the difficulties with the drafting of this Bill and the way it is framed.
What I will say about the amendments is on the basis that, while we support the purpose of the Bill and in particular stand by our amendments in the third group—we believe they will bring to Parliament its proper role when it comes to guidelines—we see that there are issues with the terms to which these amendments are directed. Having said that, I can deal quite quickly with the amendments, without any disrespect to those who have spoken in support of them.
We believe that Amendment 1, from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would detract from the Bill. We refer to our amendments in the third group and say that what is contained there would enable Parliament to address the points the noble Baroness made in practice. Similar arguments apply to Amendment 3, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We do not favour this amendment and believe it goes too far in reversing the purpose of the Bill. We listened with great respect, as I have already said, to the arguments advanced by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, which we think have great force. We can see that there could be unforeseen and unintended—perhaps they are foreseen, but they are certainly unintended—adverse consequences. With this and the other amendments, we await with interest what the Minister has to say in reply.
We would make similar observations in respect of Amendment 4, from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and Amendment 5, which we believe, to the extent that it adds to the Bill, detracts from its message and is a move in the wrong direction. On Amendment 6, again from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, we advance the same reasons as we have done in respect of the other amendments, and his Amendment 4.
On Amendments 11 and 12, we have nothing to add to what I have said before, but we believe that the Government must address the arguments advanced to ensure that the Bill is clearly drawn and does not have unintended adverse consequences that simply make the situation worse. We invite the Government to look carefully at this and, indeed, the aims of Amendments 12 and 13, although we believe that the Bill is right to focus in the direction that it does.
The noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester also raised important specific points in relation to specific matters. Again, we will be interested to hear what the Minister has to say, but we see merit in the view expressed by the Constitution Committee, not in respect to those amendments in particular but, of course, in relation to other amendments. That is all that I propose to say at this stage in respect of this group.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for the careful consideration that they have clearly given the Bill, and I hope that I can reassure them on many, if not all, the points made. I also appreciate their kindness to me in their wise assumption that I am in the presence of some of the world’s experts on this subject, and I am not one of them—but I hope that I address all the points that noble Lords have raised.
I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Bakewell, that I am very grateful to her for the work that she does in supporting Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities, and I am happy to continue to engage with her on that subject. I have already had a meeting with the group as well.
In bringing forward the Bill, the Government are seeking to ensure that the sentencing guidelines do not lead to differential treatment before the law. To do that, the Bill prevents relevant guidelines about pre-sentence reports from referring to offenders’ different personal characteristics. A non-exhaustive list of illustrative examples of personal characteristics is included in the Bill, including race, religion or belief or cultural background. This list was developed with reference to the content of the Sentencing Council’s revised imposition guideline.
Before I set out the Government’s position, I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, for his contribution to this debate, which I will ask the team to consider fully ahead of Report.
Amendments 1, 11 and 13, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would replace reference to “personal characteristics” in Clause 1 with reference to “protected characteristics” in the Equality Act 2010. We have considered the proposed change to the wording carefully and, while we understand the logic behind referring to the set of protected characteristics provided for in the Equality Act, I am not persuaded that this would meet the Government’s policy objective.
The revised imposition guideline refers to members of a “cultural minority” within its list of cohorts for which a pre-sentence report would “normally be considered necessary”. As cultural background is not a protected characteristic provided for in the Equality Act, if the Bill was to be amended in the way proposed, the council would be free to provide within its guidelines that cultural minorities received preferential access to pre-sentence reports, in turn risking differential treatment before the law. The use of the broader term “personal characteristics” in the Bill ensures that our policy intent is met and that all the issues raised by the imposition guideline are appropriately addressed. I am happy to carry on the conversation with my noble friend and look forward to our meeting later this week. I therefore urge her not to press her amendment.
Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would remove the Bill’s current blanket restriction on sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports from referring to offender’s different personal characteristics. Instead, the amendment would require sentencing guidelines to include references to personal characteristics when they are also considered to be related to an offender’s personal circumstances. I am mindful that there has already been extensive debate in this House and in the other place about the Government’s use of the term “personal characteristics”, but I hope that it may nevertheless be helpful if I briefly summarise the Government’s approach.
The Government acknowledge that the concept of “personal characteristics” is a broad and flexible one that is not intended to have an exhaustive definition. However, to put it simply, personal characteristics refer to who or what someone is. They are things that one cannot, or should not, be expected to change; the Bill sets out some illustrative examples such as race, religion or belief, and cultural background. On the other hand, personal circumstances are more temporary and contingent. They are more about what someone is doing, what they have done or what has been done to them.
The Government completely accept that the line between characteristics and circumstances may not always be clear and that some attributes, such as pregnancy, could reasonably be described as both a characteristic and a circumstance. Ultimately, however, I must stress that the Government’s objective in bringing the Bill forward is to ensure equality before the law by preventing the Sentencing Council making guidelines that risk differential access to pre-sentence reports. The Government remain of the view that the reference to “personal characteristics” in the Bill is the most robust way of meeting this objective; I therefore urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Amendments 4 and 6, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would loosen the Bill’s restriction on sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports referring to offenders’ differential personal characteristics. It would do this by allowing sentencing guidelines to include such references where the Sentencing Council considers that this would prevent inequalities in sentencing outcomes. Although the amendments are well intentioned—I fully agree with the noble Lord on the importance of doing what we, as parliamentarians, can to tackle inequalities in outcomes across the justice system—we are not persuaded that these amendments are appropriate, for two key reasons.
First, they risk undermining the Bill’s fundamental objective of ensuring equality before the law by ensuring that sentencing guidelines do not include any provision that risks differential access to pre-sentence reports. Secondly, the Government remain of the firm view that it is for Ministers and Parliament, rather than the Sentencing Council, to consider how best to tackle disproportionate outcomes across the criminal justice system; it is not something that we should seek to address using differential treatment before the law during sentencing.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, for his speech highlighting the issues around racial bias and disproportionality in the justice system. We recognise the issues that he spoke about, but, as I have said, we believe that these are matters for policy, not the Sentencing Council, to address.
As I mentioned at Second Reading, work is continuing at pace on the review commissioned by the Lord Chancellor of the data held by the Ministry of Justice on disparities in the criminal justice system. This will be key in helping decide what we must do to address disparities; the House will be updated in due course. I hope that this reassures the noble Lord, Lord Marks, that this is an issue the Government take incredibly seriously and are determined to address, and that he will agree not to press his amendments.
I acknowledge the wider comments from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the need for legislation, including whether we could postpone this legislation until after David Gauke has published his review. I remind the Committee of the timelines. The guidelines were due to come into effect on 1 April. We sought to address this issue via constructive conversation with the Sentencing Council. As the Sentencing Council did not agree to change the guidelines, we introduced legislation to address the specific concerns that we had around equality before the law. That is why we had to act in the way we have: with primary legislation.
Amendment 5, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would provide a list of non-exhaustive examples of instances where sentencing guidelines could recommend that sentencers consider requesting pre-sentence reports. Although we have carefully considered the case for adding these criteria to the Bill, we are not persuaded that this is necessary, for two key reasons.
First, I re-emphasise that nothing in the Bill restricts sentencing guidelines from advising, in general terms, that a pre-sentence report should be sought where a further assessment of the offender’s personal circumstances would be beneficial to the court. Sentencers will therefore retain discretion to decide whether a pre-sentence report should be ordered, considering the specifics of the case before them.
Secondly, I am mindful that the revised imposition guideline already includes relevant provision that meets the spirit of this amendment, and it will be unaffected by the Bill. I agree with the Lord Chancellor’s remarks in the other place that the council “got things right” in the paragraph of the revised guideline that states:
“PSRs are necessary in all cases that would benefit from an assessment of one or more of the following: the offender’s dangerousness and risk of harm, the nature and causes of the offender’s behaviour, the offender’s personal circumstances and any factors that may be helpful to the court in considering the offender’s suitability for different sentences or requirements”.
I agree that PSRs should be used more widely. My work in supporting the Probation Service needs to go hand in hand with this ambition. I hope this reassures the noble Baroness and that she will not press her amendment.
Lord Beith (LD)
Can the Minister clarify something he has not covered? It is how we deal with things that perhaps the Government regard as personal characteristics but that are not listed in the Bill, although they could fall within the non-exhaustive character of that provision in the Bill. Is it the Government’s view that the Sentencing Council has some way of knowing what such characteristics are? Various examples have been mentioned, such as autism or having been brought up in local authority care, which I mentioned. Would the council be acting illegally if it added further personal characteristics to those it was issuing guidance about when the Government did not agree with it?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for the question. So I get the answer technically correct, I will write to him and other Members here.
Lord Carter of Haslemere (CB)
My Lords, I hope it is not inappropriate to speak; I have not tabled any amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, suggested a pause, since we are expecting the Gauke review imminently. The Sentencing Council has not so far commenced its guidelines, pending this Bill, but might it agree to continue that non-commencement until we know what the Government will do in response to the Gauke review, so that this Bill does not need to be progressed until we know exactly what the Gauke review legislation will look like? It may well overlap and possibly conflict with what is in this Bill. I just wondered whether the Sentencing Council could be persuaded to postpone its non-commencement, pausing this Bill until we know the Gauke outcome.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
The Sentencing Council was very helpful in pausing its decisions. The noble Lord is right: there are a lot of moving parts at the moment, and we are waiting with bated breath for news of publication dates. But I am aware that we also want to pursue and get on with the fact that we do not want people to be treated unequally in front of a court.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)
The Lammy report made it clear that there is inequality for certain groups because of their particular characteristics. My noble friend Lady Bakewell referred to the Gypsies. I declare an interest as a Welsh Gypsy, and I thank her for her support. What research is there to show that the obtaining of a PSR causes preferential treatment? What research is there to show that a judge will give a more lenient sentence if he has a PSR before him? Is there any and, if not, why not, before a Bill like this is brought forward? Surely the noble Lord will agree with what I said before: the more a sentencer knows about a person, the better it is and the better the sentence, both for the individual and for the community.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
We are doing a large amount of work on collecting the data to understand the issue more widely, but I will write to the noble Lord with the exact information.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)
There is no research, and this Bill has been brought forward on a premise that, from my experience, is wrong. It is that the provision of a pre-sentence report means that the judge will go easier upon the defendant. I think that is wrong and, without research, I do not see how you can bring this Bill forward.
The Lord Bishop of Gloucester
I appreciate that the Minister is in an interminable situation, but he did not actually respond to my key point, which is that there is an existing protection including the current mitigating factor for pregnancy. I drew attention to what was published in April last year, which already directs sentencers to obtain a PSR before sentencing and to adjourn sentencing until one is available, but this Bill is now making that unlawful. That is my key point.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
Again, I apologise for not being too repetitive, but I am very keen on making sure that I am accurate in everything that I say. I will write to the right reverend Prelate.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to all Members of the Committee who made their very forensic and clear points about the Bill and the manifold problems with it. I am also grateful to my noble friend the Minister, who replied with about as much kindness, courtesy and elegance as it is possible to do in these very tricky circumstances. I will not be pressing my amendments today, and I am glad that he and his advisers will reflect a little more before Report, which I think they would be wise to do.
I will just leave my noble friend with one thought about the points that I made. He has spoken often about preferential treatment, and I remind him of what I said about the high steps to my restaurant or hotel. If I add a ramp, a hoist or a lift for the person in the wheelchair to gain access to a service that they would not otherwise get access to, is that preferential treatment or a genuine, progressive, liberal and even one-nation Conservative attempt to level things out a little? I know what I think, and I suspect what some other Members of this Committee might think as well, but with that I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) (CB)
My Lords, I should inform the Committee that, if Amendment 2 is agreed to, I cannot call Amendments 4, 11, 12 or 13 because of pre-emption.
Amendment 2
Baroness Hamwee
“(4A) But sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports must include provision framed by reference to the factors considered in the case of each offender (“O”) most likely to reduce offending by O.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would ensure that pre-sentence reports include information relating to reducing offending.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I will speak also to my Amendment 8 in this group. We ended the last group by using “preferential” as distinct from “different”. My Amendment 2 is intended to be a positive one. I do not think that factors considered to be most likely to reduce offending by the offender would be preferential. They might be different, but they would be different while responding to the characteristics and maybe circumstances of the offender. The Bill is negative, as some noble Lords said on the last group, and I am sure we all agree about the reoffending point. I accept that is not the only purpose of sentencing but it is perhaps most closely related to pre-sentence reports. So I suggest that that acknowledgement should go up front.
Amendment 8 is also a point of emphasis. Seeking a pre-sentence report is a matter for the court, on the basis that we have been discussing as it is now and as it will be. The Bill is about guidelines on pre-sentence reports. As I understand it, there is no restriction on the content of them—that is a matter for probation to pursue—and neither is there any restriction on what the court in any event orders. I would be very surprised if the Minister disagrees with me on any of this, but I would like to get his agreement on the record. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I have spoken at length on my amendment in the last group. My amendment here is to suggest, as I believe is completely uncontroversial, that sentencing guidelines about sentencing reports must promote greater use of such reports as part of sentencing. Whether that is a matter for the sentencing guidelines or for sentencers generally, the need for more and better pre-sentence reports is of extreme importance. I believe that everything the Minister has said on this subject since his appointment shows that the Government agree with that position. So I propose to say nothing more about that.
Amendments 3 and 8, to which my noble friend Lady Hamwee has spoken, are non-controversial. Whether they are treated as probing amendments at this stage perhaps matters little, but we are trying here to get across the principles. I do not think there is any need for me to say more on this group.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I will first deal with the two amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. We believe that Amendment 2 is unnecessary; probation officers should be left to get on with their jobs. The Bill does not prevent them addressing matters likely to reduce offending and we should have some confidence that they will share this view when it is necessary and appropriate. Why would they wish not to go down that route? That, after all, is what their job is about: preventing reoffending.
We do not believe that Amendment 8 is necessary, but we are sympathetic to where it goes. Again, this is on the basis that our amendments in group 3, which will bring the guidelines before Parliament, are accepted and acted on, so that Parliament gets to look at what is actually happening in the guidelines themselves.
Again, we are sympathetic to the aims of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but, although reports are necessary in appropriate cases, they are not necessary in every case. It is the probation officer who is best placed to alert the court in cases where a report is not proposed. A probation officer will be in court and can speak to defendants before sentencing in court.
In my experience, having sat in the court myself as a recorder for many years—and even, many years before that, having appeared in Crown Courts on quite a number of occasions—a probation officer is best placed to alert the court to the benefit of obtaining a report, or saying that they actually do not need one in a given case. However, that can be left to Parliament when it looks at the guidelines, if it gets the chance to do so.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to have the opportunity to speak about probation and reducing reoffending—topics that are very important. I would like to use this opportunity to shine a light on the important work that probation practitioners do to support the sentencing process. I hope I can reassure noble Lords about the processes that are already in place.
I will speak first to Amendment 2, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This would require the Sentencing Council to include references to the factors most likely to reduce reoffending in its sentencing guidelines on pre-sentence reports. While I cannot support this amendment, as it would remove the Bill’s prohibition on sentencing guidelines on pre-sentence reports being framed with reference to offenders’ personal characteristics, I agree that the role of probation in supporting reducing reoffending is an important one.
The purpose of a pre-sentence report is defined by section 31 of the Sentencing Code as being a report which
“is made or submitted by an appropriate officer with a view to assisting the court in determining the most suitable method of dealing with an offender”.
A completed pre-sentence report will therefore provide sentencers with an effective assessment of risk, alongside targeted assessments of individuals’ needs, by confidently articulating suitable proposals that balance the needs of public protection, punishment and the rehabilitative aspects of sentencing.
Depending on the specific circumstances of the case, the probation practitioner writing the pre-sentence report will obtain information from both the defendant and external sources in respect of mental health, drug and alcohol needs and services, accommodation, finances and youth justice contact, as well as consideration of wider circumstances that could be indicative of additional vulnerability or complexity for the defendant.
A pre-sentence report will always include an assessment of the risk the defendant poses and to whom, including the risk of serious harm and likelihood of reoffending analysis. In making the sentencing recommendation, the pre-sentence report’s author must also consider the purposes of sentencing under the Sentencing Code, including the reduction of crime, and reform and rehabilitation.
The Probation Service has always had to balance public protection with rehabilitation, and striking the right balance is a long-standing part of the culture of the service, which is reinforced by the messages and expectations set not just by senior operational leaders but by me and other Ministers. I hope I can therefore reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that rehabilitative principles have always been, and will continue to be, at the heart of the pre-sentence advice provided to courts, and that she will feel able to withdraw this amendment.
Amendment 7, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, proposes imposing a requirement on sentencing guidelines on pre-sentence reports to promote a greater use of such reports as part of sentencing. I share the noble Lord’s desire to see greater use of pre-sentence reports. As I have set out, a good PSR assesses the offender’s behaviour and the risks they pose, and recommends sentencing options tailored to those risks and needs. We know that the number of pre-sentence reports has declined, with a 44% reduction over the last decade.
There have been several reasons for this, but it may well be that judicial perceptions of probation’s capacity to deliver PSRs may influence that decision. Judicial confidence in probation is a key priority for me and for the Lord Chancellor, and I hope I can reassure noble Lords about the steps we are taking to maximise probation’s ability not just to deliver PSRs but to deliver them in a timely way and to a high quality.
First, we are continuing to invest in increasing staffing levels in probation. Last year, we recruited 1,000 new trainee probation officers, and this year we have raised that target to 1,300. That continued investment in staff is helping us fill vacancies, including in probation court teams, where last year we increased our target staffing levels.
Secondly, we are taking steps to increase the capacity of probation staff providing advice to courts. We are beginning to roll out a new digital service, prepare a case for sentence, that links to HMCTS systems and which means that listing information about upcoming cases comes straight to probation staff, rather than having to be looked up and rekeyed into the new system. This in turn will help probation court teams do the right preparation in advance, so they can identify cases in which a court is likely to need further information and have that ready on the day if the court requests a report.
We are also improving access to video-link facilities to promote greater use of remote interviewing, so that, where an offender is remanded in custody and the court adjourns for a pre-sentence report to be written, probation staff can easily carry out an interview to inform the report. Through measures such as these, we can better focus probation staff’s precious time on providing the court with the right information, rather than on chasing up data from partner agencies or having to react to court requests at short notice.
Thirdly, we are trying to maximise the different opportunities for courts to request pre-sentence reports. For example, the PSR before plea scheme allows for a pre-sentence report to be written early on in certain cases where there is an anticipated guilty plea, and it is likely that the defendant will be sentenced in the magistrates’ court.
I hope I have reassured the noble Lord about the Government’s commitment to increasing probation’s ability to provide the best possible advice to courts, and that he will be happy as a result not to press his amendment.
Amendment 8 is intended to prevent sentencing guidelines restricting the contents of a pre-sentence report or interfering with a court order. I take this opportunity to briefly reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that nothing in the Bill as currently drafted, nor sentencing guidelines themselves, will do this. Following the Bill’s passage, sentencers will retain their current discretion to decide whether to order a pre-sentence report in appropriate cases. All the Bill does is ensure that the content of sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports does not provide for differential access to pre-sentence reports for certain groups over others.
The Bill also does not impact the types of sentencing options available to the court. Sentencers will retain their discretion to impose the sentence that they consider most appropriate, based on the specifics of the individual case before them and in line with any relevant sentencing guidelines. I hope that the noble Baroness is reassured and that she will not press her amendment.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, that was the response I expected, and I thank the Minister for it. On the response from the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, I shall take the sympathy. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Sandhurst
“(4B) Sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports must be submitted to the Secretary of State by the Council and the Secretary of State must give effect to those guidelines by regulations.”
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I shall be a bit longer on this amendment than I have been hitherto. I shall speak to Amendments 10 and 17 while moving Amendment 9, which are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar.
The draft guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council could have led to an unacceptable two-tier justice system in which defendants were treated differently on the basis not of their crimes but of their racial, cultural or religious identity. Undoubtedly, this state of affairs has been damaging to public confidence in the justice system. Unfortunately, this Bill does little to address the underlying issues. It only partly addresses the problem, leaving many concerns unresolved, and it risks creating new problems down the line.
This Bill would prevent sentencing guidelines referring to personal characteristics when a court is considering whether a pre-sentence report should be requested. However, it only resolves the issue presented by these particular guidelines and does not provide Parliament with the power by regulations to amend or reject guidelines more generally, failing to prevent this or a similar situation occurring again.
The Bill is a necessary but not sufficient or adequate step in ensuring equality before the law. While a step in the right direction, it does not offer a comprehensive solution, and the amendments that we advance look to rectify this flaw. These amendments would ensure that in future sentencing guidelines on pre-sentence reports cannot simply be issued by the Sentencing Council without democratic oversight. They would require that guidelines on pre-sentence reports drafted by the council must be subject to an affirmative resolution in both Houses before they come into force as definitive guidelines. We submit that that is a basic safeguard of democratic accountability, ensuring parliamentary oversight on sensitive sentencing matters.
Without these amendments, history may repeat itself. The same council will be free to bring forward, as it wishes, ideological frameworks that Ministers will be powerless to stop before the damage is done. Had these guidelines gone unchallenged, we would now have sentencing based on identity politics, undermining public confidence in the system. Taken together, Amendments 9,10 and 17 would create an important safeguard, ensuring that no future set of guidelines in this field, at least, could bypass sufficient parliamentary scrutiny and oversight. We commend them to the House.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I understood from the noble Lord’s explanation of the amendments that this group is about parliamentary oversight. I am not clear from Amendment 9 whether the submission of guidelines to the Secretary of State is submission for approval. I am also interested in the fact that, as I read the amendment, the Secretary of State would be required to give effect to the guidelines. That raises a question: is the Secretary of State required to give effect to them whether or not she agrees them? I cannot resist this opportunity to say that we all refer to regulations as if they are a panacea but we all know that amendment to them is very rare.
Lord Burnett of Maldon (CB)
My Lords, I shall make one or two observations on this group. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, but, before anyone considers this additional process, it is important to have in mind what already exists. All guidelines that the Sentencing Council eventually issues are subject to extensive consultation—with the public consultation and with interested bodies—but, more importantly, they are subject to political consultation. That arises in two quite different contexts.
The first is that the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice are consulted. Of course, that happened in connection with this guideline, which became controversial although it was not seen as controversial by Ministers who were then in the Ministry of Justice. That is not the end of the political involvement, though, because a statutory consultee for all sentencing guidelines is the Justice Committee of the House of Commons. Again, in this particular instance, the Justice Committee was consulted. As all here know, that committee comprises Members of Parliament from a broad cross-section of parties, and, as it happens, they, too, thought it uncontroversial. So there are those two political consultees. However, that is not the end of the matter because the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor have on the Sentencing Council itself an observer who is able, on behalf of the ministry, to raise any matters of concern.
So, with respect to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and this amendment, it seems to me that upsetting the extremely carefully calibrated scheme enacted by the 2009 Act is unnecessary.
Lord Beith (LD)
My Lords, I do not recollect a regulation-making power that requires the Secretary of State to bring forward the regulations. Normally, such powers are permissive—the Secretary of State “may” bring forward regulations—or indicate an area where there must be regulations but the precise ones are brought forward at a decision by the Secretary of State.
More generally, I worry that, per the phrase used by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, this looks a bit like clipping the wings of the Sentencing Council rather than recognising that it is a valuable arm’s-length body with processes—they have just been helpfully described by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett—that ought to serve the purpose of ensuring that the Government are not blindsided by things that come from the Sentencing Council; indeed, they need not have been in this case. Going much further and introducing this fairly complex mechanism runs the risk of making the Sentencing Council appear less authoritative to those who have to take account of what it does.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, this group of amendments raises some interesting and quite difficult points. Amendments 9, 10 and 17 were introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and also proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar. On first reading, they appear to set out, albeit in a more elegant form—as one would expect, I suppose I should say—the effect of an amendment introduced in the other place by the Conservative shadow Secretary of State Robert Jenrick. Mr Jenrick’s amendment sought to give the Secretary of State—that, is the Executive—a complete veto over the guidelines proposed by the Sentencing Council. His language—I abbreviate it slightly—was that the council must
“obtain the consent of the Secretary of State before issuing sentencing guidelines as definitive guidelines”.
That is what appeared in the amendment paper for the House of Commons, to which Mr Jenrick spoke.
That ran entirely across and counter to what we say is the proper constitutional position. The starting point is that the Sentencing Council is an independent body created by statute, with the job of advising judges on sentencing and the functions that I outlined in the debate on group 1. The judges are and must remain independent, and the judicial function is an independent function that must be, and always has been, independent of the Executive and Parliament. That is not to say that there should or should not be parliamentary oversight. Parliament sets the rules; it sets the maxima for sentences, it sometimes sets the minima for sentences, and it sets the political context. But the way in which the relationship between the judiciary, the Sentencing Council and Parliament functions has been explained by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, and his explanation demonstrates the subtle interrelationship between Parliament and the judiciary in this process. It is carefully drawn, and it is very important that that careful distinction is maintained.
The language in Amendment 9 is rather different from the language in the amendment of Robert Jenrick in the other place. But it is strange and it has a strangeness built into it that my noble friend Lord Beith picked out, because Amendment 9 would provide that sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports “must be submitted” to the Secretary of State by the Sentencing Council, and the Secretary of State
“must give effect to those guidelines by regulations”.
The point that my noble friend Lord Beith made was that it is not a matter for the Secretary of State to give effect to any guidelines by regulations, or indeed to do anything else by regulations. It is we in Parliament who make regulations. Certainly, they must be laid by the Secretary of State, but then Parliament has the decision-making power. Indeed, in the further amendments laid by the noble Lords, Lord Sandhurst and Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, this is subject to the affirmative resolution. As it stands, I do not understand how the Secretary of State can be required by statute to give effect to those guidelines by regulations when it is for Parliament to accept or deny approval to such regulations.
Furthermore, it seems to me that the overall burden of the first part of Amendment 9—when it says
“must be submitted to the Secretary of State”,
followed by the implication that the Secretary of State has no option but to give effect to those guidelines—gives to the Secretary of State a power that he does not have and denies any function in the approval or the denial of the guidelines to the Sentencing Council, beyond simply proposing them to the Secretary of State.
So it is our position that Amendment 9 is in fact unconstitutional and does not work. It is for the noble Lords who have proposed it to consider how they want to proceed, but I would suggest for now that they withdraw it and come back on Report with something that at least makes constitutional sense before they go any further with this.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
Amendments 9, 10 and 17 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, would require the Sentencing Council to submit sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports to the Secretary of State, who would then be responsible for placing these guidelines before Parliament for approval.
As noble Lords will be well aware, the Lord Chancellor has been clear that this situation has highlighted that there is potentially a democratic deficit here. The Government are therefore currently reviewing the role of the Sentencing Council and its powers for developing sentencing guidelines. In doing so, we are fully mindful of the recent developments on the imposition guideline, which have brought us to debating today’s Bill.
I acknowledge and thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, for his comments. In conducting the review, the Government are particularly mindful of the special role that the council plays in bridging Parliament and the judiciary on sentencing policy and practice. There are of course significant policy and constitutional matters to carefully consider, alongside considering what recommendations arise from the wider independent sentencing review.
While I acknowledge the noble Lord’s rationale for tabling these amendments, I am not convinced that it would be proper to legislate on this in a piecemeal way, recognising that the amendments capture only sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports. I am also not convinced that using this fast-track legislation is the best way of going about this. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw this amendment, but I hope I can offer some reassurance that the Government are keeping all options on the table. Once the review of the council is complete, the Lord Chancellor and I are clear that we are willing to further legislate on this in a more comprehensive way if necessary.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate. The concerns raised today underline the vital necessity of ensuring that our justice system remains fair, impartial and subject to proper democratic accountability.
The three amendments we have just been considering seek to address what we see as a flaw in the current system: the lack of meaningful parliamentary scrutiny over sentencing guidelines that have profound implications for equality before the law. The draft guidelines produced by the Sentencing Council risked entrenching a two-tier justice system. They would have treated defendants differently based on identity rather than the merits of their case; that was unacceptable. Without these amendments, it could happen again.
I am grateful for the excursus given on the consultation process in particular by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, which was interesting and helpful. However, government must be looking forward to how we manage this process in the future, so that Parliament, if appropriate—and we believe necessary—has the last word on the sentencing guidelines. They are in part for the judges, when they have to give practical effect to what is set out in them, but the fact that the council is an independent body and consults quite widely before the guidelines are promulgated should not mean that Parliament cannot have a look at them and then step in if it believes it appropriate. That is not to tread on the constitutional independence of the courts, because it will be before any sentences are pronounced under the guidelines. It will be just a step in the process, and they will then go to the courts for implementation.
We invite the Government to look at the approach we have advanced, even if the drafting may be imperfect as it stands. The principle at stake is simple: sentencing policy is too important to be left entirely to unelected bodies. Parliament must have the final say on matters that affect the foundational principle of equality under the law. These amendments have the aim of ensuring that, at the very least, guidelines on pre-sentence reports could not come into force without the explicit approval of both Houses. That is not an unreasonable burden; it is a basic safeguard of democratic accountability.
“(13) Nothing in this section shall require the Council to issue guidance about pre-sentence reports that is not consistent with its duties under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to probe the impact of this Act on any of the Sentencing Council’s duties under the public sector equality duty.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, my two amendments in this group, Amendments 15 and 18, cover two separate topics. The first relates to the public sector equality duty and seeks to provide that:
“Nothing in this section shall require the Council to issue guidance about pre-sentence reports that is not consistent with its duties under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010”.
As your Lordships will be aware, that section provides for the public sector equality duty, which is a duty to work towards eliminating discrimination based on protected characteristics, to advance equality of opportunity and to foster good relations between those with protected characteristics and others who do not have such characteristics.
I raise this issue in Committee because it has been suggested in some quarters that the public sector equality duty might have been compromised or broken by the Sentencing Council’s proposed imposition guideline, which has now been paused. This is a probing amendment to explore what the Government consider to be the position. Our understanding is that paragraph 3 of Schedule 18 to the Equality Act disapplies the equality duty from those exercising a judicial function, or citing on behalf of someone exercising a judicial function, which would apply to the Sentencing Council, so the public sector equality duty is not engaged at all in the sentencing exercise or in the ordering or commissioning of pre-sentence reports—which is, of course, a judicial function, because it is the judge who makes the order.
It would be helpful to ensure that these discussions are not conducted in the shadow of the misunderstanding of where the public sector equality duty applies and where it does not. On the substantive point, which is independent of the jurisdictional point that I have just raised, as to whether the paused imposition guideline would have been in breach of the public sector equality duty if it applied, we would argue that a guideline that had as its plain aim the elimination of inequality in sentencing could itself be found to be discriminatory—and we would not accept that it could.
Amendment 18 is the second amendment in my name in this group. It calls for an independent review of the operation of this Bill, if it becomes an Act, within two years of its passing. In calling for this review, I suggest that it is important to keep the work of the Sentencing Council generally under review, in the light of any applicable legislation. That is particularly so if this Bill becomes law because it is likely to be overtaken, or at least supplemented, in large part by reforms to be introduced both as a result of the Gauke review that is to report extremely soon and, no doubt later, as a result of the Leveson review into the criminal courts and their wider working. There will therefore be a constant need for review to ensure that contradictions do not arise or that any such potential contradictions are eliminated between this legislation and further reforms.
On a broader basis, it is important to monitor the success or failure of the attempt to address inequality of outcomes in the sentencing process. I know that the Minister is aware of and alive to the inequality of outcomes and determined to address it. I know that he regards our objections to this Bill on the basis that it does not do so as perhaps ill founded; nevertheless, it is important to keep under review whether the Bill actually hampers the addressing of inequality of outcomes.
On the second point as to why it is important to monitor progress, the Government are dedicated and committed to ensuring that pre-sentence reports are more widely available and in future more thoroughly prepared, and the resources being applied to the Probation Service are dedicated in part to that end. Therefore, it is important to monitor the effect of any such improvement in the availability and quality of pre-sentencing reports on reducing reoffending and, ultimately, reducing the number of people in custody. That justifies having a review after two years of the operation of this Act.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
My Lords, I can be brief. On the noble Lord’s first Amendment, Amendment 15, we would not for our part want the Sentencing Council to go down the road of issuing guidance inconsistent with its duties under the Equality Act.
As for Amendment 18 and the review, we do not have a view on this matter. I note that with practically every Bill that comes before this House there is a call for a review at some point, whether it is one year, two years or five years down the road. The Sentencing Council must by now be well aware of public concerns and the concerns of legislators, and it would itself want to know how things are going. It is quite likely to call for a review if so minded. We are neutral on that topic.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
Amendment 15, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, seeks to ensure that any guidelines about pre-sentence reports issued by the Sentencing Council are fully compliant with the public sector equality duty under Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010.
I am not persuaded that this amendment is necessary, given the Bill’s key aim is to protect the principle of equal treatment before the law. It does this by removing the effect of the changes the Sentencing Council introduced in its revised imposition guideline, which provides that a pre-sentence report will “normally be considered necessary” for certain offenders, with reference to their personal characteristics, and prevents the council from reissuing guidance to the same effect.
Furthermore, nothing in the Bill impacts the Sentencing Council’s obligations to comply with the public sector equality duty in developing sentencing guidelines. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Amendment 18, also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, would require an independent review to be arranged by the Secretary of State into the changes made by Clause 1 of the Bill to sentencing guidelines about pre-sentence reports. I am mindful that a very similar amendment was tabled during the Bill’s consideration in the other place, and I do not want to repeat in full the debate there, but I hope it may be helpful if I briefly summarise the Government’s position.
While I recognise it is of course important to carefully ponder the Bill’s effects, I stress that the direct changes it makes are limited in nature. All this is about is ensuring that offenders do not receive preferential treatment regarding pre-sentence reports based on their personal characteristics. This gets to the heart of ensuring equality before the law, which is a principle which does not need to be reviewed.
To be clear, nothing in the Bill will prevent judges from requesting pre-sentence reports in cases where they ordinarily would, including in appropriate cases involving domestic abuse, young people or pregnant women.
While I therefore urge the noble Lord, Lord Marks, to withdraw this amendment, I hope that I can reassure him that there will be ample opportunity in this House to discuss matters with regard to the Sentencing Council in future, once the Lord Chancellor’s review into the wider role and powers of the Sentencing Council is complete.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I am content to withdraw the amendment at this stage and will consider further developments before Report.
Public Transport: Expansion and Electrification
Lord Teverson
To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to enable the expansion and electrification of public transport networks to meet their net-zero emissions target.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, the Government are committed to decarbonising transport in support of our national missions to kick-start economic growth and make Britain a clean energy superpower, and public transport must of course play its part. The Department for Transport is overhauling public transport services and supporting active travel so that lower-carbon options are attractive choices. Through the electrification of public transport, we will reduce carbon emissions from the fleet, improving passenger services and creating more sustainable journeys.
Lord Teverson (LD)
As the Minister will know, surface transport emissions are our largest proportion of emissions in the UK at the moment—about a quarter. The Government have done a fair bit on the buses side, which I welcome, but will they commit to 2030 being the first year when we ban new diesel buses from our roads? Will they continue the current level of funding of the zero-emission bus grant after the present funding runs out later this year?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for his question. As he will be aware, the previous Government consulted on an end date for the sale of diesel buses back in spring 2022. As he referred to, we are currently legislating in the Bus Services (No. 2) Bill to accelerate bus decarbonisation. We will be placing a requirement on operators not to use new non-zero-emission buses from a date in the future that is not earlier than 2030. This allows the sector to plan for a smooth transition to a zero-emission future.
Lord Grocott (Lab)
Has the Minister made any assessment at all of the effectiveness of the Coventry very light rail system? As its name implies, it is easier and cheaper to construct than conventional urban tramways. In particular, has any assessment been made as to the relevance of that system to possible development in other major cities in Britain?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank my noble friend for that question. He is absolutely right. In the right setting, light rail systems can be a viable and attractive alternative to heavy rail or, indeed, more bus systems. I can tell him that several regions outside London with existing or planned mass-transit systems are receiving investment through the city region sustainable transport settlements programme. This funding is providing five-year local transport capital settlements over 2022-23 to 2026-27 to eligible mayoral combined authorities, which will include Coventry, for investment in public and sustainable transport infrastructure, including light rail.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, is it mathematically and physically possible to strengthen the UK’s electricity supply system in time to meet the UK’s net-zero target?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Earl for the question. Of course, we are aware that it is important to develop greater electricity supply and infrastructure. We are confident that we can work with our partners—on transport with Network Rail and more widely with National Grid—to develop the sort of capacity of which he speaks, to develop the diesel-free, carbon-free future we are talking about.
Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)
My noble friend will recall that, despite clear undertakings, the last Conservative Government axed the proposed electrification of the Cardiff to Swansea line. Is there any prospect of that now being reconsidered?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am pleased to say that rail is already the greenest form of transport, but more is indeed needed to meet our contribution to achieving net zero by 2050. For instance, 9% of all passenger miles are covered by electric vehicles, so it accounts for only 1% of transport emissions across the sector. We are investing in electrification, particularly on the trans-Pennine route upgrade—to electrify and upgrade the main arterial route between Manchester, Huddersfield, Leeds and York. I cannot give my noble friend any commitments today, obviously, on extending the great western main line electrification, but we are working to identify other opportunities for further electrification in light of the spending view.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, what is the business case for electrification of public transport, when government policy means that we have the highest electricity prices in the developed world, a position that will only get worse if we join the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, as mooted in this morning’s deal?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I admire the noble Lord’s perspicacity in following this line of argument, but it is of course our reliance on gas from overseas that causes such fragility and variability in the cost of energy in this country.
“I believe that the struggle for decarbonised transport, clean development and clean air is as important as the struggle for clean water was in the 19th century”—
those are wise words, but they are not my own. Those are the words of Grant Shapps, the former Conservative Transport Secretary.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, what role do the Government see for hydrogen in fully decarbonising the rail network? Could alternative zero-emission options, such as hydrogen trains, be the solution where electrification is not economically or geographically viable?
Lord Katz (Lab)
My Lords, we are looking for opportunities to provide diesel-free solutions to rail travel. That includes not only electrifying more of the network but looking for infills such as bi-modes, or some of the battery trials we have seen in places such as Greenford and on Merseyrail, to supplement non-electrified routes in a carbon-free way. Hydrogen has its place in the mix, but the sector seems to be taking a mostly electric route these days.
The Lord Bishop of St Albans
My Lords, it is absolutely right that we try to move forward to decarbonise our public transport system, but many of our rural areas have quite inadequate public transport already, before we start to add that as an extra burden. Could the Minister tell us what rural-proofing is being done on this policy so that we can make sure that we are getting levelling up among rural areas?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I will start by pointing the right reverend Prelate to the Bus Services (No.2) Bill that we have discussed in the House in recent weeks. That is a huge commitment to supporting the decarbonisation of the bus fleet. That Bill will take steps to accelerate the decarbonisation of the bus fleet and invest more than £37.5 million in the rollout of more zero-emission buses. We confirmed over £1 billion of investment in buses at the Budget to support improved services across the country, including in rural areas, as well as keeping fares affordable.
Lord Snape (Lab)
My Lords, is my noble friend aware that it is more than 40 years since Sir Peter Parker, the then chairman of British Rail, recommended a rolling programme of railway electrification in this country? It would have had, as he said at the time, the twin merits of keeping together the expertise of those carrying out electrification and reducing long-term cost. Does the Minister agree with me that Sir Peter Parker was right then and he would be right now?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I absolutely agree with my noble friend that electrification is an important part of the mix in decarbonising our transport network and achieving our net-zero goals. Electrification is indeed the most widespread method of decarbonising the railway. Some 39% of the railway network is electrified but 74% of passenger vehicle kilometres travelled are electric, so we are making progress. I cannot give my noble friend any further commitments, but we are looking beyond the trans-Pennine route upgrade to identify further opportunities for electrification across the network as part of the spending review.
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, very kindly joined me in congratulating the Harrogate Bus Company on its full electrification programme. I ask the Minister: what more can be done to actually encourage bus companies around the country—particularly in rural areas—to join and produce electric buses for those that use them?
Lord Katz (Lab)
If it is not jumping on the bus bandwagon, I would like to join in both the noble Lord’s and my noble friend Lord Hendy’s congratulations on Harrogate’s achievement. We have made some amazing progress when it comes to zero-emission buses: more than 50% of new buses registered last year were zero-emission—that is a record 1,600. I am very pleased to tell the House that more than 60% of buses procured via the ZEBRA process were procured and made by UK-based manufacturers. Zero-emission buses are not just good for decarbonising transport and providing better, more reliable bus services; they are good for growth in this country, which we need to see.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, the Minister made some excellent points earlier in response to the Opposition’s query about the price of electricity. It is linked to gas prices. Does the Minister know whether the Government have any plans to delink it so that we get the true price of renewable energy?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am afraid that I am not aware of any particular plans—this strays a little outside my briefing. It is really important that we enable more green growth in transport to ensure that people have access to the sorts of transport levels that those of us who live in the capital enjoy. What we require and want, to paraphrase my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport, is brilliantly boring public transport, so that where you live does not determine what you can achieve in life.
Nuclear: Small Modular Reactors
(1 day, 5 hours ago)
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Lord Spellar
To ask His Majesty’s Government when they expect to make an announcement on the award of contracts for small modular nuclear reactors.
The Minister of State, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (Lord Hunt of Kings Heath) (Lab)
My Lords, Great British Nuclear is overseeing the small modular reactor competition for UK deployment. Following a period of detailed negotiation, bidders have now submitted final tenders, which Great British Nuclear is evaluating. Final decisions will be taken shortly.
Lord Spellar (Lab)
My Lords, I convey my best wishes to the Minister on his birthday today. Can I just press him a little further and ask him to celebrate by bringing some good news to the energy, nuclear and engineering industries and their workers and consumers by finally announcing or even giving a clearer date as to when a decision will be taken on small modular nuclear reactors? Is this to be yet another great British development lost to overseas suppliers due to bureaucratic inertia, dither and delay?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord for his congratulations. What better way to spend my birthday than answering his Question? I understand his frustration. Of course, we want to get this SMR programme over the line. Great British Nuclear is coming to the end of its evaluation process. I expect an announcement to be made within the next few weeks. I believe we have a great opportunity in this country to develop small modular reactors and a UK supply chain and to get us towards net zero, because of the essential contribution that nuclear power will play in the baseload we require.
Lord Sharma (Con)
My Lords, I welcome the fact that the Government hope to quadruple the amount of nuclear capacity by 2050—the same target that the Conservative Government had—and it is very welcome in terms of baseload. Can the Minister give us some indication of what percentage of that increase in capacity is going to come from SMRs and AMRs as opposed to big nuclear, particularly given how long it takes for decisions to be enacted?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord is referring to the road map issued by the last Government. He will know that unfortunately it was not backed up by any concrete plan or resource, so we are having to pick up the pieces. I cannot yet give him the answer on the mix between SMR and major-gigawatt plants. We are clearly alongside the SMR programme. We are moving rapidly towards final investment decision on Sizewell C, which is 3.2 gigawatts. That follows Hinkley Point C, where EDF says the first unit will open between 2029 and 2031. Over the next few months we will work very hard to look at the potential of SMRs, gigawatts and the advanced modular reactors and give industry a sense of where we are going in order to give it the security and certainty it needs to develop the supply chain we want to see.
Lord Morse (CB)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a resident of Suffolk. I mention that because to understand the context of small nuclear reactors, it is worth while understanding the progress being made—or not—on the large nuclear reactors. Is it true that the new Sizewell nuclear reactor is not yet funded and that, while it is throwing concrete around north Suffolk, there is no contractual basis for doing so?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord on living in Suffolk. Only a few weeks ago I had a meeting with Suffolk local authority leaders to discuss these very matters. He is right in the sense that, as I have already said, we are moving rapidly towards final investment decision on Sizewell C. I very much hope we will be able to get that over the line. We have committed £2.7 billion of funding through the Sizewell C devex subsidy scheme to support the project’s development during the current financial year. It consolidates the Government’s position as the majority shareholder in Sizewell C and is laying the foundations for final investment decision and, we very much hope, a 3.2-gigawatt nuclear power station that will power 6 million homes for 60 to 80 years.
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, this Government are clearly committed to making progress on SMRs, primarily to help power AI. AI will be a great consumer of power but equally has great opportunities to bring huge energy savings and efficiencies. I welcome the recently launched AI Energy Council, but are the Government doing enough to bring about the required AI energy efficiencies? I ask the Government to publish a full AI energy efficiency strategy for making the best use of AI that sets out clear targets for AI to be better than carbon-neutral before 2030.
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, we are well aware that both AI and data centres will lead to a major increase in electricity demand. We are also aware of experience in the US, and interest in this country, in linking these AI data centres to nuclear development. The EN-7, the siting policy for nuclear sites, which we are debating in your Lordships’ House on Wednesday, gives us a more flexible siting policy as a result. We are well aware of the potential. We are working very hard to consider how we can encourage this development with private sector funding. I take the noble Earl’s point about the need for us to be very clear about where we are going in this area; I very much accept that.
Baroness Winterton of Doncaster (Lab)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend the Minister for the positive discussions he has had with colleagues in the public and private sectors with regard to the manufacture of small modular reactors in South Yorkshire, but I am very aware that it is not just his department but the Treasury. Will he impress upon the Treasury the fact that the Czech and Korean Governments are forging ahead with design and technology of SMRs and that unless we get our skates on about the urgency of this, we will be buying SMRs from overseas and not making them in this country?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, I need no encouragement from my noble friend to knock on the doors of the Treasury. That is what we have been doing over the last few weeks, and having, I hope, very constructive discussions. I pay tribute to our former colleague Richard Caborn, the work he is doing in South Yorkshire in relation to the nuclear supply chain and the developments he is encouraging. I had a very good meeting with him and colleagues only a few weeks ago, and we are certainly very much apprised of the need for urgency. I am confident that we have a real opportunity in this country to develop SMRs and to see a strong UK supply chain. We should not be pessimistic. We have a great opportunity here.
The Earl of Effingham (Con)
My Lords, please allow me to quote the noble Lord, Lord Howell, former Secretary of State for Energy:
“some of us have been talking to the main SMR producers … delay and obstruction are their findings in dealing with the British Government … the order books are rapidly filling up in all other countries”.—[Official Report, 29/4/25; cols. 1095-96.]
The chief executive of Rolls-Royce has also warned that the Government run the risk that critical supply chains to support the development of SMRs will be built elsewhere if they fail to select the companies to build them by the end of June. Time really is of the essence. Will the Minister also commit to urgently addressing the regulatory, planning and environmental concerns that have caused the cost of nuclear in this country to soar?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, we inherited the regulatory and planning infrastructure that the last Government left. Indeed, we have set up a time-limited task force to look at regulation to see how, in the experience of Hinkley Point C, we can find ways, without comprising safety, to speed up the regulatory process. We have the Planning and Infrastructure Bill coming to your Lordships’ House very shortly; I look forward to the support of the Opposition in taking it through.
As for what SMR companies are saying, I have had the opportunity of meeting very many companies that wish to develop SMRs. I have been to a number of international fora. The UK’s position, which, after all, the noble Earl’s party set up—the Great British Nuclear exercise that we are currently going through—is of considerable interest. We are going through a transparent and robust process. I believe that we will have decisions very soon and that they will set this country on a very good pathway on small modular reactors.
Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, we will hear from the Cross Benches.
Lord Krebs (CB)
My Lords, can the Minister give us an assessment of the availability of the relevant skills for building SMRs? If there is going to be a skills shortage, what training programme do the Government intend to put in place?
Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, that is a very important point. We have a national strategic skills task force, and a plan. We reckon that we already need 40,000 extra people in the industry between now and 2030. We will need many more with the SMR programme. We are working very hard with the industry. I believe the kind of jobs it offers—well paid, in a stable and exciting environment—will bring people in, but we stand ready to support industry in that regard.
Science and Innovation: Alan Turing Institute
(1 day, 5 hours ago)
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Lord Clement-Jones
To ask His Majesty’s Government what steps they are taking to strengthen science and innovation following reports that the Alan Turing Institute is cutting research projects.
The Minister of State, Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (Lord Vallance of Balham) (Lab)
My Lords, the Government are protecting record levels of R&D investment, with £20.4 billion allocated in 2025-26. Through UKRI and other mechanisms, we are supporting science innovation across the UK to better deliver on the Government’s priorities and maximise the potential of UK science. The Alan Turing Institute is of course an important part of the R&D system and is currently focusing its research activities on fewer projects, in line with its refreshed Turing 2.0 strategy. The Alan Turing Institute is an independent organisation, and this realignment process is being handled internally.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I welcome today’s funding announcements. However, after a review by the EPSRC, a revised strategy and a further external review, the Turing is shutting down at least 21 science and innovation projects, three out of the four science and innovation directors have resigned, together with the chief technology officer, and at the end of last year staff sent a letter of no confidence in the leadership, saying there had been a “catastrophic decline in trust” and claiming that the viability of the institute was under question. What does all this mean for the future of the Turing, which has an enormously valuable track record and role in the AI research and innovation ecosystem? Will it continue to have a leading role in advising on AI ethics, regulation, standards and responsible innovation?
Lord Vallance of Balham (Lab)
The Alan Turing Institute was set up by six universities and now has some 65 university partners. The 2023 quinquennial review identified a number of governance and programme issues that needed to be addressed, including that the institute was spread thinly across a broad area. The Turing 2.0 strategy will focus on fewer areas, put more resource behind those projects and ensure that there is real progress to build on the strengths that the noble Lord has rightly identified. The four Alan Turing Institute challenges are in health, the environment, defence and security—in which it has a very major role to play—and fundamental AI. Going through this repositioning is a major undertaking, involving a lot of current upheaval.
Baroness Bull (CB)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a board member of UKRI. Does the Minister agree that, in terms of innovation, science research and arts and humanities research play a complementary role, and that the latter helps us to, among other things, better understand the historical context and the impact of change on society, as well as to communicate science to a broader audience? What are the Minister and the Government doing to promote and enhance arts and humanities research and to promote its value to the broader innovation economy?
Lord Vallance of Balham (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for her very important question. She may be aware that the final thing I did before leaving my job as the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser was to commission work on the creative industries by the Council for Science and Technology, for exactly that reason. Most start-ups are populated not just by technicians or scientists; they have people from arts and humanities backgrounds as well. The business of where your science fits into society is incredibly important and requires people with a multitude of skills. Therefore, we will continue to support the arts and humanities for their own sake, and for the benefit they bring to the economy through creative industries and their contribution to science and technology companies.
Baroness Morgan of Drefelin (Lab)
My Lords, the life sciences sector plays a key role in promoting innovation in the UK, and we can all be very proud of the work that it does. One of the key factors in promoting an enhanced impact is the speed at which clinical trials can be accelerated. Can the Minister say a little bit more about what progress is being made? It is quite a complex challenge to speed up clinical trials, given all the regulation, but doing so has the huge benefit of creating more jobs, contributing to growth and helping patients access new and potentially more effective drugs.
Lord Vallance of Balham (Lab)
My noble friend is quite right that clinical trials are of huge importance and benefit healthcare just from the very fact that they take place in the healthcare system, irrespective of their outcome. Historically, we have been extremely good at clinical trials in this country. Indeed, during Covid, the world’s most important clinical trial took place here: the recovery study, which was the biggest, fastest and most important study and gave definitive results. However, it is also true that our performance in commercial clinical trials has deteriorated over the past few years. We are absolutely determined to return that to where it should be, and we will be clear in a very public way about the metrics and our progress against those, to make sure that we get back to where we belong.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)
My Lords, I remind noble Lords of my interests in the register. My noble friend the Minister is the Oxford-Cambridge innovation champion, to ensure the success of this economic engine for the country as a whole. Would he agree, however, that, in addition to the brilliant research and innovation from our universities and other institutions, it is necessary to bring local, regional and national government together to support the necessary infrastructure and investment, and the skills base? Would he further agree that it is vital to make all such developments inclusive, so that nobody is left behind and the people of the local communities can benefit from it?
Lord Vallance of Balham (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness. I wonder whether she read the piece I wrote, which said something very similar. I agree entirely that this has to be inclusive innovation and that it is not about two shiny objects at the end of the line—Oxford and Cambridge—but about the corridor in its entirety. It absolutely needs to involve all the local partners in making this happen. At the end of it, it needs to improve opportunities and the economics for everybody.
Lord Markham (Con)
I am sure the Minister would agree that, if we are to continue to be the tech superpower, we need regulatory clarity, institutional continuity and competitive energy costs. Does he therefore share our concern that, in all three areas, we are losing ground?
Lord Vallance of Balham (Lab)
I agree that those areas are important. They are, of course, part of the system, including other matters such as procurement of innovation and the skills we need. On the regulatory side, the Regulatory Innovation Office is there to try to free the obstructions that exist to some innovation. The need to reduce reliance on gas and increase our ability to have a domestic supply is crucial to get energy prices to the right place. All these things are important. It is not just the initial science; it is the ability to turn that into companies that can subsequently scale.
Lord Patel (CB)
My Lords, I agree with what the Minister said about why the Alan Turing Institute ran into trouble. It was partly because of poor governance—it was thinly spread, as he said—but he also mentioned that the institute is independent and will therefore reform itself. What oversight does his department have to ensure its governance works this time?
Lord Vallance of Balham (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord. The Alan Turing Institute is indeed an independent charity, but it receives funding from the Government. Indeed, from 2024-29 it will receive £20 million a year of core funding, which is higher than the previous period, so more money is going into the institute. With that contribution, and, indeed, the contribution that comes from UKRI, there is a clear responsibility for government to ensure that this is run well and that it does indeed deliver on the changes. I met the leaders of the Alan Turing Institute this week and visited it very recently to look at some of the programmes. We will keep an eye on the progress towards this Turing 2.0 programme for transition and, indeed, the very important work that goes on, especially in defence and security.
Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interest as a former trustee of the Alan Turing Institute. Bearing in mind the outline that the Minister gave of the Turing 2.0 strategy, does he agree that the Turing could have a pivotal role in readying our public servants, but also our regulators, for the upcoming benefits of AI, and in optimising the use of AI for greater effectiveness and readiness?
Lord Vallance of Balham (Lab)
The Alan Turing Institute now has four main themes—health, environment, defence and security, and fundamental AI—but it also has the Centre for Emerging Technology and Security and the AI Standards Hub. It will continue to be a beacon for some of these areas. It is working closely with government on some of the issues that will then lead to greater adoption in the public sector, which is important. The one that has happened most recently is its work on Aardvark Weather, an AI weather forecasting system that is 10 times faster and uses a thousand times less power than conventional approaches.
Sport England: Equality Act 2010
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town
To ask His Majesty’s Government, following the decision of the Supreme Court in For Women Scotland Ltd v The Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16 on 16 April, what discussions they have had with Sport England on the meaning of “sex” in the Equality Act 2010.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Twycross) (Lab)
The Government want to ensure that everyone can fully participate in society, including in sport. We equally want to ensure that everyone can participate in a way that ensures they feel safe. DCMS has discussed the ruling with Sport England and UK Sport, and they have confirmed they are considering the implications for their guidance. As my noble friend will be aware, national governing bodies set their own policies for who can participate in domestic competitions.
Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)
I thank my noble friend for that Answer. She knows that Sport England was set up by royal charter and is in receipt of public and lottery money, and indeed has a board appointed by the Secretary of State. However, it seems to be taking its time in considering the ruling, despite the ruling very clearly saying that, where the Equality Act allows for single-sex competitions, or anything else, that should be on the basis of biological fact, as Sport England acknowledges, because the retained differences in strength, stamina and physique between born men and women affect fairness and safety. Because of those retained differences, it is important that all sports put aside for women should have biological women there. Can the Minister encourage Sport England to move with a little more speed, because I know a lot of the bodies are waiting for its advice on this?
Baroness Twycross (Lab)
It is for each sport’s national governing body to set its own policies for who can participate in domestic competitions. They are supported to do this through guidance developed by our sports council, which is considering the implications of the Supreme Court ruling. The sports councils’ equality group’s transgender inclusion guidance was jointly produced by our five home sports councils. Following the Supreme Court’s ruling, they have said that they are consulting legal experts properly to understand the implications for their guidance.
Lord Garnier (Con)
The Supreme Court’s judgment is not difficult to understand, is it?
Baroness Twycross (Lab)
I apologise. I did not hear the end of the sentence, which had the question.
Lord Garnier (Con)
I said that the judgment of the Supreme Court is not difficult to understand, is it?
Baroness Twycross (Lab)
The ruling clarifies the position under the Equality Act. It aligns with what the Government have always said about single-sex spaces. There has been interim guidance from the EHRC, and it is launching a six-week consultation on its draft updated statutory code of practice for services, public functions and associations tomorrow. I encourage all noble Lords to take part if they have views that they would like to feed in.
Baroness Hunt of Bethnal Green (CB)
My Lords, the Minister will be aware that Sport England is committed to ensuring that LGBT people get as many opportunities and as much support to get active as others, as she has confirmed. I am slightly confused by the initial snapshot provided by the EHRC, and I wonder whether she can help clarify that. It suggests that trans men can use neither the men’s changing rooms nor the women’s changing rooms, so I am wondering how a trans man might be encouraged to get involved in sport on that basis.
Baroness Twycross (Lab)
We are keen, as I know the noble Baroness is, to make sure that all people, including trans people, can take part in sport. As I have said previously, it is for sports bodies themselves to determine the specific policies, but this will be done in line with guidance that is coming out in due course, on top of the interim guidance from the EHRC, which will be launching a six-week consultation tomorrow. I hope that this will resolve some of the issues that have been raised in relation to the interim guidance. We have ongoing discussions with every relevant body, to ensure that the law is applied in a humane, just and fair way.
Baroness Burt of Solihull (LD)
His Majesty’s Government have spoken about the clarity that the Supreme Court judgment has brought to these discussions. However, I am slightly confused about the snapshot provided by the EHRC, which we have just been discussing, and the impact that it has on grass-roots sport. Does the Minister understand the instruction that, if 26 men come together to play football, a trans man cannot play, but if 24 men come together, a trans man can play? If she does understand it, would she explain it to me, please?
Baroness Twycross (Lab)
This is exactly the type of question that leads me to say that everyone with a view on this matter should please take part in the consultation which the EHRC is launching tomorrow. There is no intention for trans men or trans women to be excluded from sport. It will be for sports bodies themselves to consider how this can best be achieved, once the guidance has come out. Clearly, it is important that single-sex spaces are provided, but that we allow for respectful debate to resolve the issues that the noble Baroness has rightly raised.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, I must declare a significant conflict as a commissioner of the EHRC. I invite the Minister to clarify that it is not interim guidance that has been issued by the EHRC, as she said, but an interim update on the position, and that the consultation will open tonight, or first thing tomorrow morning, to conduct the consultation in order to draft the guidance. It would be very helpful if the Minister could clarify this, to allay the confusion both in this Chamber and in the press.
Baroness Twycross (Lab)
I am happy to confirm that that is the position. I apologise if I misled people on that count.
Baroness Thornton (Lab)
My Lords, as my noble friend the Minister has said, and as the noble Baroness has just said, the guidance at the moment has no legal standing whatever. As my noble friend will be aware, the Equality Act 2010 has always allowed trans people to be excluded from sport, and the Supreme Court judgment has not changed that. However, does my noble friend the Minister feel that it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim to exclude trans people from, for example, chess, angling and orienteering?
Baroness Twycross (Lab)
This is an important point, and I am sure something that the EHRC will consider as part of its upcoming consultation, which I am sure my noble friend and others will engage with. It will be for event organisers such as the English Chess Federation to consider the implications of the ruling and the EHRC guidance when it is published.
Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)
My Lords, there are many inclusive grass-roots sports groups across the country, open, for instance, to women and trans women, which play a vital and cherished role in supporting people’s social networks, their mental health and their physical well-being. One of the confusions caused by the Supreme Court ruling and the EHRC’s interim update is that, if these groups want to continue being inclusive, they will have to open to men as well. Does the Minister think that it might be possible to find a way for grass-roots groups to continue to meet, on whatever basis they and their members want, so that people can play the sports they enjoy without undue interference from the state?
Baroness Twycross (Lab)
The noble Lord is entirely correct that there are some really positive examples of inclusivity in this space. It is for sports bodies to determine the specific policies for all levels of their sports, recognising the need to protect fairness and safety, alongside ensuring that everyone has the opportunity to participate. The EHRC, as I have already mentioned, will be launching a consultation on its revised code of practice shortly.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, in 2022, Women in Sport found that more than four in 10 girls who took part in sport in primary school disengaged from sport as teenagers. It is believed that one factor is having male-bodied competitors against them. Some were deterred for reasons of safety and fairness, while others were deterred maybe for religious reasons. Once the Government have secured respect for the Supreme Court ruling in sport, as I hope they will, how will they encourage women and girls to participate in sport again?
Baroness Twycross (Lab)
It is really important that we do not tangle up different issues. We want everyone to be able to participate in sport in a way that ensures they feel safe. One of the ways we can do this is by ensuring that young women feel confident about their bodies—a lot of young women do not feel confident about their bodies when they are teenagers. I am keen that we do not tangle up different issues. I am happy to talk to the noble Baroness about this at greater length, should she wish.
Fair Dealing Obligations (Pigs) Regulations 2025
(1 day, 5 hours ago)
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Baroness Hayman of Ullock
That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 13 March be approved.
Relevant document: 21st Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Considered in Grand Committee on 12 May.
Recalled Offenders: Sentencing Limits
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Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the Victims’ Commissioner has warned that freeing offenders after only a 28-day recall will place victims and the wider public at an unnecessary risk of harm. Indeed, the Domestic Abuse Commissioner has said that the scheme is “simply unacceptable”. It amounts, in essence, to a transfer of a problem from prisons to the public. Does the Minister agree that he has got this proposed policy completely wrong and that the proper approach should be to address the matter of licence conditions, which are prescriptive?
If we address licence conditions sensibly, we will find that where violent offenders breach their licence conditions by reason of a further violent offence, they may be returned immediately to prison, but where a non-violent offender breaches a licence condition—for example, by not attending supervision, not going to a specified place of abode, or even by reason of a minor road traffic offence—there should simply be a points system, as there is for a driving licence. They would receive one, two and three warnings about a breach of their licence; they would get three points for one, three points for another, three points for a third; and if they persisted in breach of their licence conditions, then, like a driving licence, it would be revoked and they would return to prison. The vast majority of prisoners allowed out on licence are not violent offenders; the latter should return to complete their sentence. Does the Minister agree that the Government have gone off in the wrong direction with this proposal?
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)
My Lords, our mission is to protect the public, support victims and reduce crime. The worst thing that could happen for victims is for us entirely to run out of space in our prisons. That is forecast to happen in November, if we do not act now. The change announced last week to recall will create approximately a further 1,400 prison places and give us the time to carry out sentencing reform which, alongside prison building, will bring an end to the prison capacity crisis.
The reasons for that are clear. We have had 11 Justice Secretaries in 14 years. The previous Government built a net 500 prison places; we have 2,400 open already. Probation is a fantastic service that is really struggling. We recruited 1,000 extra probation officers last year and 1,300 this year. However, that is not all; we also have a big problem with drugs in our prisons. However, I can assure the House that offenders who pose the most risk and are actively managed by multiple agencies will be excluded from this measure, as well as those who commit serious further offences. We will publish details of that SI shortly, when we bring the measure before the House.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, limiting recalls is welcome; but these are very short sentences. During the 28-day period, will there be any attempt at rehabilitation or to find out what went wrong and what can be done to help? Will there be any follow-up? The noble Lord, rightly, supports electronic tagging. Have arrangements been made for tagging these recalled prisoners on release if they are not already subject to tagging conditions?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
The noble Lord is exactly right. When people have been in prison, it is our job to help them when they leave so that they do not come back. Unfortunately, at the moment, far too many people come back. Electronic tagging has an important role to play—and that role will increase. Tagging is not just for making sure that people can be at home on a curfew; it is so that we can track them where they are. There are also sobriety tags. So, yes, there will be a tool at our disposal when people are released after their recall.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, may I risk a thunderbolt by paying tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and—at the risk of a second thunderbolt—suggest that there is not such a big difference between what he mooted and government policy? There is a distinction between the regulatory misdemeanour of being late for a probation appointment and committing a violent crime. There is something in what he said, and in my noble friend the Minister’s response, about differentiating between a violent crime committed while on release and a minor regulatory misdemeanour that could be dealt with in the way proposed by the Government.
Lord Timpson (Lab)
My noble friend is right that there is sometimes a big distinction between the offences that people commit. It is important that those committing serious further offences and those who are managed on a MAPPA 2 or 3 are treated differently from those with lower offences. I am clear that everybody who commits an offence needs to be dealt with by the law; but they also need to have an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves so that they do not create further victims in the future.
The Lord Bishop of Gloucester
My Lords, as has been said, this stopgap measure really shines a spotlight on the whole issue of recalls, which have grown exponentially in recent years. Some 75% are for non-compliance, which is hugely detrimental to the big aim of transformed lives, which holds both victim and offender together. First, will the Minister assure us that his Majesty’s Government will look at recall in the light of the independent sentencing review, which is soon to be published? Secondly, there will be those in the process whose recall is seemingly for minor breaches, whereas in fact there may be a danger of control and fear instilled in victims of domestic abuse. We need to bring complexity into our thinking, rather than one size fits all. Will the Minister give reassurance to victims of domestic abuse that that is being taken seriously in this policy?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
The right reverend Prelate can be assured that I will take the matter of victims of domestic abuse very seriously. I am sure she will be pleased to know that we will not have to wait too long for the Gauke review to be published. Obviously, I cannot comment on what is going to be in that, but I am confident that David Gauke will recommend changes to ensure that we never run out of space again. The number of recalls is 13,000 and growing. Only six years ago, the number was half that, so clearly there is a problem. We need to address that, and we will.
Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)
My Lords, many of us applauded the appointment of the noble Lord, Lord Timpson, as the Prisons Minister, because he has such commitment to this cause and we still applaud him for the work that he is doing. Is it not obvious from the questions in your Lordships’ House that there is scope for a debate on building new prisons, on recall and on what the right reverend Prelate just mentioned about the Gauke review? We have read today that he says that 11,000 foreign nationals in our prisons will be deported; many of us will have concerns about what will happen if some of them re-enter the United Kingdom prematurely. Will the noble Lord undertake to speak to his noble friend about the possibility of a proper debate about these and associated issues?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for his generous words. It is the usual channels that will decide debates, but when it comes to prison building, we are sure that we just need to keep building more prisons. Not enough prison spaces have been built; we need to build 14,000 and to build them fast. On foreign national offenders, we have removed 15% more this year than last year. I have regular meetings with Home Office colleagues to make sure that we are doing it as productively and efficiently as possible.
Lord Woodley (Lab)
My Lords, as the Minister knows, more than 1,500 current IPP prisoners have been found safe for release by the Parole Board, only to be recalled indefinitely. This is not justice. The humane policy is to see these people resentenced and given fixed-term sentences as soon as the Parole Board says that they no longer pose a threat to the public. Can the Minister therefore explain why IPP recall prisoners are specifically excluded from the proposals on the table?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
The noble Lord is part of the IPP team, and we have a meeting later this week where we will be able to discuss things in detail with a number of noble Lords from across the House. One topic that is very dear to my heart is IPP prisoners. Whenever I go to a prison, I always seek out an IPP prisoner; I sit in their cell, and I ask them why they are there, what they are doing to get out and what we can do to support them to get out. But their risk is often far more complex. The reasons why they went to prison in the first place, while it may have been far too long ago, often mean that we need to manage them very safely in the community too. It is something of which I am well aware, and I look forward to further conversations with the noble Lord.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, as a result of the right reverend Prelate’s question, can I ask the Minister to what extent probation officers are trained to understand the distinction between minor matters that may not need recall and those that do?
Lord Timpson (Lab)
The noble and learned Baroness asks a very good question because, in my view, probation officers do the heavy lifting in the justice system. For too long, they have had too much work in their case loads. Some of that is to do with training and some with introducing technology to ensure that they have more time face to face with offenders. I have an internal review on training going on at the moment, similar to that which I did on prisons before I came into the House, and I assure all noble Lords that, if we are going to fix the problem in our prisons, we need to support our probation staff to do the job that they signed up to do when they joined the service.
Arrangement of Business
Captain of the Honourable Corps of Gentlemen-at-Arms and Chief Whip (Lord Kennedy of Southwark) (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, before we start to consider the message from the Commons on the Data (Use and Access) Bill, I remind the House of the usual courtesies and disciplines that apply to ping-pong.
We have already spent over 38 hours debating this Bill, including four and a half hours on the last round of ping-pong. This is longer than usual for the number of areas that we are considering. The issues left are, therefore, well known to Members, so I expect speeches to be kept concise and to the point. We do not need Second Reading speeches at this stage, especially on issues that are now not new to the House. I am grateful in advance to noble Lords for applying this discipline to the debate. I have asked the Whips to monitor it and intervene if necessary, if we look to be going off track.
Data (Use and Access) Bill [HL]
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17:00 - Division on Motion C1 (as an amendment to Motion C) - Ayes: 289 / Noes: 118 - Motion C1 agreed.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
That this House do not insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendment 32, on which the Commons have insisted for their Reason 32D, and do not insist on its Amendments 32B and 32C proposed to the words restored to the Bill by the Lords disagreement, to which the Commons have disagreed for the same Reason.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)
My Lords, I will also speak to Motions B and D. This first group is concerned with amendments relating to sex and gender in digital verification services, the data dictionary and scientific research. In relation to digital verification services and the data dictionary, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for his continued engagement on the issue of sex data. Although we are not dealing with amendments in lieu today, I will take this opportunity to address some misunderstandings that I fear sit behind the concerns of noble Lords which were raised in previous debates.
This Bill does not create one digital identity app or system that lists attributes such as gender that those wanting to verify information about someone are required to accept. Instead, it creates a legislative structure of standards, governance and oversight for digital verification services. It is possible to create a reusable digital identity. However, when an organisation chooses to use a DVS, it will enter into a contract with that provider; that contract will specify which attributes the organisation needs to verify and how the DVS will do it. Reusable digital identities can therefore be reused only when an organisation accepts in writing that they meet its needs. If a reusable digital identity verified gender, it could not be used to verify biological sex in cases where that was needed instead.
Where a public authority is using a DVS, it remains the case that a contract will have to be entered into. This will again set out what types of information the DVS will be able to make checks against and for what purpose. This will ensure it is explicitly clear what information is being verified when a DVS relies on public authority data released through the information gateway. I hope this reassures noble Lords that gender data could not and would not be used to verify biological sex. Similarly, individuals would not be able to reuse a digital ID verifying gender to verify biological sex.
It is for these reasons that I have laid the Motions to agree with the elected House, which removed Lords Amendments 32B, 32C, 52B and 52C. I am grateful to the Opposition for accepting the assurances offered and not tabling a Motion to insist on the previous amendments.
In response to last week’s debate, I would like to respond to concerns raised by a few noble Lords around public data when sex and gender data appear in the same field. Existing legislation already requires those processing personal data to ensure that the data they process is accurate for the purpose for which it is being used. This means that personal data processed as part of a digital verification check must be appropriate for the specific requirements of that check.
The contracts I have mentioned are a way to ensure compliance with this principle. Any personal data passed through the information gateway to DVS providers is a new instance of data processing, and therefore the data accuracy principle is reapplied. That principle requires that the personal data must not be misleading, which is of particular relevance given that public authorities will be sharing data for verification purposes. As Minister Bryant set out in the other place, if the Government identify an instance where a public authority is sharing gender data in a way that is misleading as to the fact that it cannot be used to verify biological sex, they will of course respond appropriately. In light of these reassurances and noting the clearly expressed view of the other place on these issues, I hope noble Lords will agree with Motion A.
On scientific research and Amendment 43B, I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for the time he has afforded the Government on this issue and for our productive meeting last week. I hope to reassure him and other noble Lords that there are, as we have argued throughout, sufficient protections against the potential misuse of the term “scientific research”. It is not the effect of the provisions to provide blanket approval of the reuse of personal data for AI training under the banner of scientific research.
The policy intention behind the clauses is not to enable the reuse of personal data for AI training unless it is for genuine scientific research, which is set out in the criteria in the ICO guidance. As part of its Bill implementation work, the ICO will prepare revised guidance around processing for research purposes. I expect this will cover information on compliance for data protection principles, including the fairness and purpose limitation principles. This will include the reasonable expectations of data subjects for AI model training when it constitutes genuine scientific research.
As with the previous topic, I have tabled Motion B to agree with the Commons on this issue. I am grateful to the noble Viscount for not tabling an amendment in lieu. On this basis, I hope noble Lords will also agree with Motion B and secure the continued success of the UK’s scientific research sector. I beg to move.
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom (Con)
My Lords, when I was Opposition Chief Whip in another place, I was never really sure whether it was my job to make sure that legislation was as good as possible for the good of the country or as bad as possible in order to make sure that the Government were not re-elected. With this Bill, we have done our best to make sure that this legislation is better but, I am afraid, without success.
The noble Lord, Lord Vallance, said that you could not end up with two different sources of digital verification that showed two different biological sexes. Will the noble Baroness the Minister confirm that, because of the muddle that has existed for years on this, you could have two documents that are different: one document saying one gender and another saying the other? This Bill is a missed opportunity, although I shall not seek to divide the House on Motion A.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction. In view of the remarks made a week ago by the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Vallance, who referred to government datasets from the past 15 years which mixed up sex and gender as “accurate”—or perhaps “sort of accurate”, because the exchange in the report varied slightly—do the Government defend the accuracy of those datasets, even though they were, and continue to be, muddled because no one knew what “sex” meant? Are we expected to rely on the accuracy of data which mixed up sex and gender—that is, male and female—or do the Government mean that we cannot defend those data because they were only sort of accurate? I am not entirely clear what the Government are telling us about relying on historic data.
I am also concerned about what insight this gives into what the Government intend to regard as accurate from now on. I continue to think that the Government are on quite a sticky wicket in regard to data accuracy on sex and gender and their refusal to enshrine true sex accuracy in this Bill. We continue to have a bit of a fudge, which shakes confidence in their intentions. This is a huge missed opportunity, but I realise we are not having a further vote.
I shall ask just one question. Clause 29 allows for the Secretary of State to publish supplementary codes for DVS providers. Will the Government commit to publishing a supplementary code to ensure that DVS providers understand how to verify sex accurately and avoid what has been described by the Government Benches as the “muddle” of the last 15 years?
Viscount Camrose (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this important debate. I will first speak to the issues around accurate recording of sex data before coming on to talk about scientific research.
Throughout the passage of the Bill, we have been clear that digital verification services will be a significant driver of data reliability and productivity. They are absolutely dependent on accurate recording and rigorous management of data. We supported my noble friend Lord Lucas in his original amendments on Report, and we tabled our own amendments from the Front Bench for Lords consideration of Commons amendments last week.
I am grateful to the Minister for her engagement on this issue, and I know she has taken our concerns seriously. That said, we remain concerned about the accurate recording and management of sex data, especially in light of the recent judgment of the Supreme Court. The Government must continue to remain vigilant and to take steps to ensure datasets held by the Government and arm’s-length bodies are, and continue to be, accurate.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, despite the fact this is not being pushed to a vote—I respect that, and I concede that the Government have made some clarifications, and potentially concessions, along the way in this debate—I think that the issue is not yet resolved. I call on the Government to try to solve this problem now, rather than leave it open to more years of muddle, confusion and misinterpretation, and that can happen away from here. I have noticed that the Government are not averse to using the odd statutory instrument, to which I am usually opposed; in this instance, I urge them to use a statutory instrument to sort this out. I fear that, unless they do, it will undermine trust in the new system.
To clarify, we are looking to identify datasets that have muddled up sex and gender, such as data from HMPO and the DVLA, and those that have not, such as sex registered at birth. Because of that muddle, we cannot rely on those databases. Is that not the very point? We are trying at this point to provide clarity to DVS providers. By the way, this would not in any way result in outing individual transgender people when they are using the DVS system to prove their identity or other attributes, such as their age or whatever. We are trying to ensure that each database has some consistency. If a dataset allows some people to be recorded as the wrong sex, then the whole dataset is unreliable as a source of sex data.
It was very helpful that the Government clarified in the midst of this, for example, that an official document such as a passport, whatever is written on it, cannot be proof of a change of sex; it is simply a record of the way somebody wants to be identified and is no use as a reliable source of sex data. As I have said, there are other official documents such as the driving licence where that is not the case.
I would simply urge the Government, from their own point of view, so that we do not carry on having this muddle and confusion and so that this system becomes trusted, to make sure that they sort this out, even if they will not do so here and now.
Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her engagement and for defining what genuine scientific research is. I hope very much that the AI companies, when using this extraordinary exemption, will listen to the Government, and that the Government will ensure that the policy is enforced. The trust of the people of this country would be lost if they felt that their data was being reused by AI companies simply for product enrichment and profit, rather than for genuine scientific research. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for their parties’ support.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for her introduction to the three Motions in this group.
On these Benches, we welcome the Supreme Court’s judgment on the meaning of “sex” in the Equality Act 2010. However, as Ministers have stressed—and we agree—it is paramount that we work through the implications of this judgment carefully and sensitively. As we have previously discussed, the EHRC is currently updating its statutory guidance.
Ministers have previously given assurances that they are engaged in appropriate and balanced work on data standards and data accuracy, and we accept those assurances. They have given a further assurance today about how the digital verification services framework will operate. We rely on those ministerial assurances. In summary, we believe that the previously proposed amendments were premature in the light of the EHRC guidance and that they risk undermining existing data standards work. On that basis, we support the Minister in her Motions A and D.
Turning to Motion B, the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, will not press his Amendment 43B at this stage, as he intends to accept the assurances given by Ministers. We have consistently supported the noble Viscount’s efforts to ensure that scientific research benefiting from the Bill’s provisions for data reuse is conducted according to appropriate ethical, legal and professional frameworks. The Government have given significant assurances in this area. We understand that their position is that the Bill does not alter the existing legal definition or threshold for what constitutes scientific research under UK GDPR. The Bill does not grant any new or expanded permissions for the reuse of data for scientific research purposes, and, specifically, it does not provide blanket approval for using personal data for training AI models under the guise of scientific research. The use of personal data for scientific research remains subject to the comprehensive safeguards of UK GDPR, including the requirement for a lawful basis, the adherence to data protection principles and the application of the reasonableness test, which requires an objective assessment.
The collection of assurances given during several stages of the Bill provides reassurance against the risk that commercial activities, such as training AI models purely for private gain, could improperly benefit from exemptions intended for genuine scientific research serving the public good. I very much hope that the Minister can reaffirm these specific points and repeat those assurances.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. I reassure your Lordships’ House that the Government are progressing workstreams focused on the accuracy and reliability of sex data in public authority datasets in a holistic and measured manner, as I have described in previous debates. We welcome the Supreme Court ruling, and are now working hard to consider those findings and the upcoming guidance from the equalities regulator, which will help.
I reiterate that the trust framework requires DVS providers to comply with data protection legislation, including the data accuracy principle, where they use and share personal data. That includes the creation of reusable digital identities, as well as one-off checks. If they fail to comply with these requirements, they could lose their certification. This means that the sex information listed on a passport—which, as we all know, could be a combination of biological sex, legal sex under the Gender Recognition Act and gender identity—cannot be used to verify biological sex.
The noble Lord, Lord Arbuthnot, asked whether a person can have different genders appearing on different documents. Yes, you could have both genders appearing on different documents, but they could not be used to prove biological sex.
I should say to noble Lords that there is a requirement for all this information to be recreated, reused and rechecked each time. In response to noble Lords who asked about historic data, the data will be renewed and checked under the new information that is now available.
In the majority of cases where DVS are used, there will not be a need to verify biological sex, as we have noted before, because many DVS requirements do not ask that question. Data sharing under the power created in Clause 45 will involve new processing of data, which must be in compliance with the data accuracy principle: that is, it must be accurate for the purpose for which the information will be used. Of particular relevance, given that public authorities will be sharing data for verification purposes, is the fact that data accuracy principles require that the personal data must not be misleading.
With regard to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, about supplementary codes of practice, I can confirm that the trust framework already includes requirements on data accuracy for DVS providers. That framework will, of course, be updated from time to time.
On scientific research, let me repeat my thanks to the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, for his contribution on this issue. I am glad that he was reassured by my remarks that we have been able to come to an agreeable resolution. I very much concur with the comments of the noble Lord Clement-Jones, that there has to be an ethical basis to those standards, and that point is absolutely well made.
On that basis, I hope I have reassured noble Lords. I commend the Motion to the House.
Lord Winston (Lab)
My Lords, I wonder, with regard to sexuality, whether the Minister has considered those children who are, unfortunately, born with perhaps an ovary and a testis, or with genitalia which are difficult to identify. How do those become categorised under this regulation?
The second thing is that the definition of science proposed in the Bill is not science; it is technology, and there is a big difference, as I explained in the last speech. Science involves knowledge, and we do not know that knowledge until we have the knowledge. We cannot act on that knowledge until we know what the knowledge is. That is hugely important and, as the noble Lord, Lord Vallance, who is not now in his place, said, this has the risk of holding up research which is really necessary.
Before I close, I mention just one example of this to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. He made a rather derogatory point about my comment on infection. I did not point out to him that, when I was seven, my father came home with a mild bronchial infection, which went on to be pneumonia. After six months with various inadequate antibiotics—because they did not understand the dosage—penicillin did not work and he died of a brain abscess when I was just eight. That is an example of where research is needed continuously, even when we do not know what we are doing. It is very important to understand that. This Bill and its wording do not fully define science satisfactorily, certainly to scientists.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, the first thing I would say about categorisation, as I hope I have stressed all along, is that data verification services will be required to provide accurate information. Normally, biological sex is not one of the things that most people need for their identity most of the time, but there are provisions under DVS for categorising to take account of those variations. I talked about biological sex, legal sex under the Gender Recognition Act and gender identity, for example. I hope that my noble friend has taken on board that point.
We have a fantastic scientific research community in this country, and it is our intention that it will thrive and grow. We absolutely intend to provide the proper underpinning of that, so that the scientific community does not feel that it is being undermined. I can reassure my noble friend that the provision in this Bill does not undermine the scientific research community, and it can remain confident that it will be protected going forward.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 43B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 43C.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
That this House do not insist on its Amendment 49B, to which the Commons have disagreed for their Reason 49C.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I will also speak to Motion C1.
I am conscious of the words of my noble friend the Chief Whip at the start of our proceedings, so I will try not to add unnecessarily to our ongoing discussion on the issue of AI and copyright. As both Minister Bryant and the Secretary of State have said, we share the ambition of your Lordships’ House to foster vibrant, sustainable and secure creative industries in the UK. We all want to get our response to this complicated issue right.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has twice introduced measures into this Bill that would commit the Government to prematurely implementing transparency obligations on AI developers, without consideration of the broader supporting measures that are required, nor how measures would work in practice. Twice the elected House has removed these measures, with the Government and elected Members sending a clear message that although we will take action in this area, this Bill is not the right vehicle to tackle this important problem.
Today we are debating a third iteration of the noble Baroness’s amendment. Although I am glad that the noble Baroness now agrees that the Government’s reports are the right mechanism to come to a clear view on transparency, this amendment does not consider the relevant issues together as a complete package.
I will not repeat Minister Bryant’s extensive remarks in full, but it remains the Government’s view that transparency cannot be considered in isolation. Regardless of whether an amendment says “must” or “may” in relation to enforcement, it remains the case that careful thought must be given to how transparency obligations would be enforced and by whom.
Alongside transparency, we must also consider licensing, the remuneration of rights holders, the role of technical solutions, and any other number of issues relating to copyright and AI. This is why we consulted on all these topics.
We must also keep in mind that any solution adopted by the UK must reflect the global nature of copyright, the creative sector and AI development. We cannot ring-fence the UK away from the rest of the world. This is why the reports and impact assessment that the Government have committed to publishing in their own amendments to this Bill will give proper consideration to the full range of issues in light of all available evidence.
I share the view expressed by noble Lords and Minister Bryant that this is an urgent issue which needs to be addressed. But jumping straight from reporting on four things to regulating one thing is clearly not the right approach. Piecemeal regulation such as this is not the way to prioritise the protection of 2.4 million creatives. The fact remains that we must develop this policy properly, using the evidence we are gathering from each of the 11,500 consultation responses.
We must devise a way forward that addresses these issues coherently and which works for all sectors involved. I look forward to making progress on that soon. We will bring our reports forward as quickly as we are able to, but this is too important a topic to rush. A real example of acting quickly is, as Minister Bryant announced in the other place, convening technical working groups as soon as the Bill is passed. We will get the best minds from the creative industries and the AI sector together to help us to pin down solutions that will work.
Our working groups will look in detail at how measures on transparency can be delivered and technical standards promoted and disseminated to support approaches such as watermarking, which is a focus of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose. We are ready and enthusiastic to get on with those discussions and to get workable solutions in place. Our creative industries will be best served by this approach, rather than a process that deals with only one, albeit very important, strand of a complex issue.
I understand the desire of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for these issues to be properly addressed. I accept the wish expressed by this House to send a signal to the creative industries that they are cherished and supported. We share that sentiment, and we will, through the process outlined, legislate properly on the basis of evidence and workability. There will be many opportunities for the House to be updated throughout that process.
Noting the clearly expressed view of the other place and our commitment to bring forward our proposals as quickly as we can, I urge the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, not to push Motion C1 at the end of this debate. I beg to move Motion C.
Motion C1 (as an amendment to Motion C)
Baroness Kidron
At end to insert “, and do propose Amendment 49D in lieu of Amendment 49B—
“Requirement to make provision in relation to transparency of copyrighted works used in relation to AI models
(1) The Secretary of State or the Treasury must by regulations make provision as set out in this section in relation to a trader which operates a service which—
(a) includes the making available of an artificial intelligence (AI) model, and
(b) has links with the United Kingdom within the meaning of subsection (2).
(2) The service has links with the United Kingdom if—
(a) it has a significant number of United Kingdom users, or
(b) United Kingdom users form one of the target markets for the service (or the only target market).
(3) The regulations must require relevant traders to provide copyright owners with clear, relevant, accurate and accessible information that will allow them to identify—
(a) the use of their copyright works used, and
(b) the means by which those works were accessed,
in the pre-training, training, fine-tuning and retrieval-augmented generation of the AI model, or any other data input to the AI model.
(4) The regulations may provide that the regulations apply in modified form in order that they apply proportionately to small companies and micro-entities within the meaning of the Companies Act 2006, or apply differently to UK-registered companies within the meaning of the Companies Act 2006 as opposed to companies which are not UK-registered.
(5) Regulations made under this section may make provision for enforcement of their provisions.
(6) The Secretary of State or the Treasury must lay before Parliament a draft of the statutory instrument containing regulations made under this section within six months of the publication of the report on the use of copyright works in the development of AI systems required by section (Report on the use of copyright works in the development of AI systems), and the regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure.””
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, last week, we had a decisive vote in favour of transparency for UK copyright holders—a first step towards protecting the labour and property of UK creators and creative businesses. Sadly, despite powerful interventions in the other place from all sides, including the Government Benches, those provisions were overturned on the basis of financial privilege.
Members of your Lordships’ House are rightly mindful of the primacy of the elected Chamber, so today I speak to Amendment 49D in lieu, which accepts the Government’s report on the use of copyright works in the development of AI systems already enshrined in the Bill as the mechanism by which they will come to a view on how best to frame transparency measures, while also ensuring that clear, relevant, accurate and accessible information will be provided to copyright owners so that they can identify the use of their copyright works and the means by which those works were accessed.
The amendment also takes at face value Statements made by Ministers at the Dispatch Box that creatives, UK AI companies and global brands will be in the room for discussions about copyright on no less a basis than Silicon Valley representatives. It accepts the Government’s will that they have free reign on enforcement procedures, so there are no financial commitments for enforcement as a result of this provision.
However, the amendment does require the Government to bring forward transparency regulation within six months of the report being completed. The Government have three times rejected my more comprehensive drafting, but they have also failed to bring forth something of their own. The amendment before us was drafted by an eminent lawyer with the very helpful support of the Public Bill Office.
If the Government are not willing to accept a time-limited outcome of their own report, we must ask again if the report is simply a political gesture to push tackling wide-spread theft of UK copyright into the long grass. In the real world, failing to accept a timeline means starving UK industries of the transparency they need to survive. Ministers talk about balancing the interests of AI and creative companies, as if that is reasonable. Not only are they failing to listen to UK AI companies, but the idea is a little extraordinary. No other industrial sector in the UK is required by government policy to give its property or labour to another sector that is in direct competition with it, on a compulsory basis, in the name of balance.
The Government should have leapt at this opportunity to save a much-valued and valuable UK industrial sector, central to their own industrial strategy, but they have not. The amendment before us would provide certainty that a transparency regime will be forthcoming within 18 months of Royal Assent and would signal once and for all that UK copyright law is indeed the law of the land, a fact that has now been confirmed, under duress, by Ministers at the Dispatch Box, but still they have taken no action to defend it.
This combination, giving creators, and by extension the courts, the information they need to enforce the law is the minimum viable action from the Government if we are to believe their warm words about the value of the creative sector. What you cannot see, you cannot enforce. The amendment would allow UK copyright owners to police their own property, leaving the Government to consider further legislative issues in a process that even Government Ministers admit may bear no fruit until the end of the decade.
We have had compelling speeches at each stage of our debate and, I must say, some notable acts of resistance and support, and I am deeply grateful for all of them.
Undermining copyright is a multigenerational harm because copyright not only supports today’s creators but is essential to create opportunities for the creators of the future. I want to put on record that young people refute the suggestion that emanates from government that everything is already stolen. Not only do models constantly need to be retrained, fine-tuned or augmented with up-to-date information but some people have not yet started their creative journey and some things remain to be created. It is our duty as parliamentarians to ensure that we do not squander the future of the young.
The amendment protects property rights of UK citizens and creative corporations. It asserts the right for any worker, including a creative worker, to be paid for their labour. It is also about coherence of policy. Why change benefits or implement new workers’ rights if at the same time the Government undermine copyright in the creative industry, which acts as sick pay, pension and wages across a £126 billion industrial sector?
The Government have got it wrong. They have been turned by the sweet whisperings of Silicon Valley, which has stolen—and continues to steal every day we take no action—the UK’s extraordinary, beautiful and valuable creative output. Silicon Valley has persuaded the Government that it is easier to redefine “theft” than make it pay for what it stole.
This amendment recognises the primacy of the elected House, and I urge all noble Lords, from all Benches, whatever their allegiance and whatever their whip, to stand behind our creative industries and our indigenous AI community.
I have tried everything to persuade the Government in private—everything. If the Government continue on their current intransient path with no meaningful alternatives, we will begin to see the corrosion of our powerful industry—an industry fundamental to country and democracy. It will be a tragedy, and it is entirely avoidable. It is a choice that the Government and we in this House can make today.
The UK creative industries embody our history, they hold our shared truth and tell our national story. A nation with a contested story is a troubled nation. A nation that gives away its capacity to tell its own story is a fragile place indeed. I beg to move.
The Earl of Dundee (Con)
My Lords, here is a very useful amendment proposed by the noble Baroness at this stage of the proceedings.
For the creative industries, it offers certainty that a transparency regime will be in place within 18 months of Royal Assent. Within a timetable of their own choosing, it also leaves the Government free to provide new legislation on the wider issues of personal likeness and other connected matters.
I will reiterate how this amendment, thereby already consistent with government policy, is also consistent with various articles and conventions of the human rights affiliation of the 46 member states of the Council of Europe, of which the United Kingdom remains a prominent member and of whose education committee I am a recent chairman.
First, Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to privacy, including of personal data. Article 1 of its initial protocol protects property rights, including intellectual property rights and copyright.
Secondly, Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime prohibits system interference by, for example, the transmission of computer data, while its Article 10 stipulates:
“Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights”.
Thirdly, Article 11 of the 2024 Council of Europe Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law safeguards privacy and personal data.
As has been much emphasised, the noble Baroness’s amendment not least achieves consistency with our UK tradition of protecting copyright as well—notably evident as early as the Statute of Anne 1710 granting legal protection to publishers of books.
Here and abroad, the United Kingdom must continue to assist that good practice. We are enormously grateful to the noble Baroness for this further proposed amendment. We must strongly support it.
Lord Cashman (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I speak reluctantly on the issue because, as I have said before, I am a rights holder. I refer to my register of interests. Following the speech by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, very little needs to be said. It was absolutely brilliant and searing.
I say to the Government Front Bench, as a member of the creative industry, I do not want to be told how much we are cherished and then see legislation that will begin to destroy us. We have heard much about the rights of those large rights holders, such as Paul McCartney and Elton John. I inform the House that I once received a housewarming present from Elton John, but it was 25 years ago, so it holds no influence over me.
I have thought long about this since my previous contribution. Many years ago, a dear friend of mine who is no longer with us, the wonderful character actor, Claire Davenport, had a very early and successful career. Then, like for so many other creatives, it waned. She used to ring me and say, “Chuck, I can’t believe it. My day’s been made. I’ve got a cheque”. A cheque would arrive from something that she had done maybe 10, 15 or 20 years ago. Claire, who was famous for her ample bosom, used to take the cheque, rub it across the ample cherished parts of her talent and say, “Now I can eat”.
That is the reality of what happens to people who receive repayment for the use of their creative material. If you strip that away, you are stripping away rights often from those most in need.
The creative industries have long taken on board the challenges and we have worked to find the technology to turn them around. We can do so again. This amendment is a brilliant, sensible way forward and I urge every single Member of your Lordships’ House to stand firm with the creative industries, and those yet to come, and support this amendment.
Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I support Motion C1 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I applaud her tenacity and dogged determination to make a difference to the future of our creative industries. She has fought tirelessly to get the Government to consider and accept her amendments.
This amendment, if accepted, will tell the British creative industries that the Government understand their concerns and worries for the future. Most of all, it will secure our children’s future and not sell them down the river. It will show them that there will be future opportunities for employment open to them, that their creativity will be not stolen but compensated for, and that their copyrights will be respected. I hope the Government will listen and put in place the safeguards that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is asking for. Transparency is key. Creators need to know whether they are being ripped off, and by whom, when their work is being used. Transparency will give them confidence.
I have been fortunate to have carved out a career in the creative industries over the last 55 years, and I am still benefiting from it. I feel it is my duty to ensure that those just starting off can have the opportunity to achieve the same. I urge the Government to listen to the huge concerns of those in the creative industries who look to the Government to protect their world. Our award-winning, highly acclaimed British creative industries are considered the best in the world, but they are on the brink of falling apart if they are not protected. We also need to protect the possibility of creative work for the next generation, and not steal their future—something I am sure the Government would not like to have on their conscience. I hope the Government will listen to my plea, and those of Members from around the House, and act on the noble Baroness’s vital common-sense amendment before it is too late. I declare an interest as per the register.
The Earl of Clancarty (CB)
My Lords, I have two brief points in answer to things that both the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, and Chris Bryant have said in the last week, and that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, has said today. First, when the Government say that the Bill is not the right vehicle for my noble friend Lady Kidron’s amendment, one has to profoundly disagree. Concerns of copyright are integral to the use and access of data; you cannot prise the two things apart. Let us make no mistake: this amendment belongs in the Bill, and the enacted Bill belongs in law.
The second point revolves around the principle of the argument. The Government themselves believe that there is an issue with copyright and that there should be much greater transparency. When Chris Bryant says we need to look at these things in the round and not piecemeal, I agree entirely. If we agree between ourselves that something is right, and that that right is not previously enabled in law, we should pass the law, and the principle will find the solution. We do not legalise things that are criminally wrong because they cannot at the present time be sufficiently policed. Having this in law will speed up the solution. Not having it in law inevitably means that we will drag our feet for who knows how long. That will be to the detriment of the creative industries, as creators such as Elton John know full well and are rightly angry about. We agreed on the principle that this is the right thing to do—make it law.
Lord Brennan of Canton (Lab)
My Lords, it is in some sadness that I rise again to talk on this matter. I thank Government Ministers for the very positive way in which they have engaged with my noble friends and me to discuss how to make some progress and find some kind of compromise on this matter in the Bill.
I completely accept that the Commons voted overwhelmingly to reject the amendment originally in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which we sent to them last week. As Disraeli said:
“A majority is always the best repartee”,
but it is sad if you simply rely on a majority in order to have your way when others are trying to have their say. I would welcome the Government doing a little bit more listening, because this amendment moves quite a long way towards what the Government are saying.
When the Commons debated this matter last week, a number of us went down to watch in person what the reaction was like in the Chamber. I have to say that there was a considerable amount of disquiet from the Government Benches about the direction of travel and there were a considerable number of interventions on and questions asked of the Minister, Chris Bryant. I thought he was extremely generous in the way he gave way and entertained those questions and interventions from Members of the House of Commons. He said in the course of his remarks,
“we all agree that we should introduce transparency measures”.—[Official Report, Commons, 14/5/25; col. 422.]
Those were the words that he uttered on the Floor of the House of Commons. Ministers have said to us elsewhere, and we accept, that you cannot have remuneration without transparency—unless you are an AI company, in which case you do not have to reveal what you are training your models on, even if you use the intellectual property of others. We cannot have a double standard on this matter.
My noble friend the Minister made a point that Ministers and others have made on a number of occasions: we cannot ring-fence ourselves from the rest of the world. That is true—we live in a highly interconnected world—but the whole history of copyright has been about leadership, having high standards and showing why intellectual property is a source of economic growth. This country has shown leadership throughout history in relation to copyright and setting the highest standards to try to drag people up to our level, rather than simply putting up the flag of surrender and going down to the levels of the rest of the world. I fear there is a view that we have to allow AI companies to do anything they want because otherwise they will just go and do it somewhere else. Surely we should show some leadership on this. If anyone did not have the pleasure, as I did, of listening to my noble friend Lord Bragg’s “In Our Time” programme on Radio 4 about the history of copyright, I recommend that they go back and listen to it on BBC Sounds, including the additional conversation that went on afterwards.
My preference, as I made clear last week and have made clear to Ministers, is that if Ministers cannot accept the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, they come back with their own amendment in lieu that at the very least makes sure that Ministers are given a permissive power to require transparency. That can be a “may” instead of a “must”; I know that would not be satisfactory to everybody, but a reasonable concession is needed that provides Ministers with a backstop power that will focus the minds of all concerned on the need to deal with this issue without waiting for a piece of primary legislation—a vehicle that may be some considerable way down the road, even if commitments are made by Ministers.
If these amendments are carried today, I hope the Government will come back with their own amendment in lieu to enable there to be a backstop power, even if it is not exactly the amendment we are considering today. That would go a great way towards providing the level playing field we should have for our creative industries.
Baroness Harding of Winscombe (Con)
My Lords, it seems that the Government are relying on two arguments to reject the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. The first is that regulating AI is such a big, complex problem that we cannot deal with one bit; we have to deal with it all. The second is that it is so big that it is global, so we cannot do anything local. The noble Lord, Lord Brennan, just demolished the global argument, so I am sure noble Lords are pleased that I am not going to repeat his arguments.
I want to demolish the first argument as well, which is that we should wait to do everything in one place on AI. That is for old-world technology, not new, agile technology. If we are going to regulate the digital world, we will need to test and learn. We will need to regulate through things that are necessary, even though we know that they are not sufficient. I have not heard a single argument from the Government in any place suggesting that transparency is not necessary. It is necessary, so this amendment is necessary; it is not sufficient to regulate this extraordinary, groundbreaking technology called AI, but that does not mean we should not regulate now in this way and build on it. I am afraid we will debate AI in this Chamber for decades to come, but that does not mean that we should reject this amendment. Like the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, I hope that the other place and the Government will hear the cross-party support for the work that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has been doing and bring back something listening to what we have to say.
Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)
In supporting my noble friend Lady Kidron, I would like to make one or two things clear. The creative industries are not against AI. Filmmakers, television producers, composers and writers have helped to create the very technology that goes into AI. The creative industries are not trying to pull up the drawbridge, but rather want to monitor what is going across it. They want to police it. As Sir Elton John said, not to do this could amount to a betrayal, because things begin to move very much in increasing volume. He said, importantly, that it is not about people like him; it is about, as the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, said, the next generation—the people who are creating music or writing novels now and getting a pittance for it. They and we do not want to see their work taken and exploited for nothing.
I ask noble Lords and the Minister—perhaps they have done this—to think about writing a novel over, say, two or three years, or creating a film, record or disc. You have had to put your own money into it, and then you find that your rights are being stolen. This is burglary. It is nothing else. I declare an interest as a composer. I have had music taken and put into film and adverts, and it is very difficult to stop it. The only way you will stop it is by acting now, before the gate is trampled down by the horses and the stable is empty.
It is all very well talking about a vehicle in the future, but we have heard several noble Lords say that the time to act is now. Sir Elton John has said that too, as have many famous composers. It is not just composers at the top of the pop tree; it is classical composers and contemporary composers who make a pittance—perhaps a few hundred pounds. There is a saying in Tin Pan Alley that “Where there’s a hit, there’s a writ”, and that is very true. As soon as you come up with something good, everybody wants it. If this door is left open, we will destroy the future of our creative industries. Let us stop it now.
Lord Dobbs (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her indefatigable efforts. She has argued persuasively, patiently and passionately—and there is nothing wrong with a bit of passion in this Chamber, is there chuck?
It is not just the noble Baroness. We heard about Elton John over the weekend. He is a national treasure, an icon, a working-class boy made good, a role model who knows the creative industries from the very bottom and a man who is worth listening to, particularly, I would have thought, as he was a Labour supporter at the last election. Yet in his outrage at their complacency, Elton John called this Government “total losers”. Those are harsh words. He could have gone further, because the real losers are going to be the nearly 2.5 million of us—I must declare my interest—who work in the creative industries. All of us could be losers. Yet all this amendment really asks for is a bit of transparency so that we in the creative industries know who will be using our work, which we have slogged away at, struggled with and often suffered to create.
The elected Government must, of course, get what they want, but they do not know what they want. Only the other day, the same Government were proclaiming their commitment to soft power and declaring that the creative industries are a vital part of it. Ministers said that our world-beating creative industries are one of the country’s greatest assets. Did they mean it, or were they just empty words? Why are Ministers burying themselves in their departmental silos? All we are asking is for the Government to support their own policies and join them together—give it some harmony, if you like, and follow Sir Elton down that yellow brick road which has created so much success not simply for him but for the entire country.
It is because of that great success, because our creative industries are world-beaters, that so many others would love to have part of it. Of course we must protect our creative rights and intellectual property. Why are the Government leaving the front door open and the lights on, with a guard dog chained up at the back? Those who want it will not even need to hack our work; they can simply walk in and take it.
We should listen very closely to the wise words of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. The world is changing at speed almost beyond our imagination. Please allow us—the writers, the songsters, the artists, the composers—a little protection, so that we can carry on creating and enabling Britain not just to punch above our weight but to sing above the song. I would much prefer to see the Minister not as a total loser—that is entirely inappropriate—but as a great listener. I wait with bated breath and my pen poised.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)
As my noble friend the Chief Whip said at the start of this debate, we are now into the second round of ping-pong on this Bill. These issues have been debated extensively across Committee, Report and ping-pong last week. I urge all noble Lords to keep their contributions, and this debate, brief and focused.
Lord Watson of Wyre Forest (Lab)
My Lords, it’s a little bit funny, this feeling inside, as I rise to support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron—which my Front Bench so clearly opposes—but I’m still standing, because I do not yet believe that Ministers have heard the clarion cry from our country’s creators that they need more from this Bill.
In supporting this amendment, I draw the attention of the House to my declaration in the register as the proud chair of UK Music and as an author; although I say to my good friend the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, that, sadly, I have not had the benefit of a rightsholder’s cheque to rub across my ample bosom for several years. I support this amendment because it brings a measure of balance. I understand the Government’s reticence in getting this right, but I believe it is entirely possible to offer a concession to the creative industries without jeopardising the Prime Minister’s commitment to the AI revolution.
Elton John was wrong yesterday to personalise this debate but, as one of this country’s greatest ever songwriters, he is entitled to ask: what has he got to do to make you love him? More importantly, what has he got to do to make you hear him? The Minister might not like this amendment but, if not this one, then what? No credible alternative has been offered so, reluctantly but firmly, I shall be voting for the only protection on offer today. When you fail to listen, you leave people with no choice but to sing another tune.
Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
My Lords, I am very well aware, as so many others in this House are, that we are on the second round of ping-pong. Up to now, I have never voted against the Government on a second round of ping-pong, but this is rather special. This is actually crucial. There is an outcry across the country. There is unanimity across this House. Having listened to Labour Peers, I must say that I follow the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, in having, like him, no artistic or creative ability whatever, but I care about it because I am a recipient of it. What I find so difficult is that this Government are not listening to what is being said across the country. This is their last chance to recognise the damage they are doing. I ask the Minister to go back and tell her department that there is unanimity in the House that this amendment should pass.
Lord Knight of Weymouth (Lab)
My Lords, I shall be brief. We are in a pickle. This is an important Bill that needs to gain Royal Assent quickly, for EU data adequacy reasons if nothing else. Incidentally, I do not believe that the Bill does active harm to the creative sector as it is written, but, since the copyright consultation preferred the wrong option, the sector’s trust in the Government on this issue has collapsed. I pay tribute to the way the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has represented the sector. That distrust means that Ministers’ subsequent words of reassurance are not trusted by the sector. We therefore need campaigners and Ministers to meet and find a way through with meaningful action. I believe that Ministers are trying to act in good faith and are sincere in wanting both to create a benign environment for AI in this country and to protect copyright and the remuneration of the creative industries that are so important to this country. Artists are raising their voice in good faith, although I agree with my noble friend Lord Watson about it being unhelpful to personalise some elements of the debate.
It is important to give the Secretary of State himself another opportunity to speak in the other place, on the record, at the Dispatch Box, having had a few days to reflect, and negotiate a way of reassuring the sector that Ministers see the urgency in protecting the livelihoods of artists from big tech while taking advantage of the creative and economic opportunities of AI. The amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, is a good basis for proceeding. In order to give the Secretary of State that opportunity, I will be supporting the noble Baroness’s amendment if she chooses to divide the House.
Lord Freyberg (CB)
My Lords, at the heart of this debate lies a single critical principle—trust: trust that those who built powerful AI systems will not exploit the work of others without permission; trust that the UK Government will stand by our creative sector; and trust that our laws, long respected internationally, are not ignored in the rush to complete with Silicon Valley.
Last week, the Minister in the other place, Sir Chris Bryant, raised an important point: what do we do about the copyright status of works generated by AI? It is a good question, but impossible to answer without knowing what content the models were trained on. If we cannot see what went in, we cannot possibly judge what comes out. Transparency is the gateway to fair licensing and a vibrant market in which both AI developers and creators thrive. Without it, there is no accountability, no fair return, and no protection for the next generation of artists, writers and innovators. The UK has a proud tradition of creativity and innovation. This amendment allows us to protect the former while enabling the latter. I urge the House to support it.
Lord Vaizey of Didcot (Con)
My Lords, very briefly, I want to pick up on my noble friend Lady Harding’s point about the Government’s message that they wish to legislate in the round. I urge the Government to listen to the point that my noble friend was making. We started debating the regulation of tech platforms in 2011, and it took us more than a decade to pass the Online Safety Act. It was one of the most painful legislative processes I have ever seen. The Minister will be very surprised, if this legislation is passed, how quickly it has an impact.
On the second point, about piecemeal legislation, if we had listened to that argument, we would not have passed the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, when, I think, we were in government—I may still have been a Minister when she first proposed them—for the age-appropriate design code. That is a very telling piece of legislation, because we see the impact it has around the world. The platforms now follow the age-appropriate design code, and it makes a difference. As I say, it took us more than a decade to regulate platforms—think about the missed opportunities.
My final point is to pick up on the very important technical point of the noble Lord, Lord Knight, about being in a pickle. Much as I might delight, as a former Tory culture Minister, to see the serried ranks of the creative industries putting the boot into a Labour Government, I feel enormous sympathy for them. They can turn this around this afternoon in a flash.
Lord Clement-Jones (LD)
My Lords, I declare an interest as chair of the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society.
I express the extremely strong support of all on these Benches for Motion C1, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I agree with every speech that we have heard so far in today’s debate—I did not hear a single dissenting voice to the noble Baroness’s Motion. Once again, I pay tribute to her; she has fought a tireless campaign for the cause of creators and the creative industries throughout the passage of the Bill.
I will be extremely brief, given that we want to move to a vote as soon as possible. The House has already sent a clear message by supporting previous amendments put forward by the noble Baroness, and I hope that the House will be as decisive today. As we have heard this afternoon, transparency is crucial. This would enable the dynamic licensing market that is needed, as we have also heard. How AI is developed and who it benefits are two of the most important questions of our time—and the Government must get the answer right. As so many noble Lords have said, the Government must listen and must think again.
Viscount Camrose (Con)
My Lords, it is probably redundant to pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her tenacity and determination to get to a workable solution on this, because it speaks for itself. It has been equally compelling to hear such strong arguments from all sides of the House and all Benches—including the Government Benches—that we need to find a solution to this complex but critical issue.
Noble Lords will recall that, on these Benches, we have consistently argued for a pragmatic, technology-based solution to this complex problem, having made the case for digital watermarking both in Committee and on Report. When we considered the Commons amendments last week, we worked closely with the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, to find a wording for her amendment which we could support, and were pleased to be able to do so and to vote with her.
It is important that the Government listen and take action to protect the rights of creatives in the UK. We will not stop making the case for our flourishing and important creative sector. We have put that case to Ministers, both in your Lordships’ House and at meetings throughout the passage of the Bill. As a responsible Opposition, though, it is our view that we must be careful about our approach to amendments made by the elected House. We have, I hope, made a clear case to the Government here in your Lordships’ House and the Government have, I deeply regret to say, intransigently refused to act. I am afraid that they will regret their failure to take this opportunity to protect our creative industries. Sadly, there comes a point where we have to accept that His Majesty’s Government must be carried on and the Government will get their Bill.
Before concluding, I make two final pleas to the Minister. First, as others have asked, can she listen with great care to the many artists, musicians, news organisations, publishers and performers who have called on the Government to help them more to protect their intellectual property?
Secondly, can she find ways to create regulatory clarity faster? The process that the Government envisage to resolve this issue is long—too long. Actors on all sides of the debate will be challenged by such a long period of uncertainty. I understand that the Minister is working at pace to find a solution, but not necessarily with agility. I echo the brilliant point made by my noble friend Lady Harding that agility and delivering parts of the solution are so important to pick up the pace of this, because perfect is the enemy of good in this instance. When she gets up to speak, I hope that the Minister will tell us more about the timeline that she envisages, particularly for the collaboration of DSIT and DCMS.
This is a serious problem. It continues to grow and is not going away. Ministers must grip it with urgency and agility.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, once again, I acknowledge the passion and depth of feeling from those noble Lords who have spoken and, again, I emphasise that we are all on the same side here. We all want to see a way forward that protects our creative industries, while supporting everyone in the UK to develop and benefit from AI.
Of course, we have listened, and are continuing to listen, to the views that have been expressed. We are still going through the 11,500 responses to our consultation, and I have to tell noble Lords that people have proposed some incredibly creative solutions to this debate which also have a right to be heard.
This is not about Silicon Valley; it is about finding a solution for the UK creative and AI tech sectors that protects both. I am pleased that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, now endorses the Government’s reports as the right way to identify the right solutions; however, I will address some of her other points directly.
First, she talked about her amendment providing certainty to the creative industries. I can provide that certainty now, as Minister Bryant did in the other place last week. Copyright law in the UK is unchanged by this Bill. Works are protected unless one of the exemptions, which have existed for some time, such as those for teaching and research, applies, or the rights holders have guaranteed permission for their work to be used. That is the law now and it will be the law tomorrow.
I also want to reassure my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, who talked about us stripping away rights today. I want to be clear that the Government have proposed no legislation on this issue; the Bill does no such thing. The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would provide no certainty other than that of more uncertainty—of continuous regulations, stacked one upon another in a pile of instruments. This cannot be what anyone desires, and it is why the Government do not agree to it.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Kidron and Lady Harding, suggested that her amendment, requiring regulations on only one issue ahead of all others and via a different process, would somehow leave Parliament free to consider all the other issues independently. I am afraid that this is not the case; this is a policy decision with many moving parts. Jumping the gun on one issue will hamstring us in reaching the best outcome on all the others, especially because, as I said earlier, this is a global issue, and we cannot ring-fence the UK from the rest of the world.
We refute the suggestion that we are being complacent on this. I say to my noble friend Lord Brennan that I of course agree that the UK should be a global leader, but we need to make sure that we have the right approach before we plant our flag on that. There is a reason that no other territory has cracked this either. The EU, for example, is still struggling to find a workable solution. It is not easy, but we are working quickly.
The noble Baroness once again raised enforcement, and she has left the mechanism to the discretion of the Government in her new amendment. While we are pleased that the noble Baroness has changed her approach on enforcement in light of the Commons reasons, we all agree that for new transparency requirements to work, enforcement mechanisms will be needed and must be effective.
The noble Baroness said she has tried everything to persuade the Government, and I would have welcomed a further meeting with her to discuss this and other aspects of her revised proposals. Unfortunately, however, that invitation was not accepted. To reiterate, in spite of all our different positions on this Bill, we are all working towards the same goal.
Following proper consideration of consultation responses and publication of our technical reports, we will bring forward comprehensive and workable proposals that will give certainty to all sides. If the House has strong views when the proposals come forward, there will of course be the opportunity for us to debate them. We have made it clear that our reports will be delivered within 12 months and earlier if we can. I remind noble Lords that the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, will not take effect for 18 months. There is not an instant solution, as many noble Lords want to hear today. Neither the noble Baroness’s nor our amendment is an instant solution; it will take time, and we have to recognise that.
We do not believe, in the meantime, that protracted ping-pong on this one remaining issue in the Bill is in anyone’s interest. The elected House has spoken twice and through legislative and non-legislative commitments, the Government have shown they are committed to regulating quickly and effectively. Therefore, I hope the noble Baroness and your Lordships’ House will accept these assurances and continue working with the Government to make progress on this important issue.
A lot has been said in this debate about the importance of transparency. To my noble friend Lord Brennan, I say that the Government have said from the very beginning that we will prioritise the issue of transparency in all the work we do. Transparency is essential to licensing; licensing is essential to the question of remuneration; and remuneration is essential to AI being high quality, effective and able to be deployed in the UK. These are the challenges we are facing, but all these things have to be addressed in the round and together, not in a piecemeal fashion. However, noble Lords are absolutely right to say that, without transparency, it is, of course, worth nothing.
On enforcement, the Government are sympathetic to the argument that it is a different matter for individuals to enforce their rights via the courts as opposed to large creative agencies. This is the kind of the thing that the working groups I have mentioned will explore. As Minister Bryant said last week, we want to make the new regime effective for everybody, large and small.
I will finish with some things I am sure we can all agree on: the urgency of the problem; the need to be evidence-based; that solutions will require collaboration between the creative and the AI sectors; and the solutions must work for everyone. I assure the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, that everybody will have a seat at the table in the discussions. I hope noble Lords will agree with me and truly support the innovators and creators in the UK by voting with the Government on this Motion, which will deliver a full, comprehensive package that will make a difference to the creative sector for years to come in this country.
Baroness Kidron (CB)
My Lords, I thank everybody who has spoken on this issue in the House and outside of the House. I particularly thank the Members on the Government Benches; I know it comes hard to disagree with your party, and I really appreciate it, as do all those outside the House.
I am going to try to take the high road from the Minister’s passionate defence. If the Government had spent as much time talking to me as they did to their own Back Bench to say, “Please do not rebel”, we would be in a different place. I did say that I was not able to be there at a particular time, but there were quite a lot of other occasions on which other Ministers, including the Secretary of State, knew where I was.
To go to the crux of the matter, the noble Baroness the Minister said at the Dispatch Box that this is UK law and the Government have done nothing to change it. This is precisely the problem: it is UK law, but it is unenforceable because what you cannot see you cannot enforce—period. That is the problem we are trying to solve, and it is a separate and different problem from the enormity of all the other issues she rightly raises. While I accepted the report as the mechanism and the idea that the Government could have their enforcement procedure in their own timeline, nothing that any Minister has said in either the other place or your Lordships’ House has put a timeline on it. It will take years and, by that time, there will be no creative industry left, or it will be in tatters.
I was interested in the contribution that said that AI companies have transparency and renumeration; that is the fundamental principle. I will not detain the House any longer. I am so grateful for everybody’s contributions to all our debates. This was a Lords starter; this does not challenge the primacy of the Commons. I would like to test the opinion of the House.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
That this House do not insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendment 52, on which the Commons have insisted for their Reason 52D, and do not insist on its Amendments 52B and 52C proposed to the words restored to the Bill by the Lords disagreement, to which the Commons have disagreed for the same Reason.
Employment Rights Bill
(1 day, 5 hours ago)
Lords ChamberRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Morrissey
(b) after “prevent” insert “and address”;(c) after subsection (3) insert—“(4) Where an employee makes an allegation that sexual harassment has occurred in the course of their employment, an employer must take reasonable steps to investigate the allegation.(5) Any investigation conducted in accordance with subsection (4) must be proportionate to the severity of the allegation and, where an allegation relates to—(a) sexual assault, or(b) sexual harassment by a member of the senior management of the employer,the employer must commission an independent investigation.(6) During any investigation conducted under the terms of this section, an employer must take all reasonable steps to protect the wellbeing of the employee who has made the allegation.(7) Where an investigation under this section makes recommendations, an employer must comply with those recommendations.””
Baroness Morrissey (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to the amendment in my name, on which I am very grateful for the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. We will shortly debate several proposed amendments to Clause 22 that would require employers to prevent harassment in the workplace. Amendment 82A is also designed to require employers properly to address instances of sexual harassment if they occur at work.
As set out in my register of interests, I chair the investment industry’s Diversity Project. Through that role, I receive reports of poor behaviours submitted by workers in the sector through a confidential hotline that was set up after the CBI sexual harassment scandal. Sadly, from over 30 reports submitted—90% from women—it is clear that, if someone makes an allegation of sexual harassment at work, the investigation process that follows is often very difficult for them. It is typically conducted by people they work with, compounding the embarrassment and shame, which obviously may be misplaced, and making it exceptionally awkward, especially when, as is so often the case, their complaints concern someone more senior and powerful than them in the firm.
When working in an executive role, and being no expert in the field, I was once asked to oversee a process following a woman filing a complaint of quite serious sexual misconduct, which had been witnessed by several others, only for her to withdraw it midway through because she found the whole process of being investigated by her colleagues so excruciating. Even if a complainant decides to go through with the whole process, and even if the complaint is upheld, the pattern I see from so many of the reports submitted through the Diversity Project’s hotline is that the woman’s life, including her life at work, gets worse—much worse. She ends up leaving the firm, while the perpetrator’s career is often completely unscathed.
Amendment 82A calls for an independent investigation to be carried out by people qualified to investigate cases of sexual harassment and for all those involved in the case to be appropriately protected during the investigation. It would also require firms to adopt the independent reviewer’s recommendations, following their investigation. Your Lordships may be amazed—I hope you will be amazed—to learn that, in many cases today, even if a serious complaint is upheld and the firm decides to take action against the perpetrator, it often errs on the side of leniency, especially if the perpetrator is senior or a significant revenue generator. So, I am afraid, the abuses of power continue.
Even if a firm dismisses, it can fail to qualify references, so the bad apple is put back in the system to reoffend. A couple of years ago, I received a tip-off from a former colleague that a man who had been let go from a City firm for sexual harassment had committed the exact same thing at the next firm and was now being investigated again. He was then let go from that firm and, I have just discovered, is now in a senior role at yet another one. Clearly, something is very wrong with a system that lets this happen, especially in the highly regulated financial sector. Those of us who work in financial services hope very much that the regulators—both the FCA and the PRA—will eventually produce guidance for regulated firms about what they euphemistically call non-financial misconduct, but I recognise that the problem goes far beyond the City.
I urge the Government to consider reasonable measures requiring firms to address instances of sexual misconduct at work, as well as seeking to prevent it occurring in the first place. The Bill provides a perfect opportunity to do this, after far too long when abuses of power have been allowed to go unchecked. How many more cases will we read about in the papers where nothing was done for years—decades even—to address these behaviours, before we take action? A workplace free from sexual harassment is surely the least that employees should be able to expect, and this amendment is designed to strengthen the Bill in this respect. I beg to move.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I am a signatory to this excellent amendment, but I am also speaking as a winder from these Benches. I shall speak very briefly, because I will touch on many of the issues in a later group, but this is so important. I am so glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, brought forward an amendment that focuses on the issue of investigation and action.
The noble Baroness has made the case powerfully, but for many people, it is such a shock to realise that it is the victim of sexual harassment—usually a woman, sometimes a man—who finds themselves, in effect, on trial. That is how the investigative process, when it happens, generally progresses. We all know that that is wrong and has to change.
If you talk to people who have been victims and ask them what they want most as a response to having spoken out, despite what they have gone through, the answer, again and again, is twofold. First, they never want this to happen to anybody else; secondly, they want investigation and action. The systems we have in place never focus on that issue and drive it as the primary response when somebody speaks out with a serious complaint of this nature; we will be talking later about complaints of another nature. I hope very much that people will become engaged with this issue, which has been so well represented here today.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, I commend my noble friend Lady Morrissey on moving this important amendment. She speaks from her own personal experience with wisdom and understanding, in particular on the whole issue of investigation and action. I also agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer: the victim can so often find themselves on trial, and that is unacceptable.
So I have some sympathy with this amendment, in that it seeks a more proportionate approach to the matter than the Bill currently contains. We all agree that harassment, particularly when it is persistent—and, even worse, when it comes from a senior colleague—is a stain on society. Not only does it poison the workplace; it can ruin lives.
The amendment emphasises the need for employers to act reasonably, particularly in cases involving serious allegations such as sexual assault or harassment by senior management, and to protect the well-being of the employee involved.
Of course, many businesses already follow best practice, and we believe that proper measures to address the issue are critical in building safer and more respectful workplaces. Clause 20 as drafted also raises concerns about free expression, and it is our view that the amendment would be better placed elsewhere in the Bill, where it can be more thoroughly examined and discussed in its own context, without the issue of freedom of expression being engaged.
I want to emphasise from these Benches that we are committed to tackling sexual harassment in a meaningful way, but we also believe in ensuring that the right to free expression is carefully protected. We will listen very carefully to the Minister’s response to these concerns, and we will continue to advocate for a balanced approach that protects the dignity and safety of individuals while preserving fundamental rights.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)
My Lords, this has been a good introduction to the further debates we will have today on provisions in the Bill on harassment. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Morrissey, for tabling Amendment 82A. Both made important points about investigation and action being crucial.
The Government agree that while the preventive duty places broad requirements on employers, it is important to ensure that specific steps are taken by employers to combat sexual harassment in the workplace. This is why, in addition to strengthening the preventive duty, we are introducing a delegated power, enabling us to specify steps that are to be regarded as reasonable for the purpose of meeting the obligations set out in the Equality Act 2010 to take all reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment.
The regulations may also require an employer to have regard to specific matters when taking those steps. The regulations that the power will introduce will help clarify what is expected of employers, as well as guiding the EHRC or employment tribunals when taking enforcement action. These steps may include requirements on employers to undertake investigations following complaints and action recommendations, in addition to the requirements set out in the ACAS code of practice on disciplinary and grievance procedures. To better understand what steps are effective and proportionate, we have launched a call for evidence, and we will give responses careful consideration.
I have to say to the noble Baroness that it would be premature to introduce specific requirements in relation to investigations at this stage. I ask her to withdraw Amendment 82A, but I hope she will take on board that I am happy to continue discussions with her on these issues after the call for evidence concludes. I am sure we can reach an agreement going forward on that basis.
Baroness Morrissey (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for their thoughtful remarks, and in particular for highlighting the need for investigation and action to protect the victims.
I was slightly surprised at the grouping of this amendment, as it probably sits better among the other provisions and amendments designed to combat sexual harassment that we will be discussing later.
I am glad to hear from the Minister that a consultation is planned, which may include provisions requiring employers to conduct proper investigations. I look forward to hearing further about that. But for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Young of Acton
“(1D) In this section, the definition of “harassment” cannot include conversation or speech involving the expression of an opinion on a political, moral, religious or social matter, provided the opinion is not indecent or grossly offensive.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment means employers would not have to take all reasonable steps to protect their employees from hearing or over-hearing expressions of opinion (from either employees, or third parties) on political, moral, religious or social matters that they might find offensive or upsetting by virtue of their protected characteristics, provided the opinion is not indecent or grossly offensive.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 83 I will speak to Amendments 84 to 86 and 88 in this group. I declare my interests as the general secretary of the Free Speech Union and as an employer.
As your Lordships know, Clause 20 amends Section 40 of the Equality Act to make employers liable for the harassment of their employees by third parties. Henceforth, they will have to take all reasonable steps to protect their employees from third-party harassment, and if they fail to do so, they could be sued in the employment tribunal. Do not let the proponents of Clause 20 muddy the waters by claiming it will protect workers from sexual harassment by third parties: employers are already liable for third-party sexual harassment thanks to the Worker Protection Act 2023.
Where is the evidence that non-sexual third-party harassment is a problem in the workplace? There is none in the final-stage impact assessment. For that, we have to turn to a fact sheet produced by the Office for Equality and Opportunity and the Department for Business and Trade published last year, which says:
“For the year ending March 2024, 9.2% of people aged 16 years and over who said they had experienced non-sexual harassment in the last 12 months, reported that they had been harassed by a client or member of the public contacted through work”.
But only 5.5% of the respondents in that survey reported experiencing non-sexual harassment, and 9.2% of 5.5% is 0.51%. To be clear, only 0.51% of the respondents in this survey reported experiencing non-sexual third-party harassment in the workplace or through work in the past year.
As the Equality and Human Rights Commission said in its parliamentary briefing on this clause ahead of Second Reading:
“Evidence of the prevalence of third-party harassment in the workplace, beyond sexual harassment, is limited”.
Incidentally, that is also the opinion of the Regulatory Policy Committee.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I have several amendments in this group. I also support all the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton. The extension of the Equality Act harassment provisions is not new territory. In 2023 it was included in a Private Member’s Bill, which became the Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023. A number of us were concerned about the extension of employer liability for non-sexual harassment and tabled amendments to remove that part of the Bill. In the event, that aspect of the Bill was dropped, and we all heaved a sigh of relief until we saw this Bill published last autumn.
The provisions of Clause 20 are, in many respects, worse than the 2023 Bill, which at least tried to address the issue of freedom of speech. It did not go far enough, but at least it tried. This Bill proceeds on the basis that freedom of speech is not an issue. My noble friend Lord Young’s amendments are absolutely essential if there is to be a workable and fair extension of employer liability for harassment.
I will not repeat the arguments put forward but will emphasise how burdensome such a requirement can be for a small business. Since most businesses in this country are small, accounting for a bit less than half of private sector employment, Clause 20 is a very big problem. It is already hard enough to run a small business and cope with all the regulatory burdens that the state imposes. This new requirement will extend into the realms of impossibility. How can a small hospitality or retail business realistically cover itself against every possibility that a member of staff might perceive that they have been harassed by a customer or even a passer-by?
I have a specific question for the Minister on the territorial scope of Clause 20 or, more accurately, Section 40 of the Equality Act as amended by Clause 20. Does the duty to prevent harassment apply only to UK-based employees or does it also apply to those who are overseas?
I am sure that noble Lords who have dealt with overseas call centres recognise that it can be a somewhat vexing experience. Recently, a young man who was almost certainly in India insisted that he must educate me for 10 minutes on frauds and scams before he would unblock one of my credit cards, which had hit one of those fraud trip-wires in connection with a perfectly straightforward transaction that I had already completed on another card without any problems whatever. I explained that to the young man. I explained that I knew quite a bit about frauds, scams and financial services, but he was absolutely adamant about my educational needs. I hope that my responses were not perceived as harassment, but one can never tell these days. Does Clause 20 mean that my card provider will be liable if I intentionally or otherwise harass its overseas employees? If so, how on earth does that work?
My Amendment 87, in seeking to avoid single incidents being treated as harassment, is a softer version of my noble friend Lord Young’s Amendment 86. I stress that I am not talking about sexual harassment—a single incident of sexual harassment is one too many. Rather, I am talking about the kinds of harassment that my noble friend Lord Young has described. We really cannot expect employers to be able to prevent every single incidence of hurt feelings, if only because the highly subjective nature of workers’ perceptions means that employers face an impossible task.
My Amendments 89 to 96 concern Clause 21, which empowers the Secretary of State to make regulations about “reasonable steps” in the case of sexual harassment. I always thought that the Equality and Human Rights Commission was the correct source of guidance on the application of the 2010 Act. But if we accept that it is right for the Secretary of State to get involved in the specifics of sexual harassment and the “reasonable steps” that are necessary, logic requires that it should extend to all forms of harassment where an employer has to take all “reasonable steps”. That is what my Amendments 89, 93, 95 and 96 seek to achieve.
Furthermore, if the Secretary of State issues rules about what constitutes “reasonable steps”, we need to see what the consequences of that are. If employers can establish that they have followed the steps set out in the regulations, I believe there should be no question of falling foul of the revised harassment regime in Section 40 of the 2010 Act. It should be for the Secretary of State to ensure that the rules set out in regulations are comprehensive and for employers to follow them. My Amendment 94 would then give employers protection from the harassment provisions.
Lastly, and for good measure, I included a may/must amendment in Amendments 90 and 91, so that the Secretary of State would be required to issue regulations dealing with all “reasonable steps”. This is such a difficult area for employers, particularly in customer-facing businesses, but it should be incumbent on the Secretary of State to set out clearly and comprehensively what employers need to do.
Baroness Carberry of Muswell Hill (Lab)
My Lords, I focus particularly on Amendments 83 and 84, which purport to deal with a hypothetical “banter ban”. I listened very carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Young, said about these amendments because I have been struggling to understand why they are thought necessary. I regret to say, with the greatest respect, that I am still none the wiser.
The wording in those two amendments does not need to be included in the Bill because most overheard conversations that someone who hears might not like would already fail the test of unlawful harassment in the Equality Act 2010. Most overheard conversations would not fall under the definition of harassment in Section 26 of that Act. That would include the example given by the noble Lord of a blind person at a football match. To be caught by the definition, something an employee hears at work and finds objectionable or offensive would need to be relevant to a protected characteristic and would also need to have
“the purpose or effect of … violating”
the person’s
“dignity, or … creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”.
If this were put to the test, it would not just be about the employee’s subjective perception. If a case like this ever ended up in court, which is highly unlikely, the court would also have to take into account all the circumstances and would need to decide whether it was reasonable for the overheard conversation to have had the effect of violating dignity or creating a
“hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”.
In other words, the subjective is balanced against the objective, and context will always be crucial.
The average everyday chat in the pub or elsewhere would not pass these tests, however much someone dislikes what they hear, so the Bill would not require employers to take steps to prevent conversational expressions of opinion on, in the words of the amendment,
“a political, moral, religious or social matter”.
Of course, in some circumstances, third parties do abuse and harass employees. It happens with depressing regularity, notably in hospitality, which the noble Lord seeks to exclude from the Bill altogether. It can happen when abuse is obviously directed at an employee by way of a pretended or fake conversation that is obviously expressly designed to be overheard and to offend. That is the whole point of this clause. Instances of obvious direct harassment and abuse of employees by third parties would, rightly, be protected by the Bill under current definitions.
It is important to note that steps to prevent this would not place an onerous burden on employers. As my noble friend the Minister said in her introduction, regulations will set out steps that employers should take, but many employers already take relevant steps to prevent this sort of offensive behaviour. For example, your Lordships will be very familiar with signs on public transport or in healthcare settings warning that abuse of staff will not be tolerated. That is very familiar to all of us.
The broader point here is that the Bill’s purpose is to require employers to take all reasonable steps to prevent their staff being harassed and abused by customers or members of the public. It is not about preventing or regulating private conversations or restricting free expression. I suggest that Amendments 83 and 84 would not add anything and are not needed.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, the whole of Clause 20 should not stand part and should be dropped from the Bill. The amendments that I have put my name to are mitigating, in case this very dangerous clause is not dropped, but I remain hopeful that the Government will realise—despite what the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, just argued—that this clause will, no doubt unintentionally, be not only bad for business and a range of public-facing institutions but detrimental to workers.
I appreciate that the Government are seeking to reassure and dampen down the public unease about this clause with their suggestions that campaigners are hyping up the threat that it could pose to free speech, but I have yet to hear a convincing positive argument for why legislation is being used to create this sweeping new duty that will significantly expand all employers’ liability for third-party harassment of their employees. It is unclear why, if any employee has evidence of harassment as just described, they do not call the police. Should this not be left for criminal law to deal with, rather than extending employment law?
This clause puts the onus on employers to plan for, prevent and police alleged problematic interactions—a task they are simply not qualified to do, and indeed should have no right to do. This clause amends the Equality Act by reinstating liability for harassment of employees by third parties. As we know, that was in the original 2010 Act, but, when the then coalition Government consulted on the matter, there was such negative feedback that it was kicked out in 2013. Why has it now reappeared, with no consultation?
Moreover, this new duty is considerably more onerous. For example, there are no exemptions. One of the amendments that I have put my name to tries to at least carve out especially vulnerable sectors. As we have heard, employers would be liable for any single act of harassment by a third party. In the previous iteration, employers would have been liable only if the employee was harassed for a third time. Again, an amendment has been tabled to remedy this. To date, the Government have not presented any evidence that would justify ignoring the reasons why the original liability was rebutted, so what has changed that demands it?
Superficially, protecting employees from harassment sounds fair enough to all of us, but a lot hinges on what we consider harassment to mean. First, one confusion to clarify is that the content of this clause is sometimes bundled together with the issue of sexual harassment, giving it a moral force that is not merited. To be clear—as others have been—Clause 20 covers liability for third-party non-sexual harassment.
There is then the common-sense notion of harassment in people’s minds. This is understandable but misplaced. Lord Sumption, in Hayes v Willoughby in 2013, said of harassment that it is
“an ordinary English word with a well understood meaning”,
going on to describe it as
“a persistent and deliberate course of unreasonable and oppressive conduct targeted at another person, which is calculated to and does cause that person alarm fear or distress”.
If only that was the definition. Unfortunately, Lord Sumption’s wise thought that harassment has a well understood meaning is not true in the 2025 era of lawfare.
Section 26 of the Equality Act defines harassment as
“unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic”.
The EHRC guidance sets out that this can include “spoken words”, “banter”, “jokes”, “written words”, “imagery”, “physical gestures”, “facial expressions” and “posts on social media”. That is a very broad catch-all list of forms of harassment that employers will now have to protect their employees from when encountering third parties.
Harassment under the Equality Act includes indirect harassment. I cannot see any way for an employer to seek to comply with this when they will be compelled to take all reasonable steps to prevent their staff encountering, or even overhearing, those conversations, jokes and remarks that they might find upsetting in view of their protected characteristics. Harassment cases taken to employment tribunals increasingly concern conduct having the effect of harassment, rather than behaviour intended to have that effect. The motives or intentions of the third party are irrelevant.
I have noticed that, in response to previous speeches raising concerns about this clause, the Government have argued that it will not be enough for the claimant simply to claim that someone’s conduct is offensive, and that there will be an objective test in which the reasonableness and facts of the individual situation will always be considered. But in every iteration of harassment—in law; in codes of conduct, including our own, here in the Lords; and, for example, in all elements of the regulation of hate speech—a key factor is the perception of the claimant. That is unduly subjective—something I have raised as a problem on numerous occasions, only to be told by Government Ministers that victims’ feelings are a core component. I would be more than happy if the Government were proposing amending equality law to tighten this up and narrow down indirect harassment, but, in the present circumstances, Clause 20 is a minefield and opens the door to egregious and boundless litigation across the board.
I want to consider who these third parties are. Maybe in the Government’s mind they are lairy, drunken, rich businessmen shouting abuse, or some mythical, anti-social, boorish bigots roaming around public-facing establishments hunting down hard-pressed staff to harass. In reality, who is it who goes to the football or the rugby and may fall foul of the law, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, illustrated? It is other workers who relax on their days off by supporting their sports clubs, and who do not mince their words while doing so.
Who do the Government think frequents pubs? These third parties could well include workmates who go for a pint after a long shift and may want to let off steam by moaning about their bosses, only for a member of the bar staff to take their lively views personally and feel harassed. They could be a group of care workers, gossiping away as they get their nails done and discussing the local grooming gang scandal, to which someone who works at the beauty salon takes offence. What about a bunch of apprentices on a night out at a comedy gig who join the heckling banter and perhaps shout something that a staff member or steward says insults their protected characteristic? What about the ex-police officer reading a Brexity book in the cafe and chatting to a staff member about it, and so on?
In other words, beyond some abstract legalese, third parties in the flesh are fellow workers trying to spend their private time unassailed by undue, back-door state regulation of their speech and leisure.
I note that, in universities, third parties are not just external speakers but students, who are now considered consumers and customers. Already, without this clause, there is a growing phenomenon of university management imposing rigorous speech codes on the student body in the form of anti-harassment policies under the guise of dignity at work and study policies. Many of us who are campaigners for free speech, such as those at the Free Speech Union, or my colleagues at the Academy of Ideas and Living Freedom, are working with students to roll back these policies that are a serious threat to academic freedom. Clause 20 would not only justify such censorious policing of students’ speech but would, in effect, necessitate it, as it would be remiss of any university not to take steps to minimise the liability risk of students offending academic staff and making them feel unsafe and complain of harassment.
Finally, I am concerned about the disproportionate effect that this will have on groups in society who hold dissenting views, expressions of which are too easily and regularly misrepresented as harassment. Surely any businesses that operate venues as part of the hospitality industry will seek to manage their liability through a risk-averse approach to any potentially contentious gatherings booking their premises. You can just imagine the conversations: “Oh God, no. Those evangelical Christians want to book a room again. That could be seen as harassing our gay staff”; “Oh, damn—that pro-Israel group wants to hold a meeting here, but lots of the catering staff are pro-Palestinian migrants. It is a bit risky”; “Drat. That bolshy Women’s Rights Network and Let Women Speak lot have arranged to meet here with all those customers wearing ‘Women = Adult Human Female’ T-shirts. That is bound to wind up our right-on, trans-ally bar staff. Just tell them we’re fully booked”.
In other words, Clause 20 could lead to overly cautious, “better safe than sorry”, informal blacklists. It could radically change and toxify the relationship between businesses and their customers. It is no longer “the customer is always right”, and you can forget about improving customer service; now customers are third-party harassment risks to staff.
We live in an era of divisive cancel culture. This misplaced assertion of the right not to be offended threatens social cohesion. We as legislators should seek to dismantle this culture and not add to it, as Clause 20 absolutely does.
Baroness Meyer (Con)
My Lords, I shall speak to my amendments, as well as Amendment 84, for the same reasons so clearly highlighted by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. Of course no one should ever face sexual harassment at work. That is why we passed the worker protection Act 2023 to place a clear duty on employers to take reasonable steps to prevent it, including from third parties. That law came into force only six months ago, so, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, quite clearly highlighted, why are we adding the so-called banter clause?
Clause 20 is not just unnecessary but a threat to free speech, a blow to small businesses, and a betrayal of the very spirit of this country. It amends the Equality Act 2010 to extend third-party harassment to non-sexual conduct. A casual comment between customers that is misunderstood or simply unpopular could trigger a legal claim, as noble Lords previously explained. This is not the same as the Conservative Government’s earlier reforms, which explicitly protected political, moral, religious or social opinions. Are we really expecting publicans, shopkeepers and café owners to police conversations on their premises? Someone joked that pubs would need “banter bouncers”. The Government laughed, but for small businesses it is not a joke. Even the Equality and Human Rights Commission warns that this is legally complex and challenging. Employers will need legal advice, staff training and new policy, and will risk get it wrong.
Clause 20 also demands that employers “take all reasonable steps” to protect their employees. This sounds minor, but it creates major uncertainty. What does “all reasonable steps” mean? To make matters worse, the Secretary of State will define reasonable steps by secondary legislation, without parliamentary scrutiny. This is not good governance. And at what cost? The Budget itself estimates an extra £3.4 billion cost for the hospitality sector alone. Dozens of pubs are already closing every week. Do we really want to make this worse?
This debate is not only legal and economic; it is also cultural and, for me, personal. I became a British citizen not because I had to but because I wanted to. I fell in love with this country for its soul, its quiet strength, its humour and its tolerance. In Britain, we did not take offence; we took the mickey. We disapproved without outrage. We rolled our eyes and moved on. We did not report people or call a lawyer. As Douglas Sutherland once said, the Englishman is never quite so natural as when he is being artificially humorous. That gentle irony—that refusal to take ourselves too seriously—is part of who we are. This clause will legislate it out of existence. This is not dignity at work; it is paranoia in public. Clause 20 will create a society where offence becomes power and litigation will replace common sense. We will become a society that silences its own people. We have seen where that leads—in regimes built on censorship and denunciation.
These amendments are crucial. Without them, the consequences will be more regulation, more red tape, more job losses and more silent voices before, once again, we will be forced to admit that we have gone too far. I support all the noble Lords who spoke before me in favour of these amendments. In particular, I reiterate that Clause 20 is unnecessary.
Lord Londesborough (CB)
My Lords, I will speak in particular to Amendments 83 to 85, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton. Clause 20, on harassment by third parties, although well-intentioned, has triggered this batch of amendments, none of which is perfect. Most seek to damage limit the Bill or bring in exemptions.
I will focus on the exemptions proposed in Amendment 85 and declare up front a relevant interest, in that I hold a significant minority stake in a rural community pub in mid-Wales. As we have already heard, the hospitality sector is low margin and struggling with a range of issues, including shortages of staff, smoking bans, competition from supermarkets, the rise of home entertainment, big tech and social media. Pubs specifically have had a horrendous time. In England and Wales alone, we have lost 13,000 pubs in the past 25 years and, as we have heard, each and every week another 10 close their doors for the final time.
Now this Bill expects the owner or the bar manager, often on low pay and inexperienced, to take on the role of a conversation arbiter or chat monitor in case a customer says something to their drinking or dining pal that is overheard and deemed offensive by an employee. To be clear, I accept that employers should step up if their customers or clients are being offensive to their staff. Yes, they have a responsibility to their staff’s welfare and to their code of conduct, but is legislating in this way the answer? It leaves so many questions, on a subjective level, of what is offensive and what is not.
That brings me to the second sector proposed for exemption by Amendment 85: sports venues. This is where Clause 20 threatens to become unworkable. This struck me only yesterday while I was in the London Stadium, with 60,000 others, watching West Ham stumble to yet another home defeat, this time against Nottingham Forest. There was a lot of anger in the crowd and much of the language could be described as vulgar or offensive. Others would call it passionate, fruity, spiky or humorous, but these views could be heard—or, importantly, overheard—by club officials, security staff, stewards, the police, bar staff, programme sellers and burger flippers, all of whom are employees of the club, the stadium, or various contractors and subcontractors. These views, in the space of 10 minutes, included the manager’s IQ being questioned vigorously and frequently; savaging of the players and their work ethic; forthright suggestions that the referee’s assistant should book multiple appointments at Specsavers; and, finally, the referee himself being repeatedly accused of practising self-love.
I am choosing my words carefully and not quoting directly in order to meet this House’s Code of Conduct, which I respect and have signed up to, but if I did not and repeated some of the profanities I heard yesterday, I would be in trouble. Here is the thing: Parliament, as an employer, would not currently be taken to a tribunal by a colleague, a doorkeeper or a Hansard employee who found my language offensive, but that could change if this Bill has its way.
The point is that most workplaces are covered by a code of conduct or employer’s handbook that sets out the markers and helps sort most of these incidents without the need for dispute litigation, employment lawyers or, indeed, tribunals. Much of this is driven by common sense and human decency, and the mutual interest of employer and employee to ensure a productive and harmonious working environment. Clause 20 threatens to undo much of that. I ask the Minister and this Government to seriously think again.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I rise to support the amendments in the names of my noble friends Lord Young of Acton and Lady Noakes to Clauses 20 and 21. Both noted, as have other noble Lords, the impact these clauses will have on small businesses already struggling under a juggernaut of burdens, particularly those introduced since last July.
I begin with my noble friend Lady Noakes’s amendments to Clause 21, which, as she noted, amends the Equality Act 2010. These amendments, Amendments 89 to 96, would require regulations to specify the steps an employer needs to take to prevent the harassment of an employee and to cover all forms of harassment so that, provided those steps are followed, the employer is protected from liability. This change is reasonable and proportionate, in that it would oblige regulations to specify the steps needed to protect employers from liability to claims. It is a matter of fairness and good law that a measure should be clear about the duties under it, rather than leaving it to litigation.
The measure also has precedents, such as health and safety regulations in which employers’ duties are set out. In the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999 the main duties are to identify risks, assess them and reduce them. The Workplace (Health, Safety and Welfare) Regulations 1992 require employers to provide adequate lighting, heating, ventilation and workspace and to keep them in a clean condition—and so on throughout the health and safety regulations of the 1990s. As if to egg the cake, we have the HSE’s guide on the steps needed to manage risk, which sets out step by step the process for controlling health and safety risk, in line with the regulations to identify hazards, assess risk and so on.
My noble friend Lady Noakes’s amendments to Clause 21 would ensure that employers know what is required in respect of preventing harassment, which matters in itself and is germane to good law. I therefore support them.
I also support Amendments 83 to 88, to Clause 20, in the names of my noble friends Lord Young of Acton and Lady Noakes. They address what is and is not required of employers in protecting their employees; clarify harassment to exclude
“the expression of an opinion on a political, moral, religious or social matter, provided the opinion is not indecent or grossly offensive”;
exclude the hospitality sector, university settings and sports venues so the obligation on the employer does not apply; exclude indirect harassment; take account of the employee’s perception of the circumstances and whether it was reasonable to have the effect; and take account of whether it was an isolated incident. These are all important amendments that have a great deal of support across the Committee.
Noble Lords have already explained how Clause 20 could undermine freedom of speech. We are not speaking of an employer’s liability for direct harassment by a third party, such as customers or clients, against an employee. That is covered by Section 40 of the Equality Act 2010. Rather, the clause being amended has the effect of making the employer liable for what third parties say when speaking among themselves, and which is then overheard by an employee. This might occur in a bar, restaurant, shop, the foyer of a cinema or theatre or on public transport. Customers in a restaurant or a bar might be discussing the latest immigration figures, the likelihood of yet more unsustainable migration into the country, the shortage of housing, schools and hospitals, ever longer waiting lists for a place or a bed, or an inability to understand English. To hold an employer liable for a private conversation among customers overheard by an employee is wrong. It would bring the law into disrepute.
Baroness Deech (CB)
I rise to support the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton. It is great to have another champion of free speech in this House. I put my name to two amendments, Amendments 84 and 88, but I would happily have supported all the amendments in this group.
May I raise this to a slightly higher level? Earlier this afternoon, we heard a great deal of justified passion and appeal to principle in relation to creative rights. This time, we are talking about free speech, which I see as creepingly under attack in recent years—in fact, under this Government.
The situation is getting very bad: whether it is the halting of a higher education freedom of speech Bill or the failure, conversely, to stop hate marches proceeding through Jewish areas on Fridays and Saturdays or, indeed, outside this House; or whether it is arresting people for tweets, bursting into their houses with police because they have made an unpleasant tweet. We do not know where we are with freedom of speech any more. All we know is that we have to be very careful, and this is highly significant.
If the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, was right in her analysis, we do not need Clause 20 at all; there is other protection for the sort of things that we are worried about. However, I will give your Lordships a couple of examples that puzzle me. I have read that the Co-op is now applying a policy of boycott, divestment and sanctions against Israel and Israeli products. Some would say that that is mere anti-Zionism; some would say that it is antisemitism.
Noble Lords will know that a yellow ribbon, which I see some Members of this House are wearing, stands for freeing the hostages. If I go into the Co-op wearing a yellow ribbon, am I offending those employees of the Co-op who are firmly anti-Zionist, anti-Zionism being a protected characteristic? If I go in there and ask for a tub of hummus and I am told that they do not have it, am I upsetting the employees or the policy of the Co-op? And what if there are Jewish employees of the Co-op who hold different views?
Noble Lords will know—I have often talked about this—that the main road from my home in Oxford to the station is completely blocked; one cannot get to the station except by walking about half a mile over cables and cones. I think it was yesterday that I picked my weary, arthritic way through this, and there was one of the builder’s employees pointing me in a different direction. I have to say that I lost my temper. I got worried afterwards that maybe I had harassed him but, frankly, the only way to stop harassment of those employees is for them to get that work done.
I mention those examples because I think the definitions will be extremely difficult. I am worried about freedom of speech, about the chilling effect that recent legislation and, indeed, social attitudes have had. Schoolchildren have recently been told that there should not be so much definition of their unhappiness as being about mental health. In relation to many things that are regarded as mental health issues, one might say, “Grow some grit”. I would say, “Grow some grit”, in relation to some things that people are worried about as expressed in Clause 20.
There is no right not to be offended, short of by hate speech or terrorism, let alone having someone else be offended on one’s behalf. Let us return to freedom of speech, uphold these amendments and get rid of Clause 20.
Lord Strathcarron (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 83, 85, 86 and 88 in my name. I am sure noble Lords will have noticed that, after the Second Reading of this Bill, media reports the next day focused disproportionately on what was reported as the absurdity of employers being held responsible for employees who are offended by third parties in situations in which the employers had no control over who said what, to whom, when, why or where. The “where” aspect is important, because this also applies to real or imaginary offence taken by employees off-site of the employer’s premises. It was rightly reported the next day as an Alice in Wonderland proposal, where the whole concept of responsibility is turned topsy-turvy. Another reported it less kindly as “bonkers”, and yet another as a new way for unscrupulous lawyers to make a killing.
One can only imagine the fresh media ridicule to which your Lordships’ House will be exposed if it allows Clause 20 to go through unamended. Of course, it is no ridicule for employers, or taxpayers where this happens in the public sector, but potentially a very expensive and time-consuming burden on them, and wide open to vexatious misuse.
Amendment 83 would the remove employers having to be responsible for their customers being overheard talking about matters of the day. If the proposers of the Bill had visited a pub, for example, they would know that a pub is a Parliament in which customers have just as much right to discuss the ways of the world as we do here in this Parliament.
Amendment 85 refers to the hospitality sector, sports venues and higher education settings. To give an example close to home of why it is needed in the hospitality sector, let us say that I invited someone to visit me here in your Lordships’ House and this person did not have English as his or her first language. Let us say, further, that my guest had stopped off at the Red Lion on the way here for refreshments, and that, after our meeting, I took him or her down to the River Restaurant for a quick meal. If this guest happened to see that one of the items on the menu was a curry, and remarked to the unprotected-characteristic employee serving the curry that no one in England knows how to make a proper curry, and if that remark was overheard by a chef with a protected characteristic, then the overhearing person could take real or vexatious offence, and the House of Lords could be taken to the tribunal, or more likely, after several months and thousands of pounds, there would be a pre-tribunal taxpayer-funded pay-off.
I am sure that noble Lords do not need reminding that such vexatious claims are a significant contributor to the 50,000 tribunal case hearings and one-year waiting-time backlog. We would indeed then be laughing stocks for allowing our own legislation to be used against us like this, or even to exist at all in the wider context.
That Amendment 85 should apply also to sports venues would be obvious if the proposers had attended any sports event, where support for a competing individual or team is necessarily enthusiastic and often boisterous. The crowd’s speech is so impossible for the venue employer to control that, if a protected-characteristic steward took offence at a remark aimed indirectly at an official, the employer would inevitably raise waivers with the organisers, who might quite reasonably think the whole idea is not worth the candle, and so unintended consequences would strike again. This is what we recently saw with the Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act, leading to long-standing local events—in one case, a 150 year-old local flower show—being cancelled because it was caught in the collateral damage of well-intentioned legislation, just like this part of the Bill that we are discussing now.
Amendment 85 also seeks to exempt higher education settings, where, surely, hearing and coping with diverse opinions is what education is supposed to be about. Amendment 86 seeks to remove any offence taken by casual overhearing if that happens just once, by applying a rule that would rely on the offender causing offence on purpose rather than by mistake, casually, or—with the recent enormous rise in employees whose first language is not English—doing so through an understandable lack of familiarity with the language, with its nuances, subtexts, sarcasms and ironies that a native speaker would understand.
Amendment 88 seems the most reasonable of all, removing the overhearing aspect of the legislation, which is the one most open to vexatious claims, and for which, surely, no employer can reasonably be held responsible in any foreseeable circumstances.
I hope that, after hearing all the arguments against Clause 20, the Government will agree that these amendments would remove the most egregious parts of it and bring an element of reality to bear on these unforeseeable and uncontrollable circumstances in which employers might find themselves.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 83, in the name of my noble friend Lord Young of Acton, and others in this group tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes. I would like to reflect on the practical implications of these amendments for companies that regularly receive visitors in the course of their business. As noble Lords may be aware, I work for Marsh, an international, American-owned insurance broker. We are fortunate to welcome clients from across the globe—individuals from many cultures with diverse values—who come to London to discuss their insurance needs. As the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, noted, at Marsh we are guided by a strong internal code of conduct known as The Greater Good. This code outlines our organisational values and individual responsibilities. It is built on three pillars: “Win with integrity”, “You are never alone” and “Speak up”. These principles are designed to ensure a safe, respectful and inclusive environment for all our employees wherever in the world we operate; it matters not whether it is London or Singapore.
However, while we can uphold these standards internally, we cannot reasonably expect all visitors to our offices to be bound by the same code, much as we might wish it. Nor can we predict or control every comment made in the course of a conversation. Is it truly fair or practical to hold a company liable for remarks made by a visitor that may touch on political, moral, religious or social matters, as we have heard, and are not indecent or grossly offensive but might none the less be perceived as offensive by an employee or another guest? Such a standard would place an impossible burden on businesses, not just in hospitality and so on. It is simply not feasible to monitor or pre-empt every interaction that takes place on our premises.
Baroness Cash (Con)
My Lords, there have been very helpful and mainly anxious speeches during this debate. I am very grateful to my colleagues but also to the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, whose speech this afternoon was probably the most enlightening and helpful. I say that because throughout her speech she described how improbable it was that anything described in the other speeches would happen. Unfortunately, we do not have the promise of the noble Baroness adjudicating on the claims that will be brought as a result of this clause.
I should declare at the outset that I spent 15 years as a libel barrister specialising in media law and freedom of expression. I am also a commissioner at the EHRC. I know only too well that the law as intended gets misconstrued. If one looks back at the EHRC’s code of practice in relation to equal pay, one sees very clearly that the code, issued under Trevor Phillips, was never intended to be deployed in litigation that has resulted in the bankrupting of Birmingham City Council or in the absolutely constraining circumstances imposed on large companies. It is just not there. Similarly, the reputation of our immigration tribunals is on the floor because they are likewise applying provisions in the Human Rights Act, which we are bound by the ECHR to apply, but they are applying them in subjective, absurd ways that I do not doubt for a minute the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, would throw out if they were in front of her.
So what are we to do? We know that there is common sense on all sides of this Chamber, but our job is to scrutinise legislation and ensure that, when it gets to a court and to a judge, it can be properly and safely applied. That is why I support some of these amendments: there must be a way, and I beseech the Minister to review this and to look at what anxieties on this side of the Committee could be closed by some of these amendments.
I have done a search of the Article 10 case law under the human rights and European legislation where there has been tension in other countries. In France, for example, employees were harassed directly because of smoking outside—only in France, of course. In Germany, it was because they were wearing uniforms while biking. In all those cases, Article 10 rights were protected because the legislation was specifically drafted to say that the harassment was directed at the employee. The original clause here is not safely drafted, which is why I am asking the Minister to look at this again. It is not clear that it is only direct discrimination or harassment of an employee that will be caught by this. That is why we have had so many speeches this afternoon worried about what loopholes are being allowed with the clause as currently drafted. To be compliant with Article 10, we need to tighten it. We need, in this Chamber, to scrutinise it and ensure that the message goes back to the Government that it needs to be tightened.
The other thing that the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, so beautifully enunciated in her speech was how it ought to be a reasonable perception of the activity that was deemed to be harassment. Again, we would hope that any sensible court would look at that and say, “Yes, absolutely”, but that test is not in the clause as currently drafted. I will read Clause 20, “Harassment by third parties”:
“In section 40 of the Equality Act 2010 (employees and applicants: harassment), after subsection (1) insert … (1A) An employer (A) must not permit a third party to harass a person (B) who is an employee of A”.
There is the first problem: we do not limit the harassment to direct harassment, and we need to do so. To ensure that it will be applied and interpreted by tribunals in the way that the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, envisages, we need to ensure that that is tightened. Clause 20 goes on:
“(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A), A permits a third party to harass B only if … the third party harasses B”—
there is still no tightening of the definition of “harass”—
“in the course of B’s employment by A, and … A failed to take all reasonable steps to prevent the third party from doing so … In this section ‘third party’ means a person other than … A, or … an employee of A”.
There is no reference at all in that clause to what test a court is to apply to the perception by the employee of the harassment. All the European cases, by which we are still bound under the ECHR, require an objective test to safeguard our freedom of expression rights under Article 10. What I have heard this afternoon is that there is no dispute between the two sides of this Committee that protecting Article 10 in the balance that happens here is the right thing to do, but that test is not in this clause, which is why these amendments are so important. We need that test and we need the direction of the harassment at a specific person, so that it cannot scoop up the other conversations or any of the other activities that are happening around them. It must be like the French case, the German case and all the other cases, which anyone is welcome to look up as I did. For that reason I support these amendments and beseech the Minister and the Government to look again at this. The way this clause is drafted is of very real concern.
Baroness Carberry of Muswell Hill (Lab)
My Lords, I did not want to interrupt the noble Baroness when she was speaking. However, I refer her to Section 26 of the Equality Act 2010, with which I am sure she is familiar, as an EHRC commissioner. That is where the relevant test is set out.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, this has been an interesting debate. It is difficult to know where to start, so I thought I would do so with a couple of parish notes. To the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I say that the young man who was on the other end of her call was required by contract to read out a script. If he had deviated from the script, he would have been dismissed. The noble Baroness was not guilty of harassment, but of a lack of empathy concerning his contract. To the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, I can report that hummus is for sale in the Co-op in Bow. Indeed, following the cyberattack, that was about all it had for sale. To the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, I say that were he taken to court in the circumstances he describes—though I think that unlikely—for being grumpy in a football ground, all he would have to do was say where he was, and the judge would let him off on mitigating circumstances.
When the noble Lord, Lord Young, was announced as a peer I was very pleased, because I thought he would add something to your Lordships’ House from which we would benefit. To a great extent, that has revealed itself today. Through a cleverly and carefully constructed straw man argument, he has set up today’s debate. That straw man has been paraded, hoisted aloft, by a series of speeches either wittingly or unwittingly misapprehending the purpose of Clause 20. Before I begin to discuss that, though, let me say that I have been worrying about the use of the word “banter”. That word causes me to worry, and I will explain why to the noble Lord, Lord Young. For as long as I can remember, it has been used as a defence: “It was only a bit of banter”. It was only a bit of banter, but what was it? It has been justifying racism, sexism and homophobia since time immemorial. I was very surprised, therefore, that a man who understands words in the way the noble Lord, Lord Young, does, should use that phrase. The alliteration may work; but I am not happy with the word “banter”.
As I understand it, the point of the Bill is not the noble Lord’s straw man of policing personal conversations; the point is to take on the problem of workplace bullying by customers and users of particular facilities, and ensure that the employers adequately defend the workers, particularly those who have to interact with the public and who may otherwise feel exposed.
I would like briefly to drag this debate into the area of the practical reality for many people, often young, who work in industries where contact with customers is unmediated. After graduating, I ran a bar for a year, and I know what it is like for people working in those environments. They are largely in service industries—the very industries that some of your noble Lordships seek to absent from the Bill. My understanding of this part of the Bill is that it aims to protect people from having to withstand unreasonable behaviour. If we were to throw out that objective in the way that some of these amendments suggest, that would be to declare that we do not care about the plight of those employees and how they are treated.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about the customer always being right. That is one of the problems. In the past, bosses have taken the side of customers against employees because they need the trade. In a way, the clause seeks to address that. There are other potential economic benefits, too. For example, many people talk a lot about recruitment problems in the service industry. One of the ways of enhancing such jobs would be for potential recruits to know that their employer has their back. Many good employers already do that; but everybody needs to know that there is an expectation across the board that they will be protected.
To echo my cry at the start of Committee, we need to see how the Government expect this to operate. Here, I join forces with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. We need to see what the draft regulations will look like and understand how the guidelines will interpret those regulations, so that your Lordships can be calmed and brought down from the current position.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
My Lords, before my noble friend speaks from the Front Bench, I wonder whether I might contribute. I apologise to the Committee that I did not leap to my feet prior—
Lord Fox (LD)
Was the noble Lord in the Chamber at the beginning of the debate?
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
I was—I was sitting over there. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for speaking after him. I am sure he is welcome to speak after me if he disagrees with anything I have to say.
Obviously, I am a barrister, as are many of the contributors this evening. I practised in the employment tribunal and in human rights, and I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The Joint Committee wrote to the Government in respect of the Bill, expressing concerns that were reflected by the Equality and Human Rights Commission: in particular, the potential for a conflict between the right to freedom of expression, guaranteed by Article 10—as we have heard from various noble Lords—and the Article 8 right to a private and family life. That balancing exercise would be difficult for many employers to carry out.
The previous iterations of measures of this type included safeguards which have been omitted from the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Young, pointed out. In the Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023 there was a measure that sought to place a duty on employers to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment of their employees, and which is now Section 40A of the Equality Act. During its passage through Parliament, that Bill included provisions which sought to introduce a duty on employers to prevent non-sexual harassment of their employees by third parties. That was Clause 1 of that Bill, as brought from the House of Commons. That provision failed. It would have required all reasonable steps to have been taken to prevent harassment of the employee, solely because they did not seek to prevent the expression of an opinion in circumstances where the conduct constituting harassment involved a conversation in which an employee was not a participant.
In short, the Government have so far failed to answer the question from the Joint Committee about their reasoning for not including a similar carve-out for overheard opinions in the new duty in Clause 20. That was echoed in the original iteration of the Equality Act 2010, passed by the previous Labour Government, under Section 40(2) to (4). That would have required an employer to be liable for third-party harassment where they had failed to take such steps as would have been reasonably practicable to prevent the harassment. However, to be liable, the employer would have had to have known that the employee had been harassed by a third party on at least two other occasions.
The Government have decided not to adopt the same three-strike policy taken in the equivalent provisions or in the earlier potential measure proposed in the 2023 Act. Instead, we have a rule-making power that is said to provide what steps are to be regarded as reasonable. To my mind, that sits uneasily with the mandatory terms set out in new subsection (1A). For those reasons, it should not be part of this legislation.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friends Lord Young of Acton and Lady Noakes very much for their expert, valuable and important introductions to and insights into this group. I also thank my noble friends Lady Meyer, Lady Lawlor, Lady Cash, Lord Strathcarron, Lord Ashcombe and Lord Murray for their practical, legal and philosophical objections to Clause 20, which, as noble Lords will perhaps not be surprised to know, I do not regard as straw-man arguments. It was also wise of my noble friends to note that these amendments have the support of UKHospitality. They also have the support of the British Beer and Pub Association.
These amendments are vital in ensuring that we do not inadvertently restrict fundamental rights of free expression in the workplace and beyond. We all recognise the importance of protecting employees from harassment. It is not about not caring about their plight, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, implied; it is about also ensuring that we are not creating a framework that stifles open and honest conversation. That is especially true in matters of political, moral, religious or social debate.
Clause 20 as it stands is, as my noble friend Lady Cash pointed out, poorly drafted and therefore risks leading to unintended consequences. In fact, I agree with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, about the speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, who made a very persuasive case that Clause 20 is superfluous in its current form.
The inclusion of speech or conversation that simply expresses an opinion on a political, moral, religious or social issue would lead to significant restrictions on individuals’ freedom to speak openly. This could lead to employees feeling that they cannot express their thoughts and ideas or, perhaps worse, would be penalised for expressing an opinion that someone else may find uncomfortable or offensive. As my noble friend pointed out, we must be mindful of the unintended consequences that could arise from an overbroad definition of harassment. Both he and the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, gave strong examples from the footballing world. If I may speak as a fellow West Ham United fan, I am very aware that being a supporter of that august club can be a very testing experience that can drive one to the occasional profanity.
It is not just in sports that these concerns arise. Think about public spaces such as pubs, about which we have been hearing. If an individual overhears a conversation that they find offensive or upsetting, where does the line lie? What happens if somebody misunderstands something that is said and it is taken to an employment tribunal as a case of harassment? In such situations, the burden placed on employers would become unreasonable. Would they be required to intervene every time someone overhears an opinion that they find discomforting or just dislike?
If I may ask a genuine question, how are people supposed to judge, to quote the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, whether a conversation is obviously fake or not? As my noble friend Lord Young and the noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, argued, are we expecting publicans to make finely calibrated judgments on ECHR Article 10 in particular? We should remember that even senior police officers, who are trained in these matters, often struggle to make such judgments. Employers will inevitably err on the side of caution and that is chilling.
I believe that we must ensure that harassment in this context remains focused on behaviours that are truly indecent or grossly offensive, not on speech that is merely uncomfortable or challenging. People must have the right to engage in conversations, to express differing opinions and to debate issues of public importance without the fear of being accused of harassment. To allow an employer to be forced or encouraged into silencing this kind of expression would be a serious violation of freedom of speech, which is a cornerstone of our democracy and society.
The amendments before us offer balance. They ensure that employers are not required to protect their employees from hearing or overhearing expressions of opinion, provided that those opinions are not indecent or grossly offensive. This is a reasonable and sensible approach. It respects individuals’ rights to express their views without creating an environment where every opinion has the potential to be deemed harassment.
Moreover, these amendments recognise the specific context in which such protections should apply. By excluding certain sectors, such as the hospitality industry, sports venues and higher education, we acknowledge the diverse nature of these environments where debate, disagreement and the expression of differing opinions are often the fabric of daily life. To apply the same strict rules in these settings as we would in an office environment or a more controlled space would be misguided. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, may well say that this is not the purpose of Clause 20. However, as my noble friends Lady Cash and Lord Murray pointed out, the drafting means that that is unlikely to be the effect.
The requirement for repeated instances of harassment before an employer must take action, as outlined in Amendment 86, aligns with the principle of proportionality. We should not expect employers to become the arbiters of every comment or opinion expressed, especially when such comments are made in good faith. The amendment rightly recognises that harassment should be defined as something that occurs repeatedly, not something that might result from a single isolated incident of disagreement or discomfort. I agree with my noble friend Lord Young of Acton that this is a solution in search of a problem or, based on his statistics, a sledgehammer in search of a nut.
When the Minister responds, can she please answer my noble friend Lady Noakes’s point on territorial extent? These issues are clearly not going away, so I urge the Government to take them very seriously. As it stands, Clause 20 is garbled and needs rewriting.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I hope I can reassure the Committee of the Government’s approach, as well as set straight some considerable misunderstandings on how the provisions will operate. I stress at the outset that the provisions in the Bill will protect employees while preserving existing human rights, such as freedom of speech, which I hope we can all agree are core British values. Also core to our identity is the belief that with rights come responsibilities.
I will first address the noble Lords, Lord Young of Acton and Lord Strathcarron, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, who oppose Clause 20. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, for meeting me to share his views. When we met, he pushed his position that our proposals are anti-banter, and he has reiterated that today. I make it clear that we are anti-harassment, not anti-banter, and this is what Clause 20 delivers.
I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that I feel that we have been subjected to a wave of synthetic rage by many on the other Benches this evening, who have given examples that simply would not be covered by the harassment provisions in Clause 20. Removing Clause 20 would not only go against the manifesto on which this Government were elected but deprive employees of protection from all types of harassment by third parties under the Equality Act 2010. This Government are committed to tackling all forms of harassment in the workplace. In order to make workplaces safe, we must require employers to create and maintain workplaces and working conditions free from harassment, including by third parties.
For example, if a woman is sexually harassed by a customer at work today, she has very few effective options by which to seek legal redress, even if her employer has made no effort whatever to address the issue. The only possible employment law action in this scenario at present is for the Equality and Human Rights Commission to exercise its unique enforcement powers against the employer. However, such powers can be used only very selectively and strategically by the commission, and would be unlikely to be used in anything other than an exceptional case.
Sexual harassment is, sadly, not the only type of harassment that is experienced in the workplace. Employees can experience racial harassment or harassment related to their disability or other protected characteristics. In the case of non-sexual harassment, not even the possibility of enforcement exists at present. As such, Clause 20 is required for employees to be able to seek legal redress where they have experienced third-party harassment, and to ensure that employers are clear about their responsibilities.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I would like some clarity. There is some confusion over what the definition of harassment is in law. If you asked whether I was for the harassment of employees and workers, I would of course reply that I am not, but we have to look at the way the law defines harassment, particularly indirect harassment and some of the issues that were raised.
Despite the noble Lord, Lord Fox, imagining that we have all been whipped up into some synthetic rage by the noble Lord, Lord Young, because we are incapable of working out for ourselves what we think about a piece of legislation, there is concern about free speech. I am confused about what the Minister is saying free speech is. She keeps saying that we cannot allow unacceptable behaviour. Is that part of the legislation? What unacceptable behaviour is she referring to? Is it detailed in the law? Which things is she talking about? It is one thing to say that a football team has rules, but have the Government come up with a new behaviour code in this Bill that society must adopt? If they have, I have not seen the details.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
There is harassment, and what we are debating now is third-party harassment. Obviously, tribunals would have to take into account the practicality of enforcing third-party harassment, and I have been trying to set out the grounds on which it would be considered either reasonable or unreasonable. That would have to be considered case by case, but nevertheless the issue is very different from an employee’s absolute right not to be harassed directly in the workplace.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
I am a bit puzzled as to how the tribunal will measure this alleged harassment, given the different interpretations that could be put on it. There are some conflicts, as we have heard today.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
I thought I had explained that in my description, and I do not really want to have to repeat it. I explained the grounds that would be considered when comparing harassment with acceptable behaviour.
Amendment 85 also seeks to significantly reduce the scope of Clause 20 by excluding the hospitality sector, sports venues and higher education. This would create a disparity and a hierarchy of protections across employers and sectors, leaving swathes of employees without equal protection. This cannot be justified, given that employers in these sectors will be required only to do what is reasonable, and this will depend on their specific circumstances.
Amendment 86 seeks to reinstate the three-strike rule that was repealed in 2013. However, as I have explained, an isolated or one-off incident is much less likely to amount to harassment than continuing acts. The recent Free Speech Union campaign against this clause stated that
“when the Equality Act was originally passed, it included a clause making employers liable for the harassment of employees by third parties, but it was repealed in 2013 because it proved to be so costly and difficult for employers to comply with. We mustn’t make the same mistake again”.
We agree that we should not make that mistake again. We cannot see why the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, would wish to impose on employers the unnecessary costs and burdens that this amendment would bring. By contrast, the Government’s approach will make it simpler for employers to understand their obligations and will ensure that victims can be confident that they are protected by law.
Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)
In relation to the last passage of the Minister’s speech, it appears to be the Government’s position that it is not accepted that carve-outs for three strikes are necessary because that would impose a burden on business. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill, and to the Equality Act, specifically state that in determining the effect of the unwanted conduct, courts and tribunals must balance competing rights on the facts of a particular case—the point that the Minister has just made. Will she not accept that the effect of the provision, as presently drafted, will be for a sensible employer to take overly defensive approaches to prevent actions being brought against them under these provisions? It is that reaction which will cause a stifling of free speech, and this Committee should be very worried about that.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I cannot see why we should carve out some of the most customer-facing sectors, where the sorts of harassment we are talking about are probably more prevalent. I cannot see the point of that. Surely every employee in this country has the same right to be protected from harassment, and that is what we are attempting to achieve. Most of the pubs and sports grounds that I frequent already have these policies, so it is a minority of pubs—obviously the sorts of pubs that the noble Lord, Lord Young, likes to go to—that do not have them. I think most people would like to frequent places where they feel that the employees are treated with respect and are protected.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, can the Minister explain why Clause 21 gives power to the Secretary of State to make provisions in relation to reasonable steps only for sexual harassment and not non-sexual harassment? I think she said something about it being an area in which there is evidence that this would be useful—I cannot remember her exact words. I cannot understand why the Government have not extended the logic of giving assistance in this area to tribunals beyond sexual harassment, especially given the broadening of the extent of non-sexual harassment by including third parties.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I can say only that it is for the reasons I have outlined previously in my speech. We want to make sure that where we broaden the protections, it is done on a very careful basis and achieves the desired effect.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
We are not talking about broadening protections; we are talking about setting out what constitutes reasonable steps in the case of sexual harassment, which is included in Clause 21, and other kinds of harassment, which, incomprehensively, are not included. I am simply asking why the Government have gone down that particular route.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, the easiest thing is for me to write to the noble Baroness to explain this. It is obviously based on previous experiences of case law and so on. I will write to the noble Baroness.
Her previous question was about the Bill’s jurisdiction over overseas employees. While I cannot necessarily speak to the example that she raised, the Bill does not broaden the jurisdiction of employment tribunals beyond their current jurisdiction over any overseas employees. The situation will remain as it stands.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Can the Minister explain what the current jurisdiction is? What is the current territorial extent for all tribunal cases?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I presume that it is where employees are based here in the UK, but if I am wrong I will write to the noble Baroness and clarify that.
In conclusion, I am grateful to all noble Lords for tabling these amendments but, for the reasons set out, the Government cannot support them. The Government are on the side of workers, not abusers. We will ensure that workers have the fair protections at work that they deserve. I therefore ask that Amendment 83 is withdrawn and that Clause 20 stands part of the Bill.
Lord Fox (LD)
I asked the Minister to set out in detail how future regulations and these clauses will work in practice. I hope she is able to take that on board between Committee and Report.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I will attempt to update your Lordships’ House on these issues at the time the noble Lord has suggested.
Baroness Deech (CB)
Can I ask the Minister about one very troubling case, which I am sure is known to everybody? Professor Kathleen Stock of the University of Sussex faced three years of undoubted bullying and harassment because she held and still holds gender-critical views. She was bullied and harassed by students and other staff, which resulted in her resigning. The university was fined by the OfS for breaches of freedom of speech but still believes, according to the vice-chancellor, that being fined was wrong and that free speech was being hindered by—presumably—Professor Stock having to resign. How would Clause 20 affect this well-known situation—Professor Stock bullied for three years because of her gender-critical views? The university, like all universities, has signs everywhere saying, “We do not tolerate abuse” et cetera, but I do not know whether that does much good.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I do not think it is appropriate to talk about an individual case, but can I make it absolutely clear here that we are committed to defending free speech and upholding academic freedom? The significant penalty showed that the Office for Students will take robust action where universities fail to do so. If you go to university, you must be prepared to have your views challenged, hear contrary opinions and be exposed to uncomfortable truths. We recently announced that we are giving the OfS stronger powers on freedom of speech. The sector needs to take academic freedom and freedom of speech seriously. We hope that the OfS report and regulatory action will incentivise providers to fully comply with their freedom of speech duties.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords on all sides of the Committee who have contributed to an excellent debate. Just on the final point made by the Minister, the Government’s commitment to academic freedom and free speech and upholding them in universities was not particularly clear at the beginning of the Government’s term. Bridget Phillipson torpedoed the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act within days of getting her feet under the desk and agreed only reluctantly to implement some of the clauses that were due to be implemented last year, on 1 August, thanks to a judicial review brought by the Free Speech Union.
I am not sure that the Minister responded to the very good question that my noble friend Lady Noakes asked about whether the liability of employers for third-party harassment would extend to their employees overseas.
I would like to respond in a bit of detail to the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry of Muswell Hill. One of the safeguards she mentioned against the overapplication of Clause 20 is that only an employee with the relevant protected characteristic could sue if they had been offended or upset—if they felt harassed—by virtue of that protected characteristic. But that is not quite accurate. You do not have to have the protected characteristic in question to sue your employer for failing to protect someone with that protected characteristic from being harassed, as established in the case of English v Thomas Sanderson Ltd, in which someone successfully sued their employer in the employment tribunal for not protecting a notional employee with the relevant protected characteristic, when she herself did not have that protected characteristic.
The noble Baroness also said she thought it very unlikely that an employee could sue their employer for failing to take all reasonable steps to protect them from overhearing remarks, jokes, expostulations et cetera made by customers or members of the public. But in the case of Sule v Shoosmiths in the employment tribunal, a woman did successfully sue her employer, Shoosmiths, for a conversation she overheard about immigration. She was a Nigerian lady and she overheard a conversation —not directed at her—which she found upsetting or offensive by virtue of her protected characteristic. If that woman had been employed in Downing Street and had overheard a conversation between the Prime Minister and his aides last week about the speech the Prime Minister was about to give about immigration, it may well be that she could have sued the Civil Service for not taking all reasonable steps to protect her from being harassed in that way—overhearing a conversation about immigration that she found offensive or upsetting.
If the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, sincerely believes that Clause 20 is not intended to be invoked to ban banter, why not accept Amendment 88, which would exempt employers from being sued for indirect third-party harassment? We have heard the argument over and over again on the other side of the Committee that the amendments that my noble friends and I and other noble Lords have suggested as ways of improving the Bill and clarifying exactly what steps employers would need to take to protect their employees from third-party harassment are completely unnecessary because the clause is not intended for things such as overheard conversations—banter—to be in scope. But it seems a little naive to imagine that the clause will be applied only in ways that the Government currently intend. What about unintended consequences? The noble Baroness said that she was not anti-banter, just anti-harassment. I am anti-unintended consequences. If you want to avoid those unintended consequences materialising, these vexatious complaints being brought in the employment tribunal or eccentric decisions being made by the tribunal, why not clarify exactly what the limits of employers’ liability are by accepting some of these amendments?
The noble Lord, Lord Fox, accused me of erecting a straw man and said that I was trying to generate synthetic rage about the risks I claim arise from this clause. Well, it is not synthetic—it is real. I know this because the Free Speech Union has taken on at least five cases in which people have been silenced because of a misunderstanding about the scope of the Equality Act due to a belief that the Equality Act, as it stands, requires employers to protect their employees from third-party harassment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, mentioned that one of the likely consequences of this clause is that gender-critical feminist groups might find it difficult to book spaces in pubs and other venues for fear that trans and non-binary employees of those venues might object that merely inviting women with those views into the pub would constitute a form of harassment. That has happened three times. We have cases of gender-critical feminist groups being ejected from pubs because the managers have misunderstood what their responsibilities and legal duties are under the Equality Act. They believe that those duties extend to protecting their trans and non-binary employees from being harassed by allowing third parties to discuss views they find offensive, deeply upsetting or disagreeable.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)
My Lords, I respectfully point out that we have now had more than two hours on this group of amendments and that we have just come up to 12 minutes for the response to this long debate. A fair person would say that this is excessive free speech. I respectfully ask the noble Lord to bring his remarks to a conclusion, so that we can make some progress.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I will bring my remarks to a conclusion. Sorry, I thought I had 15 minutes. I misunderstood.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
Oh, I do, apparently—and there have only been 12 minutes. But I will not use my allotted time of three more minutes.
I conclude by saying that the risk of over-application of this clause—by hospitality sectors, in football grounds and in our universities—is not a straw man. We see that risk materialising due to a misunderstanding— an imagining—that third-party harassment is already part of the Equality Act, when it is not. That risk will multiply when this clause goes on the statute book. It is not a straw man or confected rage. If the Government think it is a straw man—if they are absolutely convinced that none these risks will actually materialise—at the very least they should make that clear by accepting these amendments. They are losing nothing if they think they do not rule out of scope stuff that they do not want to be in scope in any case. I urge them to accept the amendments for the sake of clarity and for the sake of employers.
I will make one final point. When the noble Baroness—
Lord Cromwell (CB)
I think the noble Lord has misunderstood that his 10 to 15 minutes were for his earlier contribution, not for responding to the Minister. He has made some really good points a number of times now. Can we have a break, please?
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
Okay, I will wind up.
I will make just one final point. The Minister said that, in due course, the employment tribunal will make it clear that reasonable steps with respect to protecting employees from harassment will not be the same steps that employers are expected to take to protect their employees from third-party harassment, as opposed to employer-employer harassment. That may well be the case, but what that amounts to saying is that the jurisprudence in the employment tribunal, when it comes to the definition of harassment, will not be a particularly reliable guide for employers, when it comes to how they should define harassment when protecting their employees from third-party harassment. What she is saying, in effect, is that, if you cannot rely on the definition of what a reasonable step is in the ET hitherto, employers will be in the dark. They will have to chart these uncharted waters. Would it not be helpful to employers—and a boon to the beleaguered hospitality sector industry in particular—to make it clear, by accepting these amendments, what their liabilities are and are not?
Finally—
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
I was going to say the final words: I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Motor Vehicles (Driving Licences) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2025
(1 day, 5 hours ago)
Lords ChamberRead Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill
That the draft Regulations laid before the House on 14 March be approved.
Relevant document: 21st Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
The Minister of State, Department for Transport (Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill) (Lab)
My Lords, I would first highlight that this debate deals with both the statutory instrument and the regret amendment laid by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and I will cover both in my remarks.
These draft regulations aim to support the transition to zero-emission vehicles, to reduce the regulatory burden on businesses and to unlock economic growth on our journey to becoming a clean energy superpower. Businesses and families are choosing to make the switch to cleaner, greener vehicles that are cheaper to run and reduce noise and air pollution on our streets. The UK was the largest electric car market in Europe in 2024 and, so far this year, demand is up by over a third, according to industry figures. While demand for zero-emission vans is also increasing, this Government are determined to go further to give businesses and consumers the widest range of options, which is exactly what these regulations will do.
Zero-emission vehicles can be heavier than the equivalent petrol and diesel vehicles because of the weight of their battery or fuel. This can push them into a higher driving licence category than their petrol or diesel equivalents. Other than their weight, these vehicles are almost identical in size, design and payload to their petrol and diesel counterparts. Regulations to partially solve this problem were proposed by a previous Government and passed in 2018, allowing category B licence holders to drive alternatively fuelled vehicles weighing up to 4.25 tonnes if they fulfilled additional requirements. “Alternatively fuelled” meant vehicles powered by electricity, hydrogen and gas. These requirements include five hours of additional training from an accredited instructor, driving only for the purpose of transporting goods and no ability to tow. E-fuels and other synthetic fuels were not included in this regulation, as they are no heavier than conventional petrol or diesel. However, with the rapid advancement of zero-emission technology since 2018, the existing regulations now represent an unnecessary barrier to switching to zero-emission vehicles.
This instrument will enable holders of a standard category B licence to drive a fully electric or hydrogen-powered vehicle up to a maximum weight of 4.25 tonnes without these additional requirements. Existing category B rules on ages and passenger numbers will apply. Category B licence holders can usually also drive minibuses weighing up to 3.5 tonnes, providing they fulfil some additional requirements, including the driver being over the age of 21. These requirements will also apply to zero-emission minibuses weighing up to 4.25 tonnes. These regulations also allow zero-emission vehicles up to 4.25 tonnes to tow a trailer, in line with rules currently in place for their petrol and diesel counterparts, provided that the total combined vehicle and trailer weight does not exceed 7 tonnes. To ensure that disabled people are not excluded from the benefits that the statutory instrument allows, an eligible zero-emission vehicle may weigh up to five tonnes if the extra weight is attributable to specialist equipment for the carriage of disabled passengers. This additional weight allowance also applies to minibuses.
Lord Moylan
At end to insert “but that this House regrets that the draft Regulations do not extend, and in some circumstances restrict, competence to drive alternatively fuelled vehicles which are not zero-emission vehicles.”
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, as the Minister has explained, this is a very narrow and technical instrument, but it has some very interesting and indeed rather sinister ramifications.
If we start with the first interesting ramification, we could talk, at least briefly, about the state of the roads. There is a great deal of complaint about potholes in the road. I would go a little bit further. I suggest that there are many roads in this country now which do not merely have potholes, but where the base of the road—its underlying structure—is now seriously damaged and has not been properly maintained. It is true that this was not looked after well by the previous Government, but it has got worse under the current Government.
I was in Oxfordshire at the weekend. I drove along one road in the country that was in such an appalling condition that it was reminiscent of the sort of 19th-century travel writing one reads of enterprising journeys into Calabria and strange and unexplored parts of Europe at the time. This road was virtually about to break up completely. Our roads are falling to pieces and the Government are doing nothing about it.
Why is that relevant to this instrument? I can hear noble Lords asking that question—gasping in fact, in exasperation to try to know the answer. The relevance is that the principal reason why roads are breaking up in this country is the weight of vehicles: not the occasional juggernaut that passes down an Oxfordshire lane, but the relentless beating they take from heavier and heavier vehicles. Part of that is due to the fashion for SUVs, which I personally deprecate and cannot entirely understand, but a great deal of the rest of it is to do with the fact that electric vehicles are, as the Minister has said, notably heavier than petrol vehicles. That is what is breaking up our roads. This Government are doing nothing at all about it, and it is getting worse. They said they would be better than the last Government—they are not making those improvements.
That brings us to the instrument, which tries to make it easier for vehicles to be heavier, if I can put it that way. It removes certain restrictions that have been placed on the driving of heavier electric vehicles.
We should start from the point that the purpose of putting conditions on driving licences, which we have done for many decades, almost since they started, is to achieve road safety. That is why we have different licences matching different sorts of vehicles. The conditions that the Minister is removing today were put in place for safety reasons. The Government are making the case that they are no longer required for safety reasons, and the Official Opposition accept that. So to the extent that these restrictions are being removed, we have no objection to it on safety grounds; the Government have made that case. But they are being removed solely for electric vehicles, and it is very important to draw two conclusions from this.
First, the Government are sending, whatever the Minister says, a very powerful signal to people trying to develop synthetic and alternative fuels—the limits are not being reduced and the conditions are not being removed for those—that they do not matter. The Government have made their choice: their option is to back electric. They are not backing the alternatives. That is the first message, and it is not a good one. It was, as the noble Lord says, aired in the other place.
The second point, which was not, I think, aired in the other place, but is an important one, is that the Government are doing this because, as set out in paragraph 5.6 of the Explanatory Memorandum:
“Although alternatively fuelled vehicles produce less CO2 emissions than petrol and diesel vehicles, alternatively fuelled vehicles still produce CO2 emissions at the tailpipe. Consequently, these vehicles would not meet the Government’s objective for all new cars and vans to be zero-emission at the tailpipe by 2035”.
This is what is sinister: this is the first time that conditions have been attached to driving licences, not for the purpose of road safety, not to match skill to the type of vehicle being driven, but to achieve a government net-zero policy. In principle, it opens the door to other measures whereby driving licences are restricted so as to match government policy on net zero. Those people, many of them on lower incomes, who are dependent on internal combustion engines and will probably never be able to afford an electric vehicle as things stand, will find themselves squeezed out of the possibility of driving them as more and more restrictions are placed on their driving licence. This would be a genuinely sinister and worrying trend. The Government should be ashamed, quite frankly, of paragraph 5.6 of the Explanatory Memorandum, and they should repudiate it.
Finally, of course, a driving licence is no use whatsoever if you cannot get a driving test, another point that arises from this. It is again true that the Government inherited a large backlog of driving test bookings—people could not get through—but that has now risen to a queue of 600,000 people waiting for a driving test. The Government, although we aired this in the House recently by way of an Oral Question, are making no progress on this; things are going backwards. They are not better than their predecessor on this—they are palpably and measurably worse. I hope the Minister can address that point as well.
This instrument in itself is not objectionable—except for the signal it sends to synthetic fuel manufacturers and, most importantly, the introduction of the principle that driving licences can be manipulated to achieve other government policies. This is also an opportunity for the Government to explain why money is not being put in, on the other hand, to strengthening our roads to carry these heavy vehicles—rather, the roads are breaking up—and what they are doing to make a driving licence a reality by allowing people access to driving tests. I beg to move.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I do not have any argument with the Government over their laudable environmental and other objectives in bringing forward these regulations, but I have a question that is really to do with the physics of the matter. We know that kinetic energy is a key, or perhaps the key, determinant in the severity of and damage caused by road accidents. Kinetic energy is of course calculated as half of the mass times the square of the velocity.
Essentially, if, as I understand it, the Government are content that it is safe for a category B licence holder to drive a 4.25 tonne vehicle powered by zero-emissions means, why is it not safe for that same driver to drive another vehicle powered by any other means? In the event of a road accident or collision, the power source of the vehicle the category B driver is at the wheel of will make no difference to the brakes and tyres, and to the impact caused to the other vehicle involved in the accident.
When we are legislating on road safety, we have to take into account the realities and physics of the matter as well as other government objectives, such as decarbonisation, laudable though they may be. I would be very grateful if the Minister could answer that question.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, as the Minister points out, we have a large electric car market; as my noble friend Lord Moylan on the Front Bench points out, what we have is a market for large electric cars. I ask the Minister: why does that continue to be the case?
Earl Russell (LD)
My Lords, I will first turn to the regulations and then to the fatal amendment.
The Liberal Democrats broadly welcome these regulations, which represent a sensible step forward in facilitating our transition to zero-emission vehicles. Zero-emission vehicles, or ZEVs, such as those that are fully electric or hydrogen powered, are often heavier than our petrol or diesel equivalents. This additional weight is primarily due to the weight of the batteries. Since weight has been mentioned in this debate, I will just say that although electric vehicles are heavier than cars of the equivalent size, they are not heavier than the vans, buses, lorries or lots of other things that use our roads.
Previously, this extra weight could push these vehicles into higher driving licence categories, such as category C or C1, requiring drivers to undergo additional training, testing and, potentially, medical examinations and professional competency certificates. Regulations introduced in 2018 attempted to address this by allowing category B licence holders to drive alternatively fuelled vehicles weighing up to 4.25 tonnes but only under specific conditions: five hours of additional training, driving only to transport goods and no towing ability. These conditions, however, have proven to be an unnecessary barrier to the uptake of zero-emission vehicles, with the cost, time and training required being prohibitive for businesses.
These new regulations remove these previous conditions, allowing standard category B licence holders to drive ZEVs up to 4.25 tonnes without the additional five hours training or restriction on goods transport only. This will significantly reduce the regulatory and financial burden on businesses and individuals looking to switch to cleaner vehicles. This should be something that the Conservative Party welcomes—I understand that it is a party all about removing unnecessary regulations for business.
These regulations also allow the towing of a trailer, provided the combined weight does not exceed 7 tonnes, bringing ZEVs in line with petrol and diesel counterparts in this regard. Furthermore, important provisions are included to support drivers and passengers with disabilities, allowing ZEVs with specialist equipment to weigh up to 5 tonnes on a category B licence. This is very welcome and ensures equitable access to the benefits of these regulations. There is more to do in this space to ensure equal access in terms of the design placement of batteries, which inherently restrict disabled use and access to future autonomous vehicles by disabled people.
These Benches support the decisions to narrow the scope of this flexibility from alternatively fuelled vehicles to specifically zero-emission vehicles. While alternatively fuelled vehicles produce less CO2 than petrol or diesel, they still produce emissions. Focusing these licence flexibilities solely on ZEVs aligns with the cross-party consensus and the Government’s commitment for all new cars and vans to be zero-emission by 2035 and our legally binding net-zero obligations. It rightly supports the cleanest vehicles.
However, as we have heard, concerns have been raised about the removal of the five-hour training requirement, which was previously considered necessary, requiring questions about potential impacts on road safety. While the Department for Transport assessed the risk of removing the conditions as very low, based on current, albeit limited data—the Minister mentioned very few cases—concerns have been raised that heavier vehicles could lead to more severe damaging collisions, particularly involving lighter vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists. Indeed, this was an issue that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee raised.
Against this, we note that these modern vehicles inherently have more safety features, including systems such as collision avoidance. I ask the Minister how the department will
“closely monitor incident data as it becomes available”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/4/25; col. 375.]
I ask what specific matrix will be tracked and what thresholds could trigger “swift action” to protect the public if a concerning trend does emerge? What is the timeline for publishing the detailed safety guidance? What steps will be taken to actively disseminate it to drivers and businesses, particularly those who run electric fleet vehicles? I call on the Minister to commit to publishing a full and transparent review of all the safety data within two years and for that review to be made public.
Finally, the target for new EVs by 2035 is UK-wide. The Minister has mentioned this, but we have concerns about the fact that this does not extend to Northern Ireland. The Minister has been clear that this is something for the Northern Ireland Assembly. I wish to ensure that we have uniformity of regulations across the whole of the United Kingdom, so I encourage the Minister to continue those conversations with colleagues to make sure that we have the same regulations across our isles.
I turn to the fatal amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan.
Earl Russell (LD)
I apologise—the amendment. This seeks to broaden the scope of these regulations to include alternatively fuelled vehicles that are not zero-emission.
I question the perceived need for such a change, to be honest, and what benefits would flow were it to be passed. The Government’s policy, which we support, is rightly focused on promoting zero-emission vehicles in line with our climate targets. Diluting this focus to extend the weight uplift flexibility to vehicles that still produce CO2 emissions would undermine the clear objectives of supporting the transition to the cleanest vehicles.
Furthermore, alternative fuel vehicles are not subject to the inherent weight disadvantages as they have no need for heavier battery packs, so are not caught out by the previous regulations. They do not have the same excess weight. Gas-powered vehicles such as vans are the main type of alternative fuel vehicles which were in scope of the old regulations but not in scope of the new ones. But, as the Minister has said, the Government’s impact assessment found that as of December last year there were only 28 of these vehicles on our roads in the whole of the UK. Presumably, those drivers have already undergone all their training needs.
The Government’s impact assessment also highlighted that manufacturers do not have provisions to manufacture great numbers more of these vehicles. Therefore, the Liberal Democrats will support the government regulations, but we call for a full safety review to be completed in the next two years. If the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, calls a Division, we will not support it—we will abstain.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their consideration of these draft regulations. Having listened closely to the concerns expressed, I will respond to the points raised.
The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, started with the state of the roads and potholes. I admire his brave actions in driving around the roads of Oxfordshire at the weekend. He says the Government are doing nothing about it. That is far from true. The Government announced a £1.6 billion investment in the state of the roads and remedying potholes only in April. Incidentally, the damage to the roads is an exponential function of vehicle weight. A heavy lorry does far more damage to a road surface than an electric car, or indeed one of these vehicles at 4.25 tonnes rather than 3.5 tonnes. The noble Lord noted that he accepts the principle of these regulations on safety grounds.
The message to synthetic and alternative fuel manufacturers is not that they do not matter—what they are doing is valuable. The noble Lord knows, and he quoted paragraph 5.6, that it reduces carbon emissions, but in the end does not eliminate them.
The noble Lord is—or his party and the previous Government were—committed to decarbonising transport. Earlier this afternoon my noble friend Lord Katz answered the noble Lord’s question with the quotation:
“I believe that the struggle for decarbonised transport, clean development and clean air is as important as the struggle for clean water was in the 19th century”.
They are the words of Grant Shapps, the former Conservative Transport Secretary, and were as apposite a response to the earlier question as they are now to this debate. Decarbonisation is really important and prioritising vehicles that have zero emissions is really important for this Government.
The noble Lord also referred to driving tests, and he is right that the position that this Government inherited was dreadful—there were many, many people waiting for them. I have already answered questions in this House about reducing waiting times and recruiting more instructors, but it will take time to do that because remedying this position is not immediate. The Government’s aim is to reduce waiting times to seven weeks by summer 2026, and we will achieve that.
The noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, referred to the effects of kinetic energy. He is right that mass matters in road accidents, but the Government have looked into this quite seriously and the available data suggests that 3.5 tonne to 4.25 tonne electric vehicles are no more likely than their 3.5 tonne petrol and diesel equivalents to be involved in collisions.
Viscount Goschen (Con)
My Lords, I was not making that point at all. I was saying that if the noble Lord’s ministerial car broke down at a roundabout and he was hit from behind by a 3.5 tonne vehicle and a colleague was hit by a 4.25 tonne vehicle, the latter would involve 20% more energy transfer and therefore 20% more potential for severity. Would he accept the simple physics of the argument? I am not suggesting that one is more likely to have an accident than the other.
Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)
I certainly accept the simple physics. I am mostly not in the ministerial car; I am mostly on public transport. I accept his point, but the frequency of such collisions is so low that the Government are proposing to monitor what happens in the knowledge that, regarding that difference in weight, there were nine collisions involving these vehicles between 2020 and 2023, with six of them being slight. I accept completely the proposition of the physics, but not only is the real effect of this very small in terms of the total number of accidents but the Government are committing to monitor road accident data as it becomes available in order to know what will happen as a consequence of these changes. If something happens, then we will do something about it.
In answer to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, I certainly commit to saying what the incident thresholds will be. I will write to the noble Earl and put that in the Library.
The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, raised the question of small electric cars. I admire his keenness to travel around the roads of Eastbourne in tuk-tuks—actually, I admire his being brave enough to travel around the roads of Eastbourne in any vehicle of that sort—but I do not think anybody has produced an electric tuk-tuk. There are several vehicles available as an alternative to large electric cars, including the Citroën Ami, Fiat Topolino and BMW i3. I can vouch for that one because I have one and I use it. It is a very small car. We do not need large electric cars; small electric cars are easily purchased.
I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his support for the statutory instrument generally. I have said that I will write to him about the thresholds we will use to decide whether accidents are material or not. I will also write to him about the timetable for safety guidance. On the dissemination of safety guidance, fortunately there are some strong trade associations for small and medium-sized commercial vehicles. We would take their advice, as we always do. I am familiar with them and they have been involved in these discussions.
On the noble Earl’s last point, on the applicability of this instrument in Northern Ireland, we will of course continue to discuss this with the Northern Ireland Government because it is important. I agree that it would be unsatisfactory for there to be inconsistency, without a similar measure in Northern Ireland, but it is for them to do it.
The instrument, although technical, represents a common-sense step that supports industry to make the switch to zero emissions and to decarbonise our road transport as we make progress towards net zero. It will cut transport costs for businesses, reduce our greenhouse gas emissions and further accelerate our progress to becoming a clean energy superpower.
I hope I have reassured noble Lords that this instrument in no way disadvantages non-zero emission fuel types, so much as it levels the playing field between technologies. On that basis, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, feels able to withdraw his regret amendment. I trust that noble Lords have found this debate informative and that they will join me in supporting this legislation.
Lord Moylan (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lucas for raising the interesting point about an electric tuk-tuk for passenger use. I listened with great care to the Minister’s response. I have to admit, a few years ago, I looked at the possibility of purchasing a BMW i3. The cost at that stage was £33,000. I do not know what the Minister paid for his. I do not think, however, that my noble friend Lord Lucas is thinking about a vehicle of that sort and that cost. That is one of the principal—
Lord Lucas (Con)
For noble Lords’ information, the cost of an electric tuk-tuk in China is about £1,500.
Lord Moylan (Con)
I am very grateful. That is something the Minister should respond to. I shall not comment further on it other than to say that it is a useful thing to know. But the BMW i3 is not £1,500; it costs a great deal more, and that is beyond the scope of the majority of people.
My noble friend Lord Goschen and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, made a point about road safety. The Government have given assurances on this. Although I am happy to accept those assurances for today, they will be held to them. We will expect those changes to be monitored for their road safety effects. The Minister has said that and we will hold him to it—it is a very important consideration.
Concerning the state of the roads, much has been made by the Minister and the noble Earl, Lord Russell, about the fact that a heavy goods vehicle is heavier than a car. I know that. Everybody knows a heavy goods vehicle is heavier than a car. It has the word “heavy” in its name. The key difference is that there are 33 million cars in this country. There are 500,000 heavy goods vehicles. The damage being done to our roads is not, as I said in my opening remarks, because of the occasional passage of a heavy goods vehicle down a lane in Oxfordshire. It is done by the relentless passage of heavier and heavier cars across those roads, which is not only leading to potholes but breaking up the base and creating a huge maintenance and restoration bill for our roads that will not, in my view, be properly addressed by £1.6 billion.
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the Government were given the opportunity to reject the notion that they were going to manipulate driving licences and the conditions on driving licences to achieve objectives related not to road safety or vehicles but to net-zero policy. That would open a door to further manipulation in the future, which could well be used to disadvantage—as the price of a BMW i3 already disadvantages—people on lower incomes. The Government took no opportunity to reject that. Indeed, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, on behalf of the Liberal Democrats, endorsed it and thought it was a very good idea. That is a cloud perhaps no larger than a man’s hand, but it will come back—
Earl Russell (LD)
I think there is confusion here. This regulation is fundamentally about removing restrictions, not placing them. I think the noble Lord is confused on this point.
Lord Moylan (Con)
Do I have to read out paragraph 5.6 of the Explanatory Memorandum again? I thought not. I think it is engraved in the minds of most noble Lords that the purpose of the differential lifting of these restrictions is to achieve our net-zero policies. I should not have to read out the whole of the paragraph, because the noble Earl, Lord Russell, read it out verbatim, as if it were part of his speech. In fact, this paragraph was cut and pasted into his speech, so why should I have to remind him? I think he is the one who is likely to be more confused. This is a very dangerous door the Government have opened, and it will cost them votes when people realise what they are doing.
In the meantime, with that remark, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment to the Government’s Motion.
Employment Rights Bill
(1 day, 5 hours ago)
Lords ChamberRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
“Employer duties on harassment: impact assessment(1) The Secretary of State must carry out an assessment of the likely impact of sections 19 to 22 of this Act on employers.(2) The assessment must report on the extent to which the prevalence of third-party harassment makes the case for measures in sections 19 to 22 and—(a) include an assessment of the impact of sections 19 to 22 on free speech;(b) include an assessment of the likely costs to employers of sections 19 to 22;(c) include—(i) an assessment of which occupations might be at particular risk of third-party harassment through no fault of the employer, and(ii) proposals for mitigations that can be put in place for employers employing people in such occupations.(3) The Secretary of State must lay a report setting out the findings of the assessment before Parliament.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause requires the Secretary of State to assess the impact of the provisions of Clauses 19 to 22.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 97 stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Sharpe of Epsom. I am delighted that my noble friend Lord Jackson of Peterborough and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, have also signed this amendment.
As we look back over the debates we have had on Clauses 19, 20, 21 and 22, we quickly reach the conclusion—as the Minister said in winding up the last debate—that there is a great deal of misunderstanding about the effect of these clauses. That is because the Government’s impact assessment is simply not fit for purpose. This proposed new clause would require the Secretary of State to assess the impact of the provisions of Clauses 19 to 22.
In many ways, I am only repeating what I have said on several other occasions throughout the passage of the Bill: there has not been enough homework done on the impact of the various clauses. That is particularly true in relation to the clauses concerning the requirement for employers not to permit the harassment of their employees by third parties.
I say to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that my noble friends Lord Young of Acton and Lady Noakes have not exhibited synthetic rage but genuine concern. They have raised a number of important and serious concerns about the clauses as drafted. Yet the Minister, although I was hoping she might, failed to commit to undertaking a comprehensive and robust impact assessment. That is just not good enough.
In fact, on all three of the standard criteria used to evaluate regulatory proposals—rationale for intervention, identification of options and justification for the preferred way forward—the Regulatory Policy Committee has given a red rating to the Government. That should be deeply concerning to all of us in this Committee.
The Government are, of course, absolutely right that harassment in the workplace is unacceptable. That is a point on which there is strong consensus right across the Committee, and rightly so. Many noble Lords have spoken powerfully and persuasively on this matter during our debates, including many, very eloquently, on the Government Benches. Given that, it is all the more baffling that the Government should have taken such a lacklustre and superficial approach to the impact assessment for these specific clauses.
The assessment surely needs to provide a much more rigorous analysis of the risks. There is, for example, no mention at all of the very risks and impacts that led to the Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023 being amended during its passage through Parliament. That legislation originally included provisions around third-party harassment, which were dropped after those serious concerns were raised, particularly in relation to freedom of speech and the cost burdens on employers. Surely no justification is offered here for ignoring those previous conclusions.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment ably and comprehensively moved by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, which would, as he explained, insert a new clause. It is an eminently sensible amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, described the arguments put by this side in the previous debate as straw man arguments. He was like Don Quixote tilting at windmills, because his claim that they were straw man arguments was comprehensively eviscerated by my noble friend Lord Young of Acton. They were substantive arguments and substantive concerns, notwithstanding the noble Lord’s comments and those of noble Lords on the Government’s side.
Clause 20 could be described as a hologram or a chimaera because it does not provide very much in the way of detail about the practical ramifications and impacts of this clause on businesses, particularly smaller businesses. The amendment is very sensible. In section 10 of the cost-benefit analysis in the Employment Rights Bill: Economic Analysis that the Government published last October, one is hard pressed to see any detailed empirical evidence from reputable economists or other academics which would sustain the likely costings that the Government have prayed in aid in favour of this part of the Bill. We are told that the universal cost of the Bill to business will be a very speculative £5 billion, but the source of that figure is not very clear; in fact, it is quite opaque. I do not believe that figure. For a number of reasons, the data is suspect, which is why we need the proper impact assessment so persuasively argued for by my noble friend on the Front Bench. We have not had a proper analysis of the detail in a risk assessment of section 10 of the cost-benefit analysis.
We also have not had a proper consultation process on the Bill. We have not had the opportunity to look at the likely impacts that flow from this clause. I say at the outset that, like my noble friend Lord Young of Acton, I am a proud member of the Free Speech Union, which has made a similar case about consultation.
We also do not know anything about the opportunity cost. Not everyone is an economist, but opportunity cost is what may have happened if this Bill had not come along. I suspect that employers, including smaller employers, would have taken on more staff, had there not been the encumbrances in this clause. In other words, they will be risk averse: they will not wish to run the risk of taking people on, given the litigation and vexatious claims which may well arise from this clause.
The figure the Government have put forward for the number of employment tribunals does not stand up to scrutiny, given the pressure that this will put on the tribunals themselves, as well as the other courts that will be responsible for adjudicating on this litigation. Indeed, as my noble friend said, this will exacerbate the already very significant problem of backlogs in the employment tribunals.
I turn to the kernel of this amendment. If I take the Minister and, indeed, the noble Baroness, Lady Carberry, who supported her from the government Benches, at their word, I do not know why they would not wish to support the free speech caveat in this amendment. Although they have not properly identified what harassment is—they have not defined it—they are going after people who are committing acts of harassment. They are not seeking to stifle or curtail free speech.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. I would suggest that the so-called “free speech caveat” is Section 6 of the Human Rights Act, which requires all public authorities, including courts and tribunals, to interpret all other legislation in a way that is compatible with convention rights, including—for the purposes of the present debate, as I understand the noble Lord’s concerns—Article 10 of the convention on human rights.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I defer to the noble Baroness’s expertise on human rights legislation, but we are considering this specific, bespoke legislation. There will not necessarily be a read-across between that and—
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
Well, the noble Baroness will not be present at every employment tribunal and hear and adjudicate every case. As my noble friend Lord Young of Acton has said, there is a significant threat of inadvertent issues arising from this legislation, which, as my noble friend Lady Cash has said, is very poorly drafted. As subsection 2(a) of the proposed new clause sets out, it is important to look through the prism of free speech at Clauses 19 to 22.
It is also important to look at the likely costs to employers. This is the central point of my remarks: we do not know what those costs will be. It is certainly appropriate that Ministers be required to tell Parliament what the ramifications are in terms of cost. This is a Government who are committed to growth and to supporting businesses in all their endeavours. Therefore, it would be sensible to consider a review of how these issues impact on businesses.
On proposals for mitigations, there have been no ideas, no protocols, no concordats, and no policies put in place to give any guidance to smaller businesses—I am not necessarily referring to the smallest micro-businesses—to cope with the problems deliberately arising because this Labour Government have chosen to put these encumbrances and burdens on businesses. They are not giving any support to businesses to help cope with this. The costs will fall on the shareholders, on the businesses, and ultimately on the workforce—and it will cost jobs. For that reason, I support the amendment. It does not detract from the important commitment to protect ordinary working people, who deserve to be able to go to work without being bullied, harassed or treated unfairly or egregiously. We all agree with that, on which there is a consensus. It would not detract from that to make an amendment that would provide extra protections against people who are vexatious or malicious, or who cause difficulties in the long run, for no apparent reason. It is a sensible amendment that would protect business and would also protect the workforce.
Lord Hendy (Lab)
Can the noble Lord indicate what he thinks the value of an impact assessment is that does not weigh the benefits that ensue from the legislation but only the costs?
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I think that is a slightly odd question coming from the supporter of a Government who are not coming forward with either intangible or tangible benefits in monetisable ways. Were that in the impact assessment or the economic analysis of the Bill, I would defer to the noble Lord’s argument, but neither of them are there. Frankly, it is difficult for us to make a value judgment on the balance of obligations and responsibilities between the workforce and the employer when the data is not provided. I think the noble Lord has probably made my case. With that, I support the amendment from my noble friend on the Front Bench.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I support my noble friends Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral in proposing this impact assessment and thank my noble friend Lord Hunt for making the case so persuasively from the Front Bench. I shall simply pick up on a few points that were made in the amendment and his speech. The amendment asks for an impact assessment on free speech. Proposed new subsection (1) asks for an assessment of Sections 19 to 22 of this Act on employers. Proposed new subsection (2) says:
“The assessment must report on … the impact of sections 19 to 22 on free speech”
and include
“an assessment of the likely costs to employers”
of these sections, which must include types of occupations at risk and proposals for mitigations.
I want to comment on this amendment in the context of universities. I spoke earlier in Committee about the mitigations a university might take in its rules and in the checklist that it hands out to potential candidates for a place who want to come to that university to study and who are asked to abide by certain arrangements or rules. These rules will, if the employer and the university follow what they are required as trustees of a charity to follow, protect the costs: whatever endowment of funds the university has, it will have to follow caution. I have no doubt that undergraduates or graduate students coming in for postgraduate work will be asked to promise not to complain, or be overheard doing so, or speak ill of lecturer A, whose lectures they may not approve of, may think are no good or whatever, as happens in normal intercourse in a university.
One of the standard things you will hear as undergraduates leave the room is, “What a rotten lecture that was” or “Isn’t it interesting that such a subject didn’t touch on the kernel of the matter?” or whatever they think is important. This is the sort of education we want to impart. We want students to question and challenge. We want them to make the case against what they have heard and to think about it. To make an employer liable for a student doing what a university education should encourage—we encourage it at school too—seems to me silly. We should have an impact assessment of what will happen and what sort of steps a university will take to curtail that freedom to argue or to criticise an employee of the university. We should ask for an impact assessment. It would not be very difficult to consult universities and find out exactly how they would get around this potential liability as employers.
The same goes for mitigation and the costs which will be incurred. For example, take the costs to an institution such as a university of fighting a claim in an employment tribunal. The member of staff concerned, against whom the criticism has been made, will be on tenterhooks all the time. They may be distracted, may have to continue to give evidence to the employer, and so on, with a lot of back and forth. As for the employers, think of the staff costs, counsel charges, legal charges, administrative costs and committee costs they will incur, and the time that will be spent on that rather than on running their universities to do what they ought to do—to educate undergraduates and do research. This is the most moderate request for an impact assessment that I have heard. Noble Lords would be well advised to agree that we need an impact assessment, both on free speech and the likely costs—particularly the costs of going to a tribunal and waiting for all that period.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I, too, have my name on Amendment 97, which would introduce yet another impact assessment. I know that so many impact assessments have been proposed in relation to the Bill that it has become a bit of a cliché, but I am especially concerned that this one is taken seriously because the third-party harassment sections of the Bill are ill thought out in a way that could lead to unintended consequences.
One noble Lord a few moments ago asked why there was a desire for an impact assessment rather than thinking of the potential positives of the Bill. The response of the Government in relation to concerns about Clause 20, for example, which is to say that there is nothing to see here—no problem at all—is an insufficient way of responding to some quite detailed scrutiny that has been put forward. If there is any exaggeration of the potential problems, an impact assessment should be able to resolve that for us.
I will focus largely on Clause 20, looking first at its potential cost to employers. That is especially important given that the Minister’s counter to my remarks earlier was that Clause 20 will be good for business. The Government’s own assessment advises that the total economic impact of complying with Clause 20 will be under £10 million and will have negligible economic impact on businesses. That is irresponsible; some might go so far as to call it misinformation. For example, that assessment says that the cost of familiarisation with the Bill and its ramifications will be £30 per medium business and only £19 per small microbusiness. I am not sure where these woeful underestimates come from or what they are based on, but if noble Lords have never met an employment lawyer, I can assure them that that is an unlikely figure.
We need a serious cost-benefit analysis. Let us consider what this section of the Bill requires businesses to do. Employers must show that they have taken all reasonable steps; that sets a high threshold for preventive action, as we heard earlier. Let us think what that means. There are direct costs for the initial implementation of anti-harassment policies, including familiarisation with the new regulations and checking exactly what their legal liabilities will mean. As we have seen during this debate, it is not necessarily as clear as day what the Bill requires.
As we have been arguing, if you are a small microbusiness trying to concentrate on being a business and trying to grow bigger, having to study the Bill and work out what your liability will be could be quite time consuming, nerve-wracking and so on. They will have to seek out third-party and legal advice—no doubt, there will be lots of consultants queuing up—because, as responsible businesses, they will want to safeguard themselves from the financial risks of not complying. One of the main risks they will be trying to ensure they do not have to deal with is the possibility of employment tribunals.
In what seems like an entirely arbitrary figure, the Government predict that only 30 employment tribunals a year will come from these clauses. There is no explanation as to how the Government reached that figure, and it is certainly completely at odds with industry experts who expect that Clause 20 alone will see an increase in employment tribunals of 15%—in other words, an additional 14,750 cases a year. As we heard earlier in a different context, already in 2023-24, employment tribunal courts received 97,000 cases, up from 86,000 the year before. That is an increase of nearly 13%. More and more people are forced into employment tribunals for a variety of reasons.
This Bill threatens to create even more cases—an unknown figure because it is a new provision. The Government are saying that it will be only 30 a year, but that is just making it up. There is, at least, an attempt in this amendment to try to work it out. According to the chambers of commerce, the cost of one employment tribunal is, on average, about £8,500, and if a claimant is successful, there is no financial limit to the compensation in a harassment case. Imagine you are a business worried about what is going to happen: this clause will lead to risk-averse and overcautious behaviour, not detailed in the Bill, to try to avoid being held liable. Some of us fear that this is what this kind of over-regulatory, precautionary approach will lead to.
Businesses will not be able to be slipshod about their potential liability. Smaller SMEs and microbusinesses —often with no dedicated HR or EDI offices—will need to think about employing new staff dedicated to protecting them from claims and giving them advice. The idea of a whole new generation of HR and EDI staff roles in every business in the country is frightening enough, but, anyway, it has nothing to do with their core businesses. Let us also note that the average salary of an EDI officer in the UK is £42,084.
I want also to stress why an impact assessment must include which occupations might be at particular risk of third-party harassment claims through no fault of the employer and the impact, specifically, on free speech. These parts of the amendment are very important because we were asked earlier in a different group why there had been a focus on hospitality, sport and universities. There may be other sectors but, in a way, this is an assessment to see which sectors would be affected. It also asks for an impact assessment on free speech. As we have heard, the Government simply deny that there will be any impact in relation to free speech. I disagree, but let us scrutinise it.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, made the point that we should not worry about free speech because it is protected by the convention on human rights. She cited a number of clauses. It is true that, on paper, none of us should be worried about free speech; our free speech in this country is fully protected. And yet, daily—I stress, daily—there are more and more instances, as the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, who is not in her place, indicated earlier, in which free speech is under stress in this country. More and more people are walking on eggshells and are, in many instances, getting sacked or disciplined for speaking their minds in workplaces, so I am not convinced by “Nothing to see here, don’t worry about it, all is well”.
Earlier, the noble Baroness—
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Baroness; I will be brief. I want just to respond to her point, because she referred to what I said earlier. I am not trying to suggest that there are not challenges and there is not, on occasion, over-policing of people’s freedom of expression. Believe it or not, I probably read the same newspapers as the noble Baroness. I was trying, perhaps inadequately, to make the point to the noble Lord earlier that we have overarching legislation in the Human Rights Act which guarantees free speech and does so in a way that is legally and constitutionally stronger than any amendment noble Lords could pass to the current Employment Rights Bill. If that is not working, then we need to enforce it better. I am just suggesting that, as a matter of law, we have the protection for free speech; we just need to enforce it.
Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)
I am all for enhancing in any way the free speech duties required by the law, and I am happy to talk to the noble Baroness in a moment about how we can do that.
Earlier, the Minister said that the Government were on the side of workers and not the abusers, and she got a lot of, “Hear, hears!”. I would like to point out that the people who are worried about these clauses are not on the side of the abusers against the workers. That characterisation is not particularly helpful in a Committee in which we are trying, in good faith, to understand the implications of this set of clauses. Imagine that you are an employer and you hear these proposals; you will think, “Oh, my God, if I don’t completely over-comply, I’m going to be accused, demonised, as on the side of abusers, not on the side of my employees”.
It is therefore very important that this impact assessment is done to reassure those of us who are worried. If the Government feel that we are over-worrying, then a detailed impact assessment, which we have not had for these clauses, would help to reassure us properly, with facts and evidence, rather than assertion and soundbites.
Baroness Verma (Con)
My Lords, I have a brief point to make about the impact on minority businesses, which may need extra assistance, and to ask whether the cost has been taken into account in an impact assessment. If it has not, I highly recommend that the Minister consider the many thousands of businesses across the country which will have to comply. If there is not a fully programmed impact assessment incorporating all those businesses, she will undoubtedly find that a lot of them will come out on the wrong side of implementation.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, as a proprietor of a small business, I can say that anything with the words “all reasonable” in it is going to meet with some very careful consideration. Of course, I am going to take advice and spend a good deal of time internally looking at the consequences. For me, and I would expect for most businesses like mine, there are going to be costs. As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, employment lawyers do not come cheap, and I expect that this is going to cost a great deal more than the Government say it is.
Of course, I can also see the benefits. If I read Clauses 19 and 20 together, and apply them to the way schools are run, I think we are going to get discipline at Katharine Birbalsingh levels, because schools will have an active duty to make sure that their staff are not harassed by pupils or parents. They will be required to come up to the best standards, so I can see the Government’s ambitions in this. Amendment 97, which proposes a really accurate look at the benefits and costs of this part of the Bill, would be therefore helpful so that we all understand how to make the best of what are undoubtedly, at their heart, some very good intentions.
In case the noble Lord, Lord Fox, is reaching for his matchbox again tonight to light his straw men, here are a couple of examples from my experience. One is from visiting someone my age in hospital who was recovering from a serious operation. A couple of other people on the ward, under the influence of the shock of the operation and the drugs they were on, had reverted 50 years; the way they were treating the black nurses was quite extraordinarily horrible. The nurses were taking it on the chin and carrying on giving the best possible care. The other example is a disabled woman in a wheelchair who asked for help getting on a train at a station but was refused for reasons she thought condescending. She got a bit cross, and the station manager said, “Right, we’re not putting you on any train today”.
Those situations would both be impacted by Clause 20 in particular. How will this Bill work in practice? Looking at those two circumstances, will it be possible for the NHS, or indeed other caring organisations, to offer care where patients have become, for reasons that are not to do with their conscious selves, completely unreasonable? Is it reasonable to leave a disabled woman marooned in London just because she had a disagreement with a member of staff who got upset about it? How is this going to work? A really good understanding of that—rather than us all having to worry about what the impact of this section might be —would be a really helpful thing to find in this Bill.
Lord Leong (Lab)
My Lords, this has been a very thought-provoking debate, and I thank all noble Lords who have contributed. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe of Epsom, for tabling Amendment 97. The noble Lord is seeking to add a new clause that would require the Secretary of State to assess the impact on free speech and on employers of Clauses 19 to 22 when the Bill becomes an Act. We have already produced and published an extensive set of impact assessments. Indeed, we have produced and published no fewer than four impact assessments covering provisions in the scope of the noble Lord’s amendment.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
In order to get his speech off to a really good start, can the Minister include his defence of the red rating given to those impact assessments by the Regulatory Policy Committee, a completely independent assessment?
Lord Leong (Lab)
I thank the noble Lord for reminding me of this; we covered it last week. The RPC did not question the policy of the Bill. It just questioned the evidence—and I will go further on this Bill.
These assessments are based on the best available evidence of the potential impact on businesses, workers and the wider economy. We plan to further define this analysis in the future, working with a range of stakeholders including businesses, trade unions, academics, think tanks and the Regulatory Policy Committee to do so.
The Government are steadfast in their commitment to tackle all forms of harassment in the workplace. We know that harassment at work can have a huge impact on affected individuals, as well as broader economic impacts. The burden of holding perpetrators to account and of driving change is too great to be shouldered by employees alone. These measures send a clear signal to all employers that they must take steps to protect their employees from harassment, including from third parties, to encourage a cultural change.
We know that the vast majority of employers agree that harassment is unacceptable and are working to ensure that their employees are treated with respect. We will work in partnership with them towards this shared goal and will support them with these changes. We will publish an enactment impact assessment once the Bill receives Royal Assent, in line with the Better Regulation Framework. This will account for amendments made to primary legislation during the Bill’s passage through Parliament that would significantly change the impact of the policy on business. This impact assessment will be published alongside the enacted legislation. Additionally, we will publish further analysis, alongside carrying out further consultation with stake-holders, ahead of any secondary legislation, to meet our Better Regulation requirements.
According to our best estimates, across all our harassment measures the monetary cost to businesses will not be significant. Other than the initial one-off familiarisation cost, repeatable costs to businesses are very low. All three measures will also bring benefits to businesses in avoiding the harassment of staff.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
I hear what the Minister says, but even the economic analysis says there will be a 15% increase in individual enforcement cases in employment tribunals arising from litigation because of the Bill. The analysis says:
“The exact impact on the enforcement system is difficult to predict because the number of cases that enter the system each year fluctuates”,
and that
“final policy decisions taken at secondary legislation will alter the number of workers in scope of protections and likelihood of a worker making a claim. These decisions are still subject to consultation and further policy development and therefore cannot be assessed with confidence”.
Later it says that the
“initial analysis on the impact of the Bill on enforcement is subject to change as policy development continues”.
The Minister is asking us to wave this clause through on the basis of information that has not been presented to this House.
Lord Leong (Lab)
No, I was not saying that. What I said is that we are carrying out consultation and we will conduct further impact assessments. We are not saying that we are finished with it and that this is it. We have already assessed the impact of provisions about third-party harassment on SMEs in our impact assessment on third-party harassment. In all our impact assessments we assess the impact on SMEs, and the Bill is not expected to have a disproportionate impact on SMEs.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, “all reasonable steps” is serious stuff. You not only have to employ someone who has a breadth of experience that goes beyond yours as an SME to advise you as to what “all reasonable steps” are; you also have to work out, in conversations with your staff, how those are to be expressed in practice. I reckon it would cost me £1,000 in year one. In year two the cost does not go down much, because things change: the law clarifies and develops, and you have to go back to the expert. Internal conversations may be clear, so it may be £500. Multiply that across SMEs—we are not a huge SME—and you get a much bigger figure than the Government are talking about. I would really like to know where they are getting their figures from.
Lord Leong (Lab)
This is precisely why we need to have consultation and to talk to the stakeholders out there. The more information we have, the better it is for us to assess the impact. Let me carry on, and I will come back to various noble Lords’ questions.
The proposed amendments would not add value, given the expansive impact assessments the Government have already committed. Some 27 impact assessments have already been done.
The noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, asked for evidence. The ONS figures have been published, so I do not need to repeat them. They state that some 21.8% of the people aged 16 years and over who say they have experienced sexual harassment in person in the last 12 months experienced it at their place of work. On third-party evidence, the ONS states that some 9.2% of the people aged 16 years and over who say they have experienced non-sexual harassment in the last 12 months had been harassed by a client or a member of the public contracted through work.
Before I conclude, let me share a personal story which I still find it very difficult to talk about and share. Like the noble Lord, Lord Fox, I also worked in a pub in my student days. That time is a period that I would rather not remember, but because of the nature of the debate today, I am sharing this with noble Lords for the first time—including some of my colleagues. This is a very personal story. Every day that I worked at the pub, I was harassed. I was called “Kung Fu Fighter” and “Ching”; I was called everything under the sky. Every time they wanted to ask for a pint, all names were shouted at me. I complained to the manager then and he said, “Oh, it’s the British culture. It’s a bit of banter”. It was not a bit of banter, because until today I still find it very difficult to talk about. This is perhaps my contribution to whatever impact assessment the noble Lords want. I left the pub after, probably, two weeks because I just could not take it anymore. When I made some money, I wanted to buy the pub so that I could sack the manager, but, unfortunately, the pub was closed.
This is a very personal story, and I just want noble Lords to reflect. I am just one of millions of people affected in this way. I therefore invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Hunt of Wirral (Con)
We are all very grateful to the Minister for sharing that personal experience. I believe he can be comforted by knowing that there is a shared desire right across this House to ensure that all workplaces are safe, respectful and free from harassment. I hope that he would also expect, in the light of his personal experience—and I think several of us could probably share our personal experiences—that we must, however, act as a Parliament should act, which is that well- intentioned legislation has to be workable, proportionate and underpinned by clear evidence.
The noble Lord, Lord Hendy, made the point about the benefits, but any impact assessment will not be restricted to looking at the costs but will also look at the benefits. Any proper impact assessment should give the full picture, so that when the legislation is presented to Parliament, we can adjudicate on it. In many ways, the consultation he instanced is coming the wrong way round. The consultation should accompany the intention to legislate. Then, once the consultation is complete, we are subject to parliamentary scrutiny. Consultation is no excuse for lacking accountability to Parliament. That is, I think, where the issue divides us.
Lord Leong (Lab)
I take on board every contribution made by every noble Lord. This is a very important aspect, and we need to get it right. Rather than me reading a couple of sentences provided by my officials in the Box, I make an offer to all noble Lords that I will organise a meeting so that we can sit down and go through this in more detail.
Lord Hunt of Wirral
There is no need for me to say any more. Thank you very much. I accept that offer, and I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Kramer
“Non-disclosure agreements: harassment(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the day on which this Act is passed, make changes by regulations made by statutory instrument to ensure that an agreement to which this section applies is void, or may not be entered into, insofar as it purports to preclude the worker from making a relevant disclosure.(2) This section applies to any agreement between a worker and the worker’s employer (whether a worker’s contract or not), including—(a) any proceedings for breach of contract,(b) a non-disclosure agreement, or(c) a non-disparagement agreement.(3) Regulations made under this section must―(a) not prevent a worker from being granted confidentiality protections associated with a settlement agreement, but only if those protections are made at the worker’s request and not the employer’s;(b) replicate the protections offered to workers by section 1 of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023, with respect to non-disclosure agreements and harassment, but must apply those protections to all workers;(c) ensure a worker can access independent legal advice, including on alternative forms of confidentiality agreements;(d) ensure any confidentiality agreement can only be of a limited duration;(e) require any agreement to be in plain English;(f) not permit a confidentiality agreement to be made in a situation that would —(i) give rise to any risk of harassment to a third party in the future, or(ii) pose any danger to public interest. (4) For the purposes of this section—“harassment” means any act of harassment as defined by section 26 of the Equality Act 2010;“relevant disclosure” means any disclosure of information which, in the reasonable belief of the worker making the disclosure, shows that harassment has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed, by a fellow worker or a client of the employer.(5) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to make regulations to void any non-disclosure agreement insofar as it prevents the worker from making a disclosure about harassment (including sexual harassment), with relevant exceptions at the worker’s request.
Baroness Kramer
My Lords, I am privileged to speak first on this group of amendments, which is an opportunity I enjoy just by the luck of the numbering. I acknowledge the intense campaigning done by others in this House over many years—many of them will be speaking later in this group of amendments. I also express the apologies of the noble Lord, Lord Wills, who had intended to speak on a number of amendments that are in his name in this group. He has been called away by caring duties which he could not avoid. I am afraid that I will be taking a little more time than usual to speak, because I am attempting, as it were, to channel his comments on the amendments that sit with him as the lead name.
This group focuses on a series of amendments on speaking out. I will start with Amendment 98, which is not just in my name but in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Goudie and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who have both worked tirelessly on these issues. A similar amendment was supported widely in the Commons. It focuses on preventing the use of non-disclosure agreements, known in the UK as confidentiality agreements, to silence people subject to or speaking out on harassment as defined under the Equality Act. However, it does allow confidentiality agreements where the person speaking out wishes to protect their anonymity, and that is important.
The amendment requires that the regulations replicate the protections under Section 1 of the Higher Education (Freedom of Speech) Act 2023. In other words, it is a protection that currently exists for a limited few, and we know that it works in law. A driving force behind this amendment has been Zelda Perkins, who, with extraordinary courage in 1998, exposed Harvey Weinstein. She is the co-founder of Can’t Buy My Silence, and that organisation’s petition for action on NDAs has over 70,000 signatures.
If the Minister says we cannot consider such an amendment without a consultation process, I will remind her that there have been numerous consultations by BEIS and the EHRC; it has even been addressed by the Treasury Committee. Ireland and 27 US states already have such legislation. If she looks at the many examples of the use of NDAs to silence abused women that were cited in that Commons debate on this Bill, she will realise that the need for action is urgent.
Amendment 101 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and Amendment 101C in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, cover similar territory with some differences, and I am sure they will speak to them. Amendment 101A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, includes a clause providing for some degree of legal aid, recognising that legal costs are a major obstacle for harassment victims. I have added my name to all those amendments, but what we really want is for the Government to bring forward an effective amendment. I will say to the Government that I predict that this Bill will not leave this House without a substantive version of these various amendments in place.
Amendment 281, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, would effectively ban NDAs that cover up illegal conduct. It highlights a very real issue. People accept financial assessments with NDAs attached because their lives have been destroyed by retaliation for daring to speak out. The NDA itself basically says that, if they speak out again, they must repay the settlement with interest added. The NDA does not provide an exemption for speaking to a regulator or investigator, and nor is there any protection or exemption in statute. The only protection that tells a woman or man who speaks out that they can speak freely to a regulator despite having signed an NDA is in case law. Remember: many of the people who have spoken out are very vulnerable. They find that case law feels weak, they do not trust it and they remain silent. That is a situation that we must end.
I will move on to Amendments 125, 126 and 147 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wills. They look much more broadly at the issues of whistleblowing and seek to change some of the most egregiously inadequate features of the existing Public Interest Disclosure Act—I have added my name. The last Government initiated a review of the whistleblowing framework covering many of these issues, but it has never been published. I ask the Minister: will she publish it now?
PIDA—that is the short form—sits within employment law. It identifies certain prescribed people to whom a whistleblower can confidentially disclose information, but when a whistleblower is exposed, as often happens, PIDA uses the employment tribunal as its mechanism to protect whistleblowers. That protection is available only for whistleblowers who are also workers.
Amendment 126 seeks to expand the definition of a worker to include self-employed contractors, sub-postmasters, the judiciary, non-execs, trustees, trade union reps and job applicants. I suspect that most people in this House have been unaware of how many people are not covered by the current whistleblowing framework. This improvement can stretch the definition only so far because PIDA is an employment law, so clients, suppliers, relatives and associates—I could go on—will still not be covered, but some improvement is better than none.
When a whistleblower is covered by PIDA and becomes a victim of retaliation because of their whistleblowing, they can take a case to the employment tribunal. However, in tribunal, the whistleblower must prove to a very high standard that they received detriment because of their whistleblowing. That is why 96% of whistleblowers acknowledged by the tribunal as whistleblowers still lose their cases or are forced to settle and sign an NDA. To win, they have to produce evidence such as an email trail, which is usually wiped clean, or a manager involved in their dismissal who will testify definitively. Amendment 125 reverses that burden of proof and says, “If you are a whistleblower, it should be assumed by the tribunal that you have been fired because of your whistleblowing, unless the employer can demonstrate otherwise”.
Lastly, on the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Wills, I address Amendment 147, which requires an employer to take reasonable steps to investigate information disclosed by whistleblowers. This follows on from the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, in an earlier group. There are some brilliant companies and agencies that will leap on a piece of information and check it out seriously. Usually, however, the wagons are circled to protect a reputation and sometimes profits. Every survey of whistleblowers shows that their number one concern, even above their own well-being, is investigation.
I turn now to Amendment 130, which is in my name and attempts to deal with every one of these issues and many more by setting up an office of the whistleblower that would sit alongside PIDA. The language has been developed by legal practitioners in the field under the umbrella of WhistleblowersUK, to whom I owe much for its hard work and insight. Protect, a well-known civic society group, supports the OWB concept, which I also very much appreciate.
Such an office would provide a hub for the many spokes of regulators and informants’ agencies. It would protect and support whistleblowers, oversee whistleblowing processes and enforce compliance with standards. It could safely be used by whistleblowers to make disclosures. If whistleblowers are subject to retaliation, including dismissal or blacklisting, it could bring action. It could prevent the wrongful exercise of NDAs, make sure that disclosures are investigated and deal with complex issues such as reward schemes, which I believe some noble Lords intend to speak on.
I really do not have time to make the case for this because I am covering so much ground, but we know from the USA that offices of the whistleblower have an enviable track record of cracking down on wrongdoing: they deter crime, which is crucial, and they more than pay for themselves.
Whistleblowers tell regulators and investigators where in the haystack the needle is buried, and they provide the critical evidence. Many regulators and investigative agencies are now on board with the idea of an office of the whistleblower. I admit that it does not belong in this Bill, which is why I am limiting my comments, but it would be complementary to it.
I have heard some people say that if a whistleblower belongs to a union, they are protected when they whistleblow, and in an employment tribunal. Sadly, the protection is very limited, and it is not the union’s fault. First, a trade union rep is not a prescribed person—they can be required to disclose any information they have been given. Secondly, while a union member has access to insurance, which indemnifies against the cost of legal services in a case before the employment tribunal, the insurance company can and does refuse to pay where it believes the likelihood of a win is less than 51%.
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 101 in my name, in which I am joined, as we have heard, by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, but also by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, who, of course, was the leader of the TUC, and by the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, from the world of finance and business. Many people in this Committee are going to support some way of dealing with the misuse of non-disclosure agreements.
I make it clear that there is no suggestion here of banning NDAs generally. There is a role for NDAs—people leaving employment should not be able to take with them the secrets of the company or its client list, for example. What we are talking about is the misuse of non-disclosure agreements to silence complainants, particularly women complaining of sexual harassment and abusive conduct by employers, supervisors, the boss, fellow workers or the client of an employer. I remind the Committee that since NDAs came into existence, complainants have been coerced into signing such an agreement on bringing a complaint in the workplace. Often, it is a way of waving people out and into non-employment in that workplace.
I emphasise that the amendment would not ban all NDAs. It is not preventing the use of NDAs in such proper cases as I have mentioned. But if the complainant requests a non-disclosure agreement because that is what, let us say, she would like to have, the amendment requires that she be offered independent legal advice. I am very supportive of the suggestion made by the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, that there be some way in which that might be funded, certainly in the corporate world, by the employer. We may be able to talk through in this Committee how provision might be made for the employee to be given that kind of independent advice, separate from the lawyers for the firm.
The independent advice has to involve advising on more than just a non-disclosure agreement but also on all the other alternatives that might be available to a worker who has experienced harassment, sexual harassment, abusive conduct or bullying. There has to be full consent if the exemption is going to work. In general, what we are calling for is that a non-disclosure agreement should not be used to silence complainants. I make that simple and clear. I cannot understand why that would be resisted by a progressive Government seeking to create good workplaces.
This amendment lists persons whom a worker may be allowed to speak to. I advised Zelda Perkins, who was just mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. She had signed a non-disclosure agreement all those many years ago relating to Harvey Weinstein, because of something that had been done not to her but to her coworker. She was encouraged to sign it and she and the coworker, who had been seriously abused, were ushered out of Miramax with a payment. They were in their early 20s at the time and accepted the settlement, knowing no better. In the years that followed, they often felt deeply regretful about the way in which that happened and that they were put in the hands of lawyers chosen by the employer. They signed non-disclosure agreements which said they could not speak to their doctor or to any lawyer or therapist, and that they could not take support from any other source.
That is why my Amendment 101 mentions the kind of people one ought to be allowed to turn to and confide in. People need to be able to do that. Non-disclosures should not prevent people taking support from a family member, spiritual counsellor, community elder or the many other people I have listed.
This amendment deals with one of the problems that takes place. The reason why Zelda Perkins eventually breached her non-disclosure agreement and spoke out—with great fear, because she thought she would then be sued by Miramax—was the public interest that arose at the time. She wanted to support the many other women who had stepped forward and were being disbelieved, because she could explain that she had been subjected to that kind of pressure when she was speaking to the abuse that had been experienced by her colleague at work. She ended up fearful and took legal advice because she was worried that she would be sued for speaking out.
That is why we are asking that non-disclosure agreements should not be misused in this way to silence women. I have had the experience over the last few years of chairing inquiries in a number of different circumstances. One of the shocking things that comes to light is the frequency with which non-disclosure agreements are used for this purpose and the number of times that these agreements are used basically to usher somebody out of the business. The person with power, who is more senior in the organisation, gets away with it and there is no way of remedying it.
Non-disclosure agreements and their misuse should be addressed in the Bill. I urge the Government to do so. I hope that, at the end of all this, we will be able to come together with the Government to find an amalgamation of the number of somewhat similar amendments here to really deliver justice for women in the workplace.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I will speak to several amendments in this group that I have signed, which are all very good.
Non-disclosure agreements can be exceptionally toxic and corrosive, because they can be used to cover up wrongdoing by an employer. It is a very dangerous game. They are not simply a contractual arrangement between two willing parties; the employer’s wrongdoing could affect other employees as well, so their effect is much wider than on the employee who is party to the agreement. I very much support Amendments 98 and 101, and I hope that—as the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, says—we can find common agreement on them. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, did a very thorough skate-through of all of this, so I will mention only three of the amendments that I have signed.
I feel very strongly about this. Whistleblowers save public money and expose bad practice. They should be celebrated, yet they are treated as traitors by professions, public services and corporations. Amendment 147 would turn that around by placing a duty to investigate on those organisations. My own experience of a whistleblower was when a police officer came forward and told me about the domestic extremist database that I was on. Thousands of other people were on that database as well, including journalists, MPs—such as Caroline Lucas—and local councillors. There were all sorts of people on it, but the two things we all had in common were that none of us had committed a criminal act of any kind and that we had all said things that challenged the status quo. That was enough to get us on to that domestic extremist database.
I cannot imagine how much it cost. The police were tracking all of us and keeping details of what we were doing, such as when I spoke in Trafalgar Square or went on a cycle ride. All these things about me were kept on that database—what an absolute waste of police time and taxpayer money for pointless spying. I put everything out on social media, so they could have just followed me there. Ex-spy cop Peter Francis blew the whistle on how the special demonstration squad was spying on the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, when she and her husband were campaigning to get justice for their dead son.
Whistleblowers need reassurance that they will be taken seriously, and giving the company or organisation they work for a duty to investigate would provide that. It would also combine with the Government’s new duty of candour to help change the culture of many organisations. I know the Minister is keen to speed up the Bill’s progress, and I do not think that this side of the Chamber is helping in any way, but the current laws are outdated and inadequate, so rather than spending ages examining the whole subject, it would be good just to adopt the very modest Amendment 147.
Amendment 126 would ensure that those whistle-blowers left out by the existing framework finally receive legal protection. The last 25 years have seen a massive rise in self-employment and subcontracting. There are now many more people in workplaces who may spot wrongdoing or risks who have no legal remedy if they blow the whistle. The Post Office Horizon scandal saw hundreds of sub-postmasters wrongly accused and sometimes imprisoned for fraud and false accounting. Lots of people knew that the Horizon system was going wrong from very early on, but the sub-postmasters did not have the legal protection to blow the whistle.
This amendment also grants whistleblowers strong protection from blacklisting when applying for work. At present, only job applicants in the NHS are protected from discrimination as whistleblowers. We encourage those NHS workers to speak up because it saves lives, but we allow workers in the building industry to be blacklisted for raising health and safety concerns that would stop deaths on dangerous sites. Some of those in the building trade had to emigrate to find a job; this amendment would have helped protect them. I understand the Government saying that they need to consult first, but a lot of that legwork was carried out by the previous Government. It seems ridiculous not to publish that whistleblower framework immediately so that we can make change happen faster.
Amendment 281 seeks to make express provision for court discretion to void non-disclosure clauses in employment contracts. The growth of the use of non-disclosure agreements is a big concern. Recent allegations that gagging clauses contributed to the cover-up of decades of sexual abuse by former Harrods owner Mohamed Al Fayed have once again led to calls to ban them here in the UK. Last September, the BBC revealed that five women claimed that the billionaire Mohamed Al Fayed raped them while they were working at Harrods department store. We have already heard that, as others were, they were forced into signing an NDA to prevent their speaking out. These agreements, as I described them earlier, can be corrosive, toxic and immensely damaging to the individuals who sign them and then regret doing so.
This is a really important group. I hope the Minister can meet some of us to discuss a way forward to incorporate some of the sense of these amendments into the Bill.
Baroness Morrissey (Con)
My Lords, it is telling that so many amendments have been tabled from across the Committee for discussion. Amendments 98, 101, 101A and 101C all aim to restrict the use of non-disclosure agreements in sexual harassment cases. There has already been considerable debate in the other place on this as well, led by Louise Haigh MP. I hope and believe that the strength of feeling and the rationale behind it are encouraging the Minister to consider tabling the Government’s own amendment to the Bill. The Bill provides such a wonderful opportunity to address a practice that has gone on for far too long, as others have talked about. Of course, this is not an academic issue. It has a real cost and causes real detriment to people’s lives and, of course, to their careers.
I speak in support of all these amendments and have added my name specifically to the one tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, because it sets out clear limitations on the silence that has, to date, been able to be bought through NDAs, while enabling workers to request an NDA, since that can help them move on with their lives, but under only certain conditions, including receiving “independent legal advice”. I want to clarify my additional Amendment 101A, which seeks to strengthen this provision by requiring employers to contribute to legal fees. We know that fees put many women off seeking advice: it seems very daunting, and then they have to pay for it at seemingly unlimited cost. I note that Ireland, which has been mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has already adopted this practice of allowing NDAs for sexual harassment cases only in what are described as “excepted circumstances”. In those cases, employers are required to cover the employee’s reasonable legal costs.
I have suggested quite a specific figure, although I stress that it is the principle rather than any specific amount that is important. I note that I came up with that figure after consulting lawyers specialising in these matters. The key is that such costs would be borne only by those employers that have reason to enter into such agreements. Firms with good cultures that do not have sexual harassment cases will not need to enter into NDAs. They will have nothing to pay—another incentive to encourage companies to prevent harassment occurring in the first place.
As has been mentioned by others, those of us who have tabled our various amendments and supported the views of others will be very pleased to consolidate our suggestions into one amendment that is simple and workable, and will achieve the goal of limiting the use of NDAs so that they are not misused but used to help victims move on. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts and again urge the Government to use this opportunity to finally end a practice that has gone on far too long and been completely unchecked.
We all know about the #MeToo scandal and the causes célèbres, but until the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, talked about her experience as chair of inquiries and explained that the ones we hear about are, effectively, the tip of the iceberg, I would have said that we do not actually know much about the scale of the problem. No data is reported at present on the use of NDAs for sexual harassment and, of course, the nature of these agreements means that there are no revelations about the underlying issues. From personal experience, I have heard from women working in finance who sometimes use a third party to tell me their story because they are keen to see something done about it. I can only surmise that there must be many more in other sectors who do not come forward.
My final conclusion is: enough is enough. I urge the Government to seize the opportunity afforded by the Bill to restrict this misuse of NDAs.
Baroness Goudie (Lab)
My Lords, I support Amendments 98, 101 and 101A, and Amendment 101C, which is in my name. Also, I support my noble friends Lady O’Grady, Lady Kennedy and Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Morrissey and Lady Kramer, and the work they have done on these issues over the years. I thank Members of the other place for their support, including the meeting they called for us with Zelda Perkins last week, which was really helpful, and the organisations outside that have written to us all over a long period asking for support on this issue.
These amendments are all about harassment, which, surely, we are all against. If not, it is about time we were. Harassment includes sexual harassment and, surely, we are all very concerned about sexual harassment. It is obvious that we cannot combat sexual harassment effectively, which is what is required, if it is hidden from the light of day by being covered up by, or on behalf of, the perpetrator. We know that perpetrators get away and get jobs in other places. It is pernicious that all too often it is covered up and deliberately hidden from sight by so-called non-disclosure agreements. The title does not sound as objectionable as cover-up agreements, but that is precisely what they are. They are cover-up agreements, in intention and effect. They impose a positive obligation not to disclose what should otherwise be disclosed. They are pernicious, and bad apples in character. They perpetuate harassment. You can get away with harassment if you can secure a non-disclosure agreement by paying a bribe. Nothing could be more anti-social. Nothing represents a more toxic workplace culture or better ensures its continuation. Whistleblowers are silenced. If a disclosure is relevant, it should be disclosed—that is, a disclosure about harassment that has been committed, is being committed or is likely to be committed. They are all highly relevant exposures, which would thereby avoid harassment.
This is about ethical standards and workplace misconduct—indeed, gross misconduct. It is not about protecting confidential business information. I say that because that is important. We understand those non-disclosure agreements. This is about sexual harassment. On one hand, transparency and freedom of expression are virtues. On the other, confidentiality, privacy and the protection of personal data are virtues. There can be tensions between legitimate considerations that may tug in different directions. Balances have to be struck but—and it is a big “but”—that may not work well when one party is more powerful than the other. In the case of, for example, Harvey Weinstein, there may also be an important public interest in a disclosure. Non-disclosure agreements need to be properly regulated and not permitted to continue in the way they have and to have their chilling effects. This is especially so when the disclosure ban arises in the context of an employee and employer and/or relates to harassment, bullying or discrimination, including, importantly, sexual harassment, and intellectual property rights and competition considerations are not engaged. It is time to act to prevent the misuse and abuse of NDAs, which should not continue. It has continued for too long. I very much hope that the Minister will meet a group of us to see how we can consolidate a small amendment to the Bill that would strengthen it greatly.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
There we go. We have had the adjudication. It was a very good speech. I am very grateful to my noble friend Lady Jones of Whitchurch. She demonstrated the patience of a saint in earlier, more contentious groups, if I can put it like that. If there needs to be further evidence of her patience, I was very grateful for the significant time that she and her Bill team and other experts gave me to discuss this issue and a later issue in the Bill.
Numerical accidents aside, I have to commend the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on her impeccable opening to the debate. I think we can all agree that it was a fabulous tour de force around the issues.
In contrast to the Bill as a whole or previous groups, there is some serious room for non-partisan and cross-partisan consensus in this area. I really do believe that, for reasons that ought to be self-evident from what we have heard from Members of the Committee already.
We have heard from noble Lords—actually, it may be a total accident but I think it has been noble Baronesses so far—and we know that there is a place for a certain type of non-disclosure agreement to protect commercial confidences and client lists, et cetera. We are trying to be more balanced and more forensic than that in this group, and we know why. We want to protect those things, to have a decent employment relationship and to have commerce and so on, but not to have the abuses. I suggest that the abuses have to go broader than harassment; that is why Amendment 281 in my name is drafted in terms of illegal activity more broadly. I will say more on that in a moment.
I support the thrust, the intention and the aspiration of all the amendments in the group. At this stage I consider them all probing amendments. Realistically, I suspect that what the Committee, or everyone who has spoken so far, wants is a government amendment, informed by these discussions, that we can all get behind. That is the way to do it, obviously.
I will speak in favour of Amendment 281, or of the drafting approach that I have taken, having listened to other Members of the Committee and tried to take on board their Second Reading speeches and their considerable work, over many years in some cases. I commend Amendment 281 because it aspires to some simplicity, some versatility, some breadth and the avoidance of unintended consequences.
For example, it is broader than harassment. The approach I have taken is based on my understanding of what the common-law position was anyway. Like everyone else in the Committee and beyond, I watched the scandals around Harvey Weinstein and #MeToo, et cetera. When they began to erupt—and, goodness me, do they not keep on coming?—my analysis, my view, was that these contractual agreements were all voidable in the public interest in any event. As a matter of common-law principle, they should all have been voidable in a court and therefore unenforceable in any event. The problem with relying on just my understanding of the common law is that it does not send a signal to the wicked employers—not all of them, but the ones who are wicked—nor give confidence to victims, whistleblowers and so on.
This is one of the areas where there is some value in putting some common-law principle clearly, succinctly and non-exhaustively on the face of a statute, to give confidence and clarity so that people know that abusive non-disclosure agreements—not the ones that we think are valuable, but abusive ones—which are being used to silence and cover up revelations of illegal activity, broadly, will not be enforceable in court, whether or not you have shelled out some money in the first place. That was what I attempted to do in the drafting approach that I chose with Amendment 281.
Members of the Committee who have come armed with the actual Marshalled List, which I know is a novel thing to do, will find Amendment 281 on page 114. The approach I have taken is to say that non-disclosure agreements are voidable. They are not automatically so, but they are voidable—that is, in those circumstances, unenforceable—if they prevent disclosure of conduct that may be contrary to law.
When a court is considering whether to void such an agreement—to make it unenforceable—there are certain factors that ought to be taken into account. The severity of the allegation of proven or admitted conduct, including the veracity of those allegations, would come up in an attempt by the former employer or current employer to enforce this agreement. The second factor is whether all parties to the contract were in receipt of independent legal advice. This means that an employer trying to construct one of these agreements and to get an employee to agree to it will have to realise that if that independent legal advice is not evidenced and not provided, later, the whole thing will be an expensive waste of time, because it is likely to be voided in the public interest by a court or tribunal. Therefore, they had better do what employers often do in standard consent agreements, which is pay for independent advice and have that witnessed.
Baroness O’Grady of Upper Holloway (Lab)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and to support Amendment 101 in the names of my noble friend Lady Kennedy and the noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Morrissey. I think that many of us are speaking in support of all the amendments that are trying to achieve the same result, and it is a real tribute that the strength of support is so broad across the Committee.
I have warmly welcomed the whole Bill, including the Government’s commitment to ensuring that employers take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment. I thank the Minister for meeting with me to discuss the issue of non-disclosure agreements. My concern is that the Government’s current proposals to deal with the scandal of abusive non-disclosure agreements under whistleblowing legislation fall short of the fundamental principle, for me, that every victim/survivor should have the right to speak up and seek support.
The use of NDAs to cover up abuses of power, we all know, happens in every walk of life. This is not just about Westminster, the City of London, the media and entertainment industries, trade unions, the church or higher education. Let us not forget the all-male Presidents Club charity dinner for captains of industry at the Dorchester Hotel, and the 130 young women, paid £150 for a 10-hour shift, who were handed five-page non-disclosure agreements just moments before they went out to serve. According to a CIPD survey, one in five employers have used NDAs in cases of sexual harassment.
My worry is that the public interest test contained in whistleblowing legislation sets a very high bar for protected disclosure, and that most victims will remain silenced. What about, for example, if the perpetrator is not prominent in public, business or cultural life? Can the Minister confirm whether a disclosure by workers would meet the public interest test in those circumstances? Or what about one individual worker who is harassed and does not know whether other workers are at risk? Will that satisfy the criteria for public interest under whistleblowing law? Perhaps the Minister can also confirm whether government proposals cover only sexual harassment? Or do they also cover racism and all forms of harassment faced by those with protected characteristics under equality law? Will misconduct such as bullying on those grounds be included?
I thank the Minister for that meeting and for writing to me afterwards. I agree that there will be lessons to learn from new legislation in Ireland and elsewhere, but I cannot agree that that is a reason for holding back. If ever there was a case for going further and faster, then this is it. Women and all those suffering in silence have waited long enough.
The TUC—I should declare that I am a former general secretary—has long held a position that NDAs should not be used in any case of harassment, discrimination or victimisation. According to a report published this year, again by CIPD, nearly half of employers would support a ban on the use of NDAs, with only 18% opposing such a ban. Can’t Buy My Silence and other campaign groups enjoy huge public support. There is a broad cross-party consensus for action that unites both sides of industry.
Will the Minister reassure us today that the door is still open for the Government to strengthen the Bill along the lines proposed by my noble friend Lady Kennedy and, importantly, send a message to all those who have suffered alone and in silence, and to all those who, as a result of that silence, have been put at risk, that real change is on its way?
Lord Cromwell (CB)
My Lords, as the first boy to speak tonight, I want to say what a pleasure it is to follow such a powerful and persuasive group of speakers. I support all the amendments in this group.
I turn first to the NDA amendments. NDAs can be appropriate in sectors where intellectual property, commercial confidentiality or security issues apply. In fact, I should declare that I have recently signed one in a commercial context. These documents are typically pre-contract or part of terms of employment and signed up to by a worker at the start of their employment. Usually, they apply to everyone in a relevant area rather than being targeted at an individual.
By contrast, the NDAs these amendments address are very different; they generally arise during employment and act retrospectively—in other words, when something happens that should not have done.
I was always taught that you cannot contract out of the law: that an agreement or contract that enables or conceals something illegal is potentially itself illegal, and at least void and unenforceable. Under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, harassment is a crime. Therefore, it seems to me that an NDA in respect of —as Amendment 101 points out—harassment, sexual misconduct, retaliation and discrimination or any other crime comes very close to trying to contract out of the law.
I would broaden the definition, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, has done in her amendment, to void any NDAs that cover any form of illegality. Indeed, a wrongdoer requesting an NDA in such circumstances feels tantamount, to me, to an admission of guilt. NDAs being put forward by the powerful to protect themselves from publicity around a wrongdoing is, at the very best, contrary to the HR policies of any decent employer.
While these amendments seek to prevent the misuse of NDAs, they also provide—as others have spoken about—for workers themselves requesting an NDA. Consequently, NDAs do have a place with proper advice to both parties: what Amendment 101 calls “fully-informed consent”. In short, voiding NDAs that amount to an abuse of power while recognising that a worker may themselves seek an NDA feels like the right balance.
Finally on NDAs, to date there has been a superabundance of consultations and inquiries— as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, pointed out— into the misuse of NDAs from a very wide range of organisations. Now, and I hope the Minister will agree, we need action—no more discussions and consultations. We know what the problem is; we just need to sort it out. I therefore ask the Minister to confirm that the Government will either present or support a suitably consolidated amendment on Report, as others have requested.
I also support the amendments on whistleblowing. Amendment 125 would close what amounts to a loophole. On Amendment 126, something that has bedevilled whistleblowing for a very long time is the overly tight definition of who can be a whistleblower. The amendment is therefore a welcome step in expanding that category, though it does not go as far as it needs to, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has shared with us tonight.
Amendment 147 concerns the crucial point of a duty to investigate. Many companies—particularly larger ones—have on paper, somewhere in their files, a well-drafted policy intended to support whistleblowers. However, many people who become whistleblowers typically do not see themselves as such initially. Often, they are simply trying to point out where something is wrong and needs addressing. It is what happens next that turns them into a whistleblower.
The corporate reaction to highlighting problems or concerns is often viscerally and personally hostile. Such people are seen as troublemakers, snitches or even traitors. They are often, almost from the outset, isolated, stigmatised and persecuted. To deal with that reaction, there is a need, as Amendment 147— another great amendment—sets out, for an automatic duty to investigate properly, which means having well-delineated and well-understood processes recognising and incorporating whistleblowing that are actually followed in practice with action, and to pick up issues and deal with them constructively and, if possible, before they escalate into a whistleblowing incident.
On Amendment 130, an office of the whistleblower would have both a systemic role in improving and monitoring whistleblower treatment, standards and processes, and a much-needed personal role in supporting whistleblowers as individuals, as again the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, so eloquently laid out.
I will touch quickly on two related points. First, investors have a role here, although they often get forgotten in these discussions. They have a clear interest in knowing what is going on inside organisations they are entrusting with their money. I know from talking to them that they support better engagement and using their considerable leverage to get matters improved. Secondly, in the UK we do not compensate or reward whistleblowers. Being a whistleblower is expensive, sometimes ruinously so. Legal bills, loss of income and being made completely unemployable often follow. Yet the UK attitude to date has been that doing the right thing should not be rewarded—as if it was somehow vulgar—or even the personal losses incurred recouped. That correlates with the lower reporting of problems in the UK compared with the US and other jurisdictions. This has changed a little recently, and both the current director of the Serious Fraud Office and his predecessor have spoken in public in favour of paying whistleblowers. The FCA has stated that it is not in principle against this—a very British statement—and HMRC and the CMA already give modest payments for information on, for example, tax fraud.
The UK needs to catch up. I hope that the role of investors and whistleblower compensation are things that we can come back to, but for now I support all the amendments in this group and I sincerely hope that the Minister will do the same.
Baroness Whitaker (Lab)
My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. This group of amendments, in particular those dealing with non-disclosure agreements, deals with issues that are of cardinal importance in making workplaces safe for in particular but not only women. I support them and will speak briefly to Amendment 101 and others.
I cannot add to the comprehensive and telling introductions by my noble friends Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady O’Grady, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and indeed all the others, but I will just remind the Committee of the fact that my experience of employment tribunals confirms the need for these amendments to the Bill. It is not only the high-profile cases that we hear about which are representative of the problem. I got to know of very many instances of women in low-paid, insecure work, often from minority-ethnic backgrounds or even disabled, who could not afford legal advice, which was addressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey.
When this issue was raised at Second Reading, my noble friend the Minister answered very positively, but I share the opinion that more must be done and I hope she will do it. If we can make our universities safer by banning NDAs in cases of sexual harassment, then the least we can do is to mirror those safeguards for employment.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, I very much agree with the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. That a Lucas can agree with a Cromwell demonstrates the healing power of time—it has taken only 400 years.
I support the amendments in this group, particularly Amendment 101. I very much like the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, because it would draw in what happened to my friend who went through the NDA process. I like Amendment 147 because, as the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said, this should all be about producing better behaviour. You want an incidence of bad behaviour to lead to better behaviour, not to disguise and cover-up. That ought to be the fundamental drive of the process.
To add a couple of sidelights, I am told it is very much current employment practice to ask, when taking a reference from a previous employer, whether an NDA has been signed. If the answer is yes, you take that employment no further—so NDAs can be really damaging things to sign. It is therefore important that someone signing one has achieved the fully informed consent that the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, referred to.
Another aspect of obscurity is in tribunal awards. I note, for instance, that tribunal awards that really criticise what has gone on in a school remain private. They never get sent to Ofsted. We ought to be using that tribunal process and what it has discovered to produce change. Where these things cannot be made public, as is often the case, they ought none the less to get into the system in a way which encourages better behaviour in future.
Lord Fox (LD)
My Lords, this has been an important debate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, said—I apologise if I have mispronounced her name—most if not all speakers have worked on these two important and connected issues for years. That has been reflected in the quality of the speeches we have heard. It also reflects the fact that progress has not been made. We need to make progress here.
The traditional approach from Ministers in situations such as this is to say, “These are important issues and we agree something needs to be done”, and then either “We need more consultation”, as my noble friend pointed out, or “This is not the right vehicle for these issues”. Those are the two excuses that will be given. The point on consultation has been well made by my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell. As for whether this is an appropriate vehicle, just look at this Bill. It is well over 300 pages and covers almost every aspect of employment. To say there is no room in this Bill—I am pre-empting what may or may not be said—would be wrong. There is more than enough space in this Bill to cover these issues.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, said, this was debated in the Commons and my honourable friend Layla Moran also had an amendment on this issue, but the Bill came here without it. The safe way of making sure that this can survive contact with a very large majority at the other end is for the Minister to take this on and put it in the Bill on the Government’s behalf. We have heard a lot of excellent speeches from the Minister’s own Benches, as well as across the Floor. Clearly, we can all agree on both these issues. The Minister should stand up and say “We will take this on, work with all interested parties and produce two amendments for both of these issues” to address what has clearly been going on for too long without being resolved in legislation.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, I agree that this has been an extremely interesting debate. I thank all noble Baronesses—they are mostly Baronesses, with some noble Lords—for their contributions. In particular, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, deserves singling out for her very thought-provoking introduction to this group.
As my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral pointed out in the previous group, every individual should feel safe and supported in their working environment. We recognise that NDAs have deviated from their original purpose, which was to protect trade secrets and intellectual property, as the noble Baronesses, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and Lady Goudie, pointed out. They have been abused in some circumstances, particularly where they are used to silence the victims of misconduct, which includes sexual harassment.
However, we must also acknowledge there are some cases where NDAs may serve a legitimate purpose. Some individuals may wish to resolve disputes privately, without the need for public disclosure. It is important, therefore, that we do not take a blanket approach but instead consider the context in which NDAs are being used. Many of the amendments acknowledge those simple facts. Having said that, we also need to consider the wider impact that NDAs might have—for example, in cases of medical malpractice. How can society and the medical profession learn from mistakes that are not made public?
It is clear that further scrutiny of NDAs is essential. The potential for abuse cannot be ignored, and we must ensure that any agreement entered into is fully informed and entirely voluntary. I will briefly speak as a non-lawyer, because I was particularly taken by Amendment 281, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti. Like the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, I was rather shocked that such an NDA might exist even under the current regime. How can one sign a legally binding document that prevents the disclosure of a breach of the law? With apologies to my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, I say that only the legal profession could manage the perverse logic to invent such a thing.
As we have seen, particularly in the NHS, whistle-blowers are often the individuals who bravely speak out against wrongdoing, misconduct or unethical practices that might otherwise go unnoticed. Their courage in raising concerns is critical to maintaining trust and ensuring that the organisation remains committed to the highest ethical standards.
Both noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb, referred to the NHS. I looked into this earlier, and in one high-profile case, the NHS spent over £4 million on legal action against a single whistleblower, including a £3.2 million compensation settlement. This sparked criticism from Professor Phil Banfield, the chairman of the British Medical Association, who argued that whistleblowing is often not welcomed by NHS management. He emphasised that NHS trusts and senior managers are more focused on protecting their reputations than addressing the concerns of whistleblowers or prioritising patient safety. That is clearly a very unacceptable state of affairs, and that example alone suggests that the Government should take these amendments extremely seriously.
I am sure that the Minister is about to stand up and offer to have further discussions on this subject. We will pre-empt her and volunteer to take part in those discussions. There is clearly much more work to be done in this area. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s remarks.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business and Trade and Department for Science, Information and Technology (Baroness Jones of Whitchurch) (Lab)
My Lords, I genuinely thank all noble Lords—they have mainly been noble Baronesses—who have taken part in this excellent debate, in which we have addressed some important, salient and highly concerning issues about the misuse of non-disclosure agreements. We have heard some very moving and completely unacceptable examples that have no place in the modern workplace.
I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friends Lady Kennedy of The Shaws and Lady Goudie, for their Amendments 98, 101 and 101C, which seek to restrict the use of non-disclosure agreements that prevent workers disclosing certain misconduct. My noble friend Lady Kennedy’s amendment looks to apply this to a broader category of misconduct, including harassment, retaliation and discrimination. I also acknowledge that the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and my noble friend Lady Kennedy make it clear that workers should still be able to request confidentiality protections in agreements between a worker and employer, if they so choose. A number of noble Lords have reiterated that that is an important principle.
I also thank my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for her Amendment 281, which makes express provision for a court to void an NDA in the public interest if it seeks to prevent the disclosure of illegal conduct by the employer. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, that my noble friend made a very compelling case on that issue.
I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morrissey, for Amendment 101A and her contribution today. Her amendment would void any provision in an NDA that prevents a worker making a disclosure about sexual harassment. However, it would allow NDAs in settlement agreements to stand where the victim of sexual harassment requests them and where they have received independent legal advice. I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, for his comments in support of that amendment.
Today’s debate on NDAs demonstrates the best elements of your Lordships’ House. Points have been well made by all noble Lords, and we have listened carefully to their arguments. I was grateful to have the opportunity to meet with a number of noble Lords in recent weeks to reaffirm the Government’s position on the misuse of NDAs and to understand the intention behind these amendments. Let me be clear: NDAs should never be used to silence victims of sexual harassment and other forms of misconduct in the workplace.
My noble friend Lady O’Grady asked whether the proposals extend beyond sexual harassment. The whistleblowing measures in the Bill cover only sexual harassment. However, the whistleblowing framework already covers disclosures about criminal offences, breaches of legal obligations and endangerment of health and safety. In many cases, harassment and discrimination in the workplace will fall within those categories.
While the Government agree that NDAs should not be misused by employers to conceal misconduct in the workplace, any restrictions on their use must be carefully considered to avoid unintended consequences. For example, confidentiality can allow employers and workers to resolve a dispute and move on without publicity and expensive legal proceedings. It is vital that we take the time to consider any impacts on a worker’s ability to choose the right outcome for themselves, including the option of an NDA.
Lord Lucas (Con)
My Lords, did I catch the sense that the Government are looking to see what changes they can make now—for instance, picking up on the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, made about the virtue of making it clear that you cannot enforce hiding criminal acts through a non-disclosure agreement? I absolutely agree that this would be something that would work well. The importance of people taking truly independent advice seemed to me to be another example. If indeed that is the case, could she apply the same logic to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron?
Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)
May I just add to that? My concern is that my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti is right that, in law, one should not use contractual agreements to avoid criminal processes. However, you do not have criminal processes unless you have a complainant, and often women do not want to go through that process. They would rather have a settlement, but they want to be in control—it is about giving power to the person who is at the receiving end of abusive conduct. That is why we are asking that these amendments be considered, so that, in the light of the Government’s great commitment to the protection of women and girls, women and girls in the workplace have the opportunity of saying, “I would like an agreement, but I want it on my terms” and may choose anonymity so that it does not remain the case, as happens now, that women then carry it forward—they are the ones who bear the burden of having to go public with a complaint. Often, it affects their employment possibilities in the future.
This is about women being in the driving seat when there is a complaint of bad behaviour in the workplace. That is why just having a bland thing saying, “This is criminal conduct, if somebody squeezes a woman’s breast in the workplace or keeps patting their behind and so forth” is not good enough. Women should be allowed to say, “I do not want this to continue. I want to remain in my job. I want protection for my employment, and I want it to be dealt with by way of an agreement where I am in the driving seat”.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, the answer to both noble Lords—and I think I said this during my response—is that the amendments are all raising really important issues. There is an issue about the breadth of the issues and the extent to which we need to legislate or perhaps amplify things that are already the law but are not understood to be the law. We have more work to do on this, but we are working at pace on it. We still have time before the Bill passes through your Lordship’s House, so I hope we can make some progress during that time.
Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)
I am sorry to intervene on the noble Baroness once more. Does that mean she intends to talk to interested Peers before Report?
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
I have already had one meeting and, as noble Lords will know, I seem to be in perpetual meeting mode. I certainly am very happy to carry on having those discussions.
Lord Cromwell (CB)
I would love to join such a meeting. I lost count of the number of times the Minister said “consider”. I hope we are going to do more than consider and are going to act. In addition, her long list of things that are already available just highlights that there is a whole piece of work to be done here about making people aware of what their rights are, what they can access and what is illegal. That, law or no law, is part of the process.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister both for the meeting that many of us had before Committee and for her response today. I hope I am not being overoptimistic, but I am reading some positivity in her comments that progress could take place before Report.